From:      levy at tcf.org
Subject: Articles that may interest you
Date:      November 17, 2008

 First an interview for Atlantic Magazine, then an e-mail we got from Daniel Levy:

The Interview - Daniel Levy On Obama, Netanyahu and the Settlements. http://jeffreygoldberg.theatlantic.com/a…

The e-mail based on an article in Haaretz: /www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1037283.html
As per Jeffrey Goldberg of Atlantic Magazine - November 17, 2008 - Daniel Levy, the director of the Middle East Initiative at the New America Foundation (which is run by a blogger, it should be noted) and the director of the Prospects for Peace initiative at the Century Foundation, is one of the smartest analysts of the Middle East conflict in Washington, or anywhere else. He often veers too left for my taste (on only one occasion, I believe, I veered too left for his taste), but he’s a rigorous thinker and is steeped in the painful and complicated details of the ongoing crisis. Levy, who keeps his own blog, of course, has been a player in negotiations through the 1990s, and brings real-world experience — and real Israeli experience — to the conversation. As we enter the Obama era, it seemed worthwhile to send Levy some questions:

Jeffrey Goldberg:  Are you a Zionist?

Daniel Levy: The answer is a yes, albeit a more complex yes than I’d like it to be.  I would describe myself as a Zionist on at least three levels.  First, and at the most practical level, having made aliyah to Israel from the U.K., taken up citizenship, and made my life there, my Zionism meets the more classical and exclusionary definitions.  Second, I do consider the Jews to be a people, and support that people’s right to self-determination in a nation-state, Israel.  Finally, and in many ways derived from both of the above, I consider Israel to be central to my own Jewishness and my identity–more than a religious affiliation, it’s a national and cultural affiliation to modern Israel, the language, to Tel Aviv, etc.

Where it gets complex is this–sixty years after the establishment of the state, and alongside all its accomplishments, the onus is now on Israel and its founding ideology, Zionism, to demonstrate in practice that it can be non-expansionist in territorial terms toward its neighbors, and that it can confer genuine equality on the non-Jewish citizens of the state.  Most troubling of course is that for more than two-thirds of its existence, Israel has imposed a hostile occupation on another people, the Palestinians of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, and to be blunt, that occupation will have to end for Israel to survive.  To the extent to which a Zionist narrative has been used to drive forward and justify the post-’67 settlement enterprise (and the discrimination within Israel), it is a Zionism that actually works against the interests of Israel, and not, of course, the Zionism that I am signing up for.

JG: You write about the occupation in a way that suggests you believe it was Israel’s fault from the outset.  Whose fault do you believe it is?  Put another way, do you think the Khartoum declaration of late 1967–the so-called “three noes” — set the stage for the tragedy that followed, or is it not relevant?

DL: The Khartoum noes represent a more complex issue than is often assumed.  The setting is, of course, after the ‘67 war, with Israel in control of vast swaths of Egyptian and Syrian territory, as well as the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.  Israel expresses a readiness to talk peace and understandably interprets the three noes of Khartoum as, well, being a negative answer.  But historians suggest it wasn’t that simple.  See this long quote below from pages 258-259 of Avi Shlaim’s book The Iron Wall:

“Israel’s leaders watched with keen anticipation to see what conclusions the Arab leaders would draw from their military defeat.  The conference ended with the adoption of the famous three noes of Khartoum: no recognition, no negotiation, and no peace with Israel.  On the face of it these declarations showed no sign of readiness for compromise, and this is how Israel interpreted them.  In fact, the conference was a victory for the Arab moderates who argued for trying to obtain the withdrawal of Israeli forces by political rather than military means.  Arab spokesmen interpreted the Khartoum declarations to mean no formal peace treaty, but not a rejection of a state of peace; no direct negotiations, but not a refusal to talk through third parties; and no de jure recognition of Israel, but acceptance of its existence as a state.  President Nasser and King Hussein set the tone at the summit and made it clear subsequently that they were prepared to go much further than ever before toward a settlement with Israel.  At Khartoum, Nasser and Hussein reached a genuine understanding and formed a united front against the hard-liners…The Khartoum summit thus marked a real turning point in Nasser’s attitude to Israel.  At Khartoum, Nasser advised, and indeed urged, King Hussein to explore the possibility of a peaceful settlement with Israel.  This was, of course, not known in Israel at the time.  As far as Israel was concerned, the Khartoum declarations closed every door and every window that might lead to a peace settlement.  On October 17 the cabinet took a decision that amounted to an official cancellation of the decision of 19 June.”

The famous three noes are explained as being an opening position and that Jordanian King Hussein actually had something of a mandate from Nasser’s Egypt to begin exploratory talks with Israel.  We know those took place.  We also now know that Egypt itself was putting out peace feelers prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  In the end, of course, that Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was reached, but only after another needless war–something that might unfortunately be repeated with Syria now.

***

But here’s the bigger picture: the UN in 1947 in UNGAR 181 calls for a division of mandatory Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state according to a territorial ratio of approximately 55 percent to 45 percent.  After the War of Independence, Israel is in control of not 55, but 78 percent of the land, and builds its state in that area.

After the ‘67 war, Israel controls 100 percent.  I would argue that Israel’s big achievement today is that we have reached a situation where the Arab world is saying yes to the 1949-67 division of 78:22–not the 1947 plan, but also not one centimeter more than the ‘67 lines.

Some may argue that if Israel already got a yes to 78 percent, we can surely get it to 80 percent, or 85 percent, or even more–I think that is neither realistic nor desirable, and in attempting to achieve it, we are liable to commit national suicide.

So my bottom line is that Israel needs to take yes for an answer, which means ending the occupation. And let’s face it, the fact that the occupation is so entrenched, especially the civilian settlements and their supportive infrastructure–none of that can be considered a sensible or legitimate response even to the traditional interpretation of the Khartoum noes.  Does it justify Palestinian violence?  No.  Is the post-’67 settlement enterprise a huge mistake for the Zionist project and an albatross around the neck of Israel?  Absolutely yes.

We can argue about the history, but the imperative today is to seize the opportunity to entrench the ‘67 borders, a two-state reality, and to end the occupation (with agreed, minor, and mutual land swaps involving the West Bank and East Jerusalem, but respecting the 78:22 principle).

***

JG: Man, you know nothing turns me on more than long quotations from Avi Shlaim.  There’s an unbiased observer for you.  Anyway, next question: Who’s to blame today?  Or put another way, why is the process so locked-down right now: Israeli political paralysis, Palestinian religious extremism, the continued presence of settlements in the West Bank, American disinterest, all of the above?

DL: In answer to your latest delightful question, I’m not too keen on playing the blame game.  I could agree to all of the reasons you gave and add lots more.  But I think we need to get beyond who is to blame and to think constructively and creatively about how to get out of this mess.  The situation is not good.  Neither Israelis nor Palestinians benefit, and while scoring points can always be fun, it doesn’t get us very far.  In fact, I would even say that blame is secondary to a bigger problem which is that we are locked into a process that is increasingly incapable of delivering–and we need to recognize that.

I would suggest that there are two basic design faults to what we call the peace process, whether that be Oslo or Annapolis or everything in between.  One, the two parties have gone about as far as they’re going to go to finding solutions in bilateral negotiations.  What is left to do–the final points of closure on core issues–is obviously the hardest bit, and I don’t think the parties can do that alone, especially not with the current leaderships one both sides.  There is almost a perverse incentive at work to postpone hard decisions and to negotiate indefinitely–that is the path of least resistance in terms of domestic politics for Israeli and Palestinian leaders.

Two, the Palestinians are expected to successfully build their own economy, security forces and institutions of governance while in a pre-state condition of pervasive foreign (Israel) occupation that includes an expanding civilian settler population–that needs to be protected by the IDF.  The idea is that the Palestinians prove themselves and then Israel makes progress–it has not and cannot work that way.

So both sides are struck.  The process suffers from the laws of diminishing returns as we keep trying this failed and flawed method and it does no favors to Israel as it creates circumstances in which we are unable to extract ourselves from a predicament which severely damages our interests.  I would suggest that what we need now is effective external intervention to break this impasse, and realistically this would have to be U.S.-led.

JG: Okay, external intervention is needed.  What, exactly, does President Obama do?  How does he get the Israelis to remove settlements?  How does he strengthen the PA and marginalize Gaza?

DL: To an extent, it does depend on what kind of an Israeli government an Obama presidency is working with.  If the Israeli leadership at the time is not clear in its willingness to remove settlements, withdraw on the West Bank, and implement a two-state solution, then I would recommend not investing in a peace process just for appearances’ sake.  Such a process would, after all, not succeed, further undermining both hope and credibility, and the last thing we need is another failed process.  Under such circumstances–and most people will assume that this is the scenario of a Netanyahu premiership (although I’d at least test the proposition that Netanyahu can be a pragmatist after all)–I would suggest that the Obama administration makes its explicit declarative intention as being to keep the two-state option alive and viable.  That means focusing on preventing new settlements, outposts, and settlement-expansion (and also on allowing the Palestinians to reconstitute a reformed PLO and Palestinian national movement).  A singular American focus on settlements–and that can be lots of talking and monitoring and upbraiding, it doesn’t have to be linking aid–can have a fascinating, liberating, and even decisive impact on the internal Israeli debate about settlements.  The Obamaites could also ask Bill Clinton a thing or two about handling Netanyahu, as he played no minor role in Netanyahu’s first term as PM being cut short to barely 30 months.

On the other hand, if one is dealing with an Israeli government that has identified an Israeli national interest and even Israel’s survival with a West Bank withdrawal, two-state solution, and settlement removal–as is the case with the outgoing Olmert government and with Prime Ministerial candidate Tzipi Livni, then I’d suggest a different tack.  The key in this scenario would be for the U.S. to come up with creative ways for addressing the legitimate Israeli concerns regarding what happens in the territories from which Israel withdraws–how does one guarantee a predictability of especially security, but also of governance outcomes once Israel and the IDF is no longer there.  So it’s about providing compelling, attractive, and even enticing answers to the questions that postpone the needed Israeli withdrawal.

I say creative because the current way to answer that question is all about building Palestinian capacity without changing the basic circumstances.  And I am convinced that cannot work.  The alternative package that the U.S. would have to take a lead in putting together would lean heavily on an international role for a period of time in the newly de-occupied Palestinian state–with a particular focus on guaranteeing security-related issues.  Yes, I am talking about an international force, but only once there’s an agreed border and as a post-occupation partial replacement for the IDF–and the U.S. would not be the main provider of troops (numbers anyway are not large).

That’s the kind of plan the new administration should be thinking about, while in addition, American diplomatic engagement would also almost certainly be needed to finalize an Israeli-Palestinian agreement (American proposals and hard work to carry the sides across the finishing line), and additional incentives, both bilateral and international as appropriate, for both parties–including in the security arena, costs of relocating settlers, and Palestinian refugee compensation.

As for the PA, Gaza, etc., virtually everything we have done so far in supposedly strengthening the moderates and intervening on behalf of one side has been either counter-productive or ineffective.  One can’t marginalize Gaza –it’s part of the two-state solution.  And we’re most certainly going to have to bring Hamas inside the tent to make this work.  I think that’s doable and the first imperative for the U.S. is to leave the Palestinians to do their own internal politics, and to reconstitute their own reformed national movement.  I’m not suggesting U.S. mediation, but the removal of what amounts to a U.S. veto on Palestinian national reconciliation.  Our basic demand from a newly unified Palestinian national leadership should be: no use of terror and agreement on an authorized interlocutor for U.S.-mediated peace talks with Israel.

None of this will be easy, including the internal Palestinian stuff.  The Egyptians are working on that right now, but the prospects are not good, although they would be improved if the U.S. sent signals that they approve of these talks, and if other actors, such as the Saudis, were encouraged to support these mediation efforts.

That’s enough for now.  There is of course much more to say on what needs to be done on the regional level, and of how to use the Arab Peace Initiative as a central ingredient for peace making and as an incentive for Israel.  But let’s save that for later.

***

JG: Over the next four years, what are the chances that we’ll see another Arab-Israeli war, in either Lebanon, Gaza or the West Bank?

DL: Unfortunately, the chances of another war are not insignificant, although there is no inevitability to there being further war and if we act smart this outcome can be avoided.  However, if one looks at the trajectory of hostility to Israel, instability in the region, and misguided Israeli policies, then that makes for a worrying trend line.

Hezbollah, of course, maintains its own militia in Lebanon and that would be the focus of any future Israeli-Lebanon clash–as it was two years ago.  I would argue that the smartest move Israel could make regarding Lebanon would be to remove those excuses (or reasons) that Hezbollah uses to justify its maintenance of an independent armed capacity that actually resonate inside Lebanese politics.

What would that mean?  Israel could hand over the Shebaa Farms (which are of no value and which Israel has no intention of keeping anyway), could start ending IDF over flights of Lebanon, and could allow the Lebanese armed forces to equip itself as a more serious national army (although not with offensive capacities that would threaten Israel).  These measures would create a situation whereby Hezbollah would be faced with a dilemma, as its justifications for its current military posture would be removed.  Hezbollah would then have to rely on external explanations (such as the Palestinian cause), or risk being seen as explicitly serving an Iranian, not Lebanese, agenda.  Such moves by Israel would actually limit Hezbollah’s room for maneuver, and I would suggest that they would make future clashes less likely.  Of course, Hezbollah and the state machinery of Lebanon may become indistinguishable–Hezbollah is already part of the government and could assume a more leading role.  But in most ways that only complicates their decision-making further when it comes to entering conflict with Israel.  Bottom line: there are things Israel, the U.S., and the international community can be doing to help stabilize Lebanon, to limit Hezbollah’s choices, and to make confrontation less likely.

On the Palestinian front, there is ongoing, if often low-intensity, conflicts. If anything the default position is still the war footing.  The current ceasefire is testimony to that–a secession of hostilities of limited duration.

Absent a resolution to the basic conflicts, new rounds of violence, whether more or less intense, can be expected to break out.  Netanyahu’s suggestion for economic peace is of course a joke and will certainly not prevent this violence.  But as I discussed earlier, the Annapolis model is also not working and that too will collapse into violence (and expect some of the Palestinian security forces to be involved in the violence) if its failings are not corrected.  The most important preventive action to be taken in this regard would be to remove the casus belli and to end the 1967 occupation with the kind of provisions and in the fashion that I described above.

Of course, that does not mean there will be no threat to Israel’s security, or that everyone will be happy, but: 1, this is a precondition without which further conflict is pretty much guaranteed; and 2, it offers the most promising sustainable security environment for Israel and places Israel in a far stronger position to deal with future threats (defending Israel from an agreed upon border, no settlers to protect, increased regional and international legitimacy, basic neutralizing of Palestinian grievance narrative, etc.).

In addition, there are other threat scenarios–Syria may not wait forever for a peace deal, neither Egyptian nor Jordanian stability are guaranteed, and Iranian bellicose rhetoric continues–but Israel is in a far better position to manage all of these if we can get beyond our current occupation predicament with the Palestinians, and if we can do that then I think Israel will have an answer for any of these uncertainties.  I believe we can get it right; I’m just deeply worried that we won’t.

_____________________

The above assumes a two State Solution of the Israeli Palestinian conflict which entails first a solution of the internal conflict of the Palestinians, and which presents the danger that rather then Hamas led Gaza becoming a PLO led component of the Palestinian Southern entity, the Palestinian Northern entity of the West Bank, becomes a Hamas dominated entity as well - and the whole Palestinian State becomes more of a problem then the expected solution.

At SustainabiliTank.info we rather believe in a three States Solution, where Israel makes its agreements with the West Bank and leaves the rebellious “Hamas-in-Gaza” which we like to call - Hamasstan - plainly hanging in the air until someone creates internally  the sense needed to bring them to the table under a formula already proved in the other/larger entity that was created first. We believe this to be a better staged evolution then the one described without such stages by David Levy.  ( PJ at SustainabiliTank.com )

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Four Middle East Crises on Obama’s Horizon.
By Daniel Levy, in Haaretz of November 16, 2008.

No one should be surprised that president-elect Barack Obama’s first press conference, three days after his historic November 4th victory, was devoted almost exclusively to the economy. Obama was also quick to remind reporters that there is only one president at a time, and his turn does not begin until January 20. Israel’s upcoming February 11 election? Recent American presidents have had a decidedly mixed record of intervention in Israeli elections. President Bill Clinton hastily convened the March 1996 Summit of Peacemakers at Sharm el-Sheikh, but it did not save Shimon Peres in the polls that May. Clinton was more effective in ensnaring a peace-shy prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the Wye River Memorandum - paving the way to Netanyahu’s downfall and Ehud Barak’s May 1999 election victory. Before that, president George H.W. Bush tripped up Yitzhak Shamir on the issue of settlements, assisting Yitzhak Rabin in Israel’s 1992 vote.

A new president, however, is unlikely to dip his hand in the shark-infested waters of Israeli politics, certainly not on Day 1, especially since the possible impact would be hard to predict. The Obama team would be best advised to simply remind Israelis of its own standpoint: a commitment to two states and to advancing the peace process “from the minute I’m sworn into office” (Obama in Amman, July 2008). To forget this pledge until after February 10 would in itself be an intervention of sorts, and an unwelcome one. Will Kadima, Labor or Meretz be able to ride the wave of Obama expectations? That will be for them to attempt and for the voters to decide.

- (2) Another upcoming Middle East election the new American president will have to navigate is in Iran, where presidential polls are scheduled for June 2009. The tricky balancing act here will be, on the one hand, not to lose time testing direct engagement with Iran, an Obama election pledge, while, at the same time, doing nothing that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could use to strengthen his own re-election efforts. Paradoxically, a less threatening, more open-for-business tone from the U.S. may be the best way to undermine Ahmadinejad. Direct talks with Ahmadinejad are very unlikely to feature on the immediate Obama to-do list, and would almost certainly be ill advised. In any event, he is not the key address for diplomatic approaches. That would more likely be supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Expect discreet feelers and exploratory contacts with key Khamenei confidants, such as Ali Akbar Velayati and Ali Larijani, and expect not to know that they are taking place.

Israel’s best posture on this is surely to avoid any public disagreement with the U.S. on Iran, to ensure that Israel has input into the agenda for talks, and to give American-Iranian negotiations a real chance, as the best option for addressing our concerns.

- (3) For Syria, a two-year waiting game ends on Inauguration Day. President Bashar al-Assad apparently decided some time ago that his best bet was to wait out the implacable opposition of French president Jacques Chirac and American president Bush. Syria has recently prepared for this day, for instance by relaunching peace talks with Israel via Turkish mediation, by assuming a constructive role regarding Lebanon, and by moving closer to Europe, most notably to Chirac’s successor, Nicolas Sarkozy.

In some senses, Syria is seen as low-hanging fruit for a U.S. re-engagement that would reshuffle Middle East alliances in its favor. After all, Syria is a relevant player when it comes to Iraq, Iran, Lebanon and the Palestinian arena. A reorientation of Syria’s policies will not take place overnight or following a brief diplomatic flirtation. But a new approach to U.S.-Syria bilateral relations, with reasonably calibrated benchmarks and including American support for Israeli-Syrian talks, stands a good chance of success. Look out for early indications of that change.

- (4) Finally, how to deal with Palestinian internal politics? One of the more devastating legacies of the Bush years was the failure to constructively navigate the Palestinian transition away from the strongman rule of Yasser Arafat and the single-party domination of Fatah. A stable Palestine and sustainable peace and security for Palestinians and Israelis cannot be built on a divided Palestinian house. The American position has been one of encouraging Palestinian division. That needs to change urgently, not by an Obama administration directly engaging Hamas, but by it discreetly signaling an end to the American veto on Palestinian national reconciliation along lines similar to the Saudi-brokered Mecca deal of February 2007. Given the stop-start Palestinian talks now being brokered by Egypt, there might be some urgency to the American policy re-think on this issue - the peace process is deeply flawed in its absence.

- (5) Of course, Iraq will loom largest when president-elect Obama turns his attention to the Middle East - and therein lies the core challenge: Will the next administration, unlike its predecessor, appreciate both the extent and the nature of the interconnectivity between the region’s varied crises? The signs at least are encouraging.

Daniel Levy, a senior fellow at the New America and Century Foundations, was previously an adviser in the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, and the lead Israeli drafter of the Geneva Initiative.

——————-

As we said earlier - we do not think that the internal reconciliation within the Palestinian side should be allowed to hold back attempt at progress in the other areas. We really do not believe that the administration of Gaza will change before there is a success with the  easier dialogue between Israel and a Palestinian West-Bank entity.  The problem is that settlements were removed from Gaza, but this made things worse.

Diplomats Say Uranium Traces Found at Bombed Syrian Site.
Samples taken from a Syrian site bombed by Israel last year contained traces of uranium combined with other elements that merit further investigation, diplomats said Monday. (AP/MSNBC)

See also Formal Report Drafted on Syria Atom Probe - Mark Heinrich
The UN nuclear watchdog is drafting an investigative report on Syria for the first time, suggesting to Western diplomats the agency has found some sign of undeclared activity at a site bombed by Israel last year.

Moreover, Syria has been made an official agenda item at the year-end November 27-28 meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s board of governors, unlike previously when IAEA officials said initial inquiries were inconclusive. (Reuters)

—————-

AP - updated 6:46 p.m. CT, Mon., Nov. 10, 2008

VIENNA, Austria - Samples taken from a Syrian site bombed by Israel on suspicion it was a covert nuclear reactor contained traces of uranium combined with other elements that merit further investigation, diplomats said Monday.

The diplomats — who demanded anonymity because their information was confidential — said the uranium was processed and not in raw form, suggesting some kind of nuclear link.

But one of the diplomats said the uranium finding itself was significant only in the context of other traces found in the oil or air samples taken by International Atomic Energy Agency experts during their visit to the site in June.

Syria has a rudimentary declared nuclear program revolving around research and the production of isotopes for medical and agricultural uses, using a small, 27-kilowatt reactor, and the uranium traces might have originated from there and inadvertently been carried to the bombed site. But taken together, the uranium and the other components found on the environmental swipes “tell a story” worth investigating, said the diplomat.

The second diplomat said the findings would figure in a report on Syria that will be presented to the IAEA’s 35-nation board next week ahead of a scheduled two-day board meeting starting Nov. 24.

The findings are important after months of uncertainty about the status of the investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Preliminary results of the environmental samples collected from the site by an IAEA team were inconclusive, adding weight to Syrian assertions that no trips beyond the initial IAEA visit in June were necessary.

The U.S. says the facility hit by Israeli warplanes more than a year ago was a nearly completed reactor that — when on line — could produce plutonium, a pathway to nuclear arms.

***

Covert program denied: But Damascus denies running a covert program.

Ibrahim Othman, Syria’s nuclear chief, has said his country would wait for final environmental results before deciding how to respond to repeated IAEA requests for follow-up visits to the one in June, when the samples were collected.

But a diplomat attending a closed IAEA meeting in September told the AP that Syrian Ambassador Mohammed Badi Khattab suggested his country would not allow further visits under any circumstances because it was still technically at war with Israel and was concerned any additional IAEA probe would expose some of its non-nuclear military secrets.

Beyond wanting to revisit the site bombed by Israel, IAEA experts also want to follow up on U.S. Israeli and other intelligence that North Korea was involved in building the alleged Syrian program.

Also, IAEA officials have been seeking permission to visit three other sites purportedly linked to the alleged reactor destroyed by the Israelis — although Syria already has said that those locations are off limits because they are in restricted military areas.

***

Images raise suspicions of Syria facility.

Syria fears the IAEA probe could lead to a massive investigation similar to the probe Iran has been subjected to for more than five years — and to related fallout. Iran is under U.N. sanctions because of its refusal to heed Security Council demands to curb its nuclear activities.

IAEA experts came back June 25 from a four-day visit carrying air and soil samples from the Al Kibar site hit by Israel. But intelligence suggests that radioactive material had not yet been introduced into the alleged reactor before it was destroyed.

That left the inspectors looking for other components, including minute quantities of graphite, a cooling element in the type of North Korean prototype that allegedly was being built with help from Pyongyang. Such a reactor contains hundreds of tons of graphite, and any major explosion would have sent dust over the immediate area.

***

Mark Heinrich - Formal report drafted on Syria atom probe.
Mon 10 Nov 2008, 15:31 GMT

VIENNA (Reuters) - The U.N. nuclear watchdog is drafting an investigative report on Syria for the first time, suggesting to Western diplomats the agency has found some sign of undeclared activity at a site bombed by Israel last year.

Moreover, Syria has been made an official agenda item at the year-end November 27-28 meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s board of governors, unlike previously when IAEA officials said initial inquiries were inconclusive.

The IAEA has been probing Syria since May over U.S. intelligence allegations that it was close to completing a plutonium-producing nuclear reactor with North Korean help before Israel flattened the site in an air strike.

Syria denies pursuing nuclear energy for atomic bomb purposes in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It says the unverified U.S. intelligence was fabricated.

A restricted copy of the 35-nation meeting’s agenda said Syria was added to address a pending report by IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei, similar in format to those issued quarterly on an agency probe into Iran’s secretive nuclear programme.

“The agency clearly thinks it has something significant enough to report to put Syria on the (nuclear safeguards) agenda right after North Korea and Iran,” said a senior diplomat with ties to the Vienna-based U.N. watchdog.

“We do not have firm word on what the inspectors found (at the site), only that the findings suggest there are more questions to pursue,” said another senior diplomat accredited to the agency.

The diplomats asked for anonymity in exchange for discussing politically sensitive and confidential information.

Syria — an ally of Iran, which is subject of a much longer-running, and now stalled, IAEA investigation — has one declared nuclear site — an old research reactor.

ElBaradei told an IAEA board meeting in September that preliminary findings from test samples taken by inspectors granted a visit in June to the desert location hit by Israel bore no traces of atomic activity.

Diplomats said the IAEA apparently had now evaluated all the environmental swipe samples but exactly what the sleuths found remained unclear and would be laid out in the report.

Syria says all that was there was a disused military building, not a clandestine nuclear complex of North Korean design that could have yielded plutonium for atomic bomb fuel as Washington has maintained.

It told the IAEA in September it was cooperating fully with the IAEA inquiry but would not go as far as opening up military sites because this would undermine its security.

ElBaradei said then that Syrian cooperation had been “good” but Damascus needed to show “maximum cooperation” for the agency to draw conclusions.

Diplomats close to the IAEA say Syria has ignored agency requests to check three military installations that may have harboured materials connected to the alleged reactor site.

Following the incident at the Syrian - Iraqi border,  and the Iraqi position rejecting that incident, with seeming backing from other Arab Governments and the Iranian Government also, now Syria feels encouraged to clamp further down on whatever flowers of wisdom appear in that country. From the press - it seems that Canadian and Dutch diplomats follow closely these developments. What will all of this bode for the Middle East? Remember please that the UN will have to extend or not to extend - the US involvement in Iraq by the end of December.

Syria Sentences 12 for Political Crimes
A Syrian court sentenced 12 dissidents to 2 1/2 years each in prison on Wednesday for political crimes after they had called for democratic reforms. The 11 men and a woman were arrested after holding a meeting to revive a movement calling for freedom of expression and a democratic constitution in Syria. The charges included “weakening national morale.” (Reuters)

Syria Comes Down on Dissidents - Stephen Starr
The 12 Syrian dissidents were held behind a cage in a court room packed with family members and well-wishers. After the sentences were read out, several of the detained shouted cries of defiance and locked hands together. About a dozen diplomats from various embassies, including Canadian and Dutch representatives, attended the proceedings.

Several Internet cafes dotted around Damascus have recently seen new regulations posted whereby every computer user must provide an identity card before being assigned a computer. The computer number and time spent on the Internet is then recorded. (Asia Times-Hong Kong)

Will Syria Dump Its Old Friends? - David Blair
When you lead a poor country with hardly any oil, only 19 million people and a pitifully weak army, you cannot afford to burn your bridges with anybody. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s foreign policy is to reach in all directions at once, play in every game and explore every possible alliance. In a country that calls itself a republic, Assad inherited the presidency from his father, Hafez, who died in 2000. This makes him the world’s only example of an absolute monarch, with no throne, ruling a hereditary republic. When it comes to lacking any shred of popular legitimacy, no one can compete with Assad. He cannot even claim the dubious standing that comes from having led a successful coup, as his dad did 38 years ago.
The West and Israel both want Syria to shake off Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hizbullah and Iran. At present, Syria forms the crucial supply route linking Hizbullah with its chief paymaster and arms dealer, Iran. Assad’s goodwill also saves Iran from near total diplomatic isolation in the Middle East. (Telegraph-UK)

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Reaction to the US Raid into Syria: Only Muted Outrage.

By ANDREW LEE BUTTERS/BAGHDAD Wednesday, Oct. 29, 2008, www.time.com

Syrian villagers shout anti-U.S. slogans as they gather near the coffins of relatives who died a day before when U.S. military helicopters launched an extremely rare attack inside the Syrian border, on Monday, Oct. 27, 2008.
Hussein Malla / AP

On the face of it, last weekend’s raid by U.S. Special Forces on Iraqi insurgents sheltering just over the border in Syria was a risky roll of the dice. After all, the political and diplomatic balances in the region are in a state of flux, anticipating possible changes resulting from forthcoming elections in America, Israel, Iran and Iraq, and also peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians and possibly Syria. And then there are the troubled negotiations over a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that would allow U.S. forces to continue operating in Iraq next year, in which the Iraqis are particularly concerned to avoid their country being used as a platform from which the U.S. can attack their neighbors.

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• Maliki Goes to Syria
• Fears of a Tet Offensive in Iraq

Still, the attack on al-Qaeda weapons smuggler Abu Ghadiya may not have been quite as risky as it may appear. Sure it embarrassed the Iraqi government, which loudly condemned the action. And it was grist to the mill for Iran, which has strongly opposed the SOFA deal because of its own fears about the presence of U.S. troops on its doorstep, and which remains influential within the Iraqi ruling coalition. Syria, obviously, felt compelled to ritually denounce what it called “terrorist aggression.” But unable to either prevent the Americans entering its territory or to retaliate directly, the Assad regime was left to demand that the U.N. ban such cross-border raids, and to shut down the American Community school and an American cultural center in the Syrian capital.

But the Syria attack is unlikely to have any real impact on the prospects for reaching agreement on SOFA — those were looking grim even before the raid, largely because Iraq’s leaders, who face regional and national elections over the next year, are mindful of the fact that most Iraqis want foreign troops out of Iraq as soon as possible, and that in the ballot booth, they might not look favorably on politicians who had invited the American forces to stay. At the same time, Iraqi public opinion is hardly opposed to the U.S. killing jihadis and smugglers who have wrought terrible carnage in this country. Iraqis have been more inclined to ask why Syria seems to still be harboring the kind of terrorists who have killed so many innocent civilians here.

And even Syria may not be as angry with the American actions as the vitriol out of Damascus would suggest. Although reading the goings-on in the opaque authoritarian regime is never easy, it’s certainly clear that Syria faces its own jihadi problem, which may have festered as a result of its own policies: After the U.S. invaded Iraq and began talking about regime-change in Damascus as well, the Syrian government began turning a blind eye toward — even possibly supporting — Ba’athist Iraq insurgents and foreign jihadis who used the Euphrates River valley (where last weekend’s attack occurred) as a kind of a Ho Chi Minh trail into Iraq. But in the last year or so, the Syrians had begun clamping down on the jihadis, in part because they feared the danger of being dragged into a chaotic conflict if Iraq falls apart. And the secular regime in Damascus has long been a target of a homegrown Sunni insugency. But Syria may be having more trouble reining in the jihadis than it expected. Earlier this month, a car bomb exploded in Damascus, an attack that many interpreted as a retaliation from jihadi groups. If so, the Syrians may not be all that sad to see the last of Abu Ghadiya and his ilk.

Damascus has much to fear from allowing a robust jihadi insurgent underground to grow roots on Syrian soil, and much to gain from U.S.-sponsored peace talks with Israel, which Syria says its wants so badly. Allowing American incursions now to pass without response may give the Syrians more leverage when they finally get to the bargaining table.

But that’s not to say that these cross-border incursions wont have consequences. The Bush administration is claiming the right to go after terrorist groups even if that means violating the sovereignty of other countries. But others may be inclined to make use of the precedent in a manner less welcome to Washington. Already, Turkey has been launching strikes against the PKK, a militant group of Turkish Kurds hiding in the mountains of northern Iraq. The Turks say this is self-defense, but Iraq’s Kurds worry this is just the beginning of a move to crush Kurdish aspirations for autonomy. And one day Iran could decide that it, too, has a right to attack militant groups — some of them allegedly receiving covert U.S. backing — that are launching attacks on Iran from the mountains of northern Iraq. And to the extent that Iran fears cross-border raids from U.S. forces in Iraq, it has plenty of incentive to do whatever it can to dissuade its Iraqi allies, who include key players in the current government, from agreeing to extend the American presence.

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TV Station: Syria Pulls Troops Off of Iraqi Border.

A view of the US embassy in Damascus on Wednesday two days after the embassy notified its community in Syria that it could close its door for public after a US military raid on a Syrian village eastern Syria which killed eight people. Syrian government ordered Tuesday that the US cultural center and Damascus community schools be closed in response to the raid. (Bassem Tellawi - AP)

The Associated Press
Thursday, October 30, 2008; 12:28 PM

DAMASCUS, Syria — A Syrian television station is reporting that the country is reducing the number of troops on its border with Iraq in response to a deadly U.S. cross-border raid.

Syrian and Iraqi officials did not immediately confirm the report.

The private station, Dunia, showed footage Thursday of Syrian troops dismantling positions on the border and leaving the area. The report says the act was a Syrian response to the “American aggression.”

On Sunday, the U.S. military launched a deadly raid into Syria.

Washington hasn’t formally acknowledged the raid. But U.S. officials say the target was a top al-Qaida in Iraq figure who operated a network that smuggled fighters into Iraq.

Friday, Oct. 31, 2008

EDITORIAL
A warning to Syria and Iran.
By launching armed attacks in Syria last weekend, the United States sent another warning to governments that refuse to stop terrorists who operate on their territory. U.S. President George W. Bush has made it clear that he will not stand idly by as terrorists target American troops, and some scholars insist he has the right to take action. But the real question is whether unilateral moves will solve the problem or make it worse. The record is not encouraging.

Convinced that the government in Damascus was ignoring charges that terrorists were using Syrian territory to enter Iraq, the U.S. last weekend sent four helicopters carrying special forces 6.5 km into Syria to disrupt the network. The assault targeted Badran Turki Hishan al-Mazidih, known as Abu Ghadiyah, who heads Syrian logistics for the insurgent group al-Qaida in Iraq. Reportedly the U.S. had intelligence that Abu Ghadiyah was preparing a terrorist attack in Iraq. The U.S. troops killed several men and reportedly seized some others. Syria countered that the attack was “a criminal and terrorist aggression” that killed seven civilians.


There is little doubt that insurgents use the 560-km border to cross from Syria into Iraq. At one point, it was estimated that more than 120 men entered Iraq each month via this route. Documents seized in a raid in 2007 on an al-Qaida safe house in Iraq revealed substantial details about the network that helped them cross the border and about its operations. There are, however, questions about Syrian government complicity, whether it is truly involved or merely ready to turn a blind eye.

Iran is also paying attention to the U.S. strikes, as it is alleged to host camps that train foreign insurgents before they enter Iraq. But Washington should worry whether such unilateral actions will whip up domestic sentiment in Arab countries against it to a level that makes it difficult if not impossible for those governments to cooperate with the U.S. These may not be democracies, but they are not impervious to public opinion.

***

Some see in the moves a new manifestation of the “Bush doctrine.” Unlike the preemption argument that was used to justify the invasion of Iraq, this new rationale asserts that the U.S. — or any government — has the right to strike specific targets that seek to do it harm. { That reminds me to remind wanabe President Sarah Palin to beef up on the Bush Doctrine that she was ignorant thereoff at her first freshwoman test}

Mr. Bush made his case in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly last month: “As sovereign states, we have an obligation to govern responsibly, and solve problems before they spill across borders. We have an obligation to prevent our territory from being used as a sanctuary for terrorism and proliferation and human trafficking and organized crime.”

American frustration is understandable, but that must not justify actions that only make it harder for Washington to realize its ultimate objectives.

Iraq condemns US raid on Syrian village: American troops used Iraqi territory as ’staging ground’ for attack.

By Patrick Cockburn
Wednesday, 29 October 29,  2008, AP

The Iraqi government has unexpectedly denounced a CIA raid on a compound in a Syrian border village that killed an al-Qa’ida commander who dispatched fighters into Iraq.

“The Iraqi government rejects US aircraft bombarding posts inside Syria,” said an Iraqi government spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, in a surprise rebuke to Washington. “The constitution does not allow Iraq to be used as a staging ground to attack neighbouring countries.”

The raid, the first on Syrian territory by the US since the invasion of Iraq five years ago, highlights the way the US carries out military operations without consulting the Iraqi government. This is humiliating for the Iraqi government and reinforces Iraqi doubts about signing a security pact with the US by the end of the year.

The operation on Sunday, in which US helicopters landed 24 special forces troops in Sukkariyeh, five miles inside Syria near the border town of Abu Kamal, was carried out by the CIA according to US officials in Washington.

The US soldiers reportedly killed Abu Ghadiyah, the nom de guerre of Badran Turki Hishan al-Mazidih, who had been denounced by the US for facilitating the “flow of terrorists, weapons and money from Syria to al-Qa’ida in Iraq”. His body was flown back to Iraq, officials said.

Syria denied the presence of al-Qa’ida in Sukkariyeh and claimed the dead were local farmers.

The Syrian government yesterday ordered the closure of an American school and a US cultural centre in Damascus in retaliation.

Abu Ghadiyah, aided by close family members, had his assets frozen by the US Treasury in February in a directive claiming he was the head of logistics in Syria for al-Qa’ida. The most surprising aspect of the US attack was its timing. Syria has been a conduit for anti-US insurgents since the Sunni Arab uprising against the US occupation started after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

But the Sunni rebellion has largely subsided since 2007 and Syria has become more co-operative in stopping the movement of fighters across the border. The US and Iraqi governments also claim to have succeeded in largely eliminating al-Qa’ida in Iraq in Anbar province, which has a long common border with Syria. Abu Ghadiyah’s smuggling activities would have been less significant than in the past. The CIA-led raid into Syrian territory will deepen suspicions in Syria and Jordan that, so long as the US has a military presence in Iraq, it will be used as a launching pad for operations against them.

Iran has already made clear that it is against the Status of Forces Agreement (Sofa), negotiated by Iraq and the US over the past eight months. The decision on signing the agreement has divided the Iraqi government, and the cabinet is looking for amendments. In theory Sofa would increase Iraqi control but its critics claim it would formalise the occupation.

US officials are trying to get the pact signed before the UN mandate for the US occupation runs out at the end of the year.

The decision on whether or not to sign Sofa has split the Iraqi politicians.

The ministers of defence, interior, foreign affairs and finance are in favour; so too are the Kurdish parties. But the Shia religious parties are dubious or against it. The US raid into Syria is likely only to increase those doubts.

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We posed the question about Iraq - an obvious question. But what went on - the timing - may actually point at Syria. Here the situation is not clear cut. So what is the stand of the Suni Arab States and of Iran, in the matter of the Syrian attempt to play in the nuclear arena? Now that is a very different question that leads to the same underlying issue nevertheless - that issue is why does the US insist on being addicted to oil - and that is now a US election issue!

• UN to Probe Suspected Syrian Nuclear Site
  Freshly evaluated soil and air samples from a Syrian site bombed by Israel on suspicion it was a covert nuclear reactor provide enough evidence to push ahead with a UN probe, diplomats at the International Atomic Energy Agency said Tuesday. Diplomats said the IAEA’s final evaluation of environmental samples collected from the site earlier this year, completed a few days ago, has the agency convinced it needs to press on with its investigation. (AP/Wall Street Journal)
• Syria Protests U.S. Raid to UN, Closes American School and Cultural Center - Ellen Knickmeyer
  Syria protested a deadly U.S. raid into its territory to the UN on Tuesday, and announced it was closing an American school and cultural center in its capital. U.S. military officials said Monday that American forces flew by helicopter about four miles into Syria on Sunday, targeting the leader of a smuggling network used to funnel fighters, arms and money into Iraq. (Washington Post)
  See also American School, Cultural Center Still Open in Syria Despite Order (AP/Washington)