The EU refuses to see the multi headed Hydra it has become and expects President Obama to play along. Reality calls – EU please get serious at becoming some sort of one headed entity! The US President is a busy man now with all that US Jazz.
It slowly starts sinking in – we said it a long time ago!
Battling the ‘Multilateral Zombie’ – EU climate strategy after Copenhagen.
LEIGH PHILLIPS
February 3, 2010, http://euobserver.com/9/29354/?rk=1,
http://old.norden.org/analysnorden/defau…
EUOBSERVER / ANALYSIS – “The EU’s post-Copenhagen strategy should be
just to have a strategy, any strategy,” quips one Brussels think-tank
wag during an interview.
The rough hip-check Europe received in the Danish capital in December,
sidelining the bloc during the eleventh-hour huddle between major
powers that produced the Copenhagen Accord, has produced a wave of
despondency and cynicism amongst Brussels politicians, green
lobbyists, and analysts – and carbon traders across the continent to
boot. They’re all having a crack at how poorly the EU played its hand
during climate negotiations.
For the last three years, if it hasn’t been the institutional reform
of the Lisbon Treaty, it’s been the bloc’s obsession with climate
change that has dominated the EU agenda. Even if the EU is well off
the at least 40 percent cut in emissions that science demands if we
are to avoid catastrophic climate change, it remains the case that as
a result of its 2008 climate and energy package, Europe remains the
most advanced rich-country power on the planet in terms of its binding
CO2 reduction commitment.
With its climate boy-scout badge afixed to its sleeve, Brussels headed
off to Camp Copenhagen expecting at least to see its self-proclaimed
leadership reflected in winning something along the lines of a broad
commitment from other powers to at least a 20-percent cut in carbon
emissions below 1990 levels by 2020.
But in the end, the EU ended up the goody-two-shoes pupil who’s top of
the class, but yet, when he invites all the other kids over for a
party, glumly watches as they end up playing among each other instead
of with him. It was the US, China, India, Brazil and South Africa that
cobbled together the last-minute three-page-long Copenhagen Accord
without the EU even in the room, while most of the developing world
complained throughout the two weeks that Brussels was at best just a
cat’s paw for Washington.
Denmark’s Connie Hedegaard, now incoming EU
climate commissioner, was repeatedly attacked for favouring rich
countries over the developing world.
“It was the strangest conference I have been at in my life, from all
points of view,” Mr Barroso told a pow-wow of the leading European
think-tanks in early January.
Typical of the initial EU reaction were comments from Swedish
environment minister Andres Carlgren, who, when meeting in Brussels in
late December with his EU counterparts to debrief after the UN summit
and begin the discussion of what to do next, slammed the result as a
“disaster.”
“It was a really great failure and we have to learn from that,” he
said at the time. { but the gentleman forgot to say whose failure it was!}
Glass half full!
However, after the holidays, a clutch of pollyanna-ish EU officials
have since fervently urged everyone to consider the Accord’s silver
lining. Both President Barroso and the bloc’s chief climate
negotiator, Artur Runge-Metzger, in various venues have emphasised
that many of the things the EU had been pushing for were contained in
the final result – developed countries agreed for the first time a
concrete sum for climate finance, a target maximum average global
temperature increase of two degrees was embraced and a review,
allowing for a ratcheting up of targets if necessary, is foreseen for
2015.
Ms Hedegaard during the parliamentary hearing to confirm her
appointment as commissioner gave a robust defence of the document.
“I would very much have liked to have seen more progress in
Copenhagen, but finance was delivered; all the emerging developing
nations have accepted co-responsibility [for reducing emissions] and
Brazil, South Africa, China, India and the US, all of whom were not
part of the Kyoto Protocol, have now set targets for domestic action,”
she told MEPs mid-January.
But even as the EU begins to view the Copenhagen glass as half full,
elsewhere, support for the document is beginning to unravel.
Last week, realising that only around 20 countries had listed their
emissions reductions commitments in a schedule attached to the Accord,
UN climate chief Yvo de Boer quietly abandoned the 31 January deadline
for states to have done so.
At the same time, EU member states that have never been comfortable
with the bloc’s climate ambitions have used the opportunity to delay
or block European plans to boost its CO2 emissions reduction
commitment from 20 percent on 1990 levels to 30 percent. On 18
January, environment ministers met in Seville, to assess, for the
second time, the reasons for the failure in the Danish capital. UK,
France, Germany, Belgium and Spain continued to push for the increased
pledge, while Italy and Poland said now was not the time given the
poverty of ambition by other states at Copenhagen.
As of this week, the consensus in the bloc is to maintain its target
of 20 percent and conditional offer of 30 percent if other powers make
comparable efforts – in other words exactly the same position the EU
has held for the last year, although Ms Hedegaard has publicly said
she hopes to see a move to 30 percent “by Mexico,” meaning the next UN
climate summit in the Central American nation at the end of 2010.
At the same time, the commission itself is in the ‘twenty-percenter’
camp, pushing this position in Copenhagen, “afraid to be naked” with
nothing left to put on the table in the game of climate strip poker.
Moreover, crucially, the executive’s goal of a transatlantic emissions
trading system is unworkable with cuts pledges that are wildly
divergent and without legally binding commitments from Washington.
The US is looking to a 17 percent emissions reduction on 2005 levels,
which works out to be just three percent when using the same 1990
baseline year as the EU. Watch for the US, if legislation gets
through, at some point to somehow nudge up its cut to 20 percent and
the EU to stick to the same figure, dressed up in language about how
the two targets are now comparable, with a fudge over the differing
baseline years.
Support unravelling:
Separately, four of the five architects of the Accord, Brazil, South
Africa, India and China, have themselves gone lukewarm on the project,
smarting from accusations from much of the rest of the developing
world that these four richest of the poor countries had broken ranks
after a year of unprecedented global south unity.
Last weekend, meeting in New Delhi, the four so-called Basic countries
described the accord as merely a “political understanding” without any
legal basis and that action should instead proceed on the basis of the
two documents to come out of the official UN process – one outlining
the second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol and the other
dealing with climate actions by the US and emerging economies.
Indian environment minister Jairam Ramesh said: “We support the
Copenhagen Accord. But all of us were unanimously of the view that its
value lies not as a standalone document but as an input into the
two-track negotiation process under the UNFCCC.”
“The two-track negotiating process …is the only legitimate process
to reach a legally binding treaty in Mexico,” he added.
Meanwhile, the cornerstone of the Accord, an understanding that
however limited America’s commitment, Washington would at least be
able to deliver on this promise.
But with the surprise election to the US Senate of Massachusetts
Republican Scott Brown on an anti-climate-bill ticket, killing the
Democrat’s filibuster-proof majority, the country’s climate
legislation is threatened. A defeated or heavily watered down bill
only engenders further reservations in the minds of Chinese, Indian
and even European leadership about promising tough reduction targets.
For all the public talk of Latin American, Chinese and African climate
“villains” blocking the process in Copenhagen, privately, there is
frustration with Washington as well. A senior EU policy official
speaking to EUobserver described President Obama’s position as the
same as that of George Bush. “We are willing but only if others move,”
the official said, attributing the position to both the current and
former US leaders.
One EU climate voice {?}
A popular post-Copenhagen analysis from the Brookings Institute, the
centrist US think-tank, that has made the rounds of officialdom and
NGO-land warns of a slow-motion failure scenario similar to the Doha
round of WTO talks, a process it describes as a “multilateral zombie”
in which climate negotiations “stagger on piteously, never making much
progress while never quite dying either.”
Nevertheless, despite the dark days and the cynicism of some
onlookers, we can already begin to sense the outlines of a European
strategy.
EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy has already said he hopes to
see a common climate strategy emerge from an 11 February extraordinary
EU summit originally scheduled to deal with the economy. Angela
Merkel, as well, has upgraded a climate meeting in Bonn in June from
expert to ministerial level and the European Commission is preparing a
series of proposals that it is to put to the member states.
One of the main lessons the European Commission has drawn from the
Copenhagen failure is that European representation in climate change
talks needs to be streamlined in order to project its position more
effectively, even if the commission is not awarded the task of
negotiating on behalf of the bloc, as it does in trade talks,
“We are fragmented from a negotiating point of view,” President
Barroso said in his first public appearance of the year. “In trade
matters, this is different. The European Commission is the voice.”
Ms Hedegaard is of the same mind. In her parliamentary hearing, her
top message concerned European disunity: “In the last hours, China,
India, Russia, Japan each spoke with one voice, while Europe spoke
with many different voices.”
“A lot of Europeans in the room is not a problem, but there is only an
advantage if we sing from same hymn sheet. We need to think about this
and reflect on this very seriously, or we will lose our leadership
role in the world,” she told MEPs.
In a similar vein, the commission president has also suggested that
the new EU External Action Service – the bloc’s diplomatic corps born
of the Lisbon Treaty – be given more leeway to engage in climate
bargaining.
Until now, this sort of bilateral pressure has been left up to the
member states, with Paris tasked with winning over Francophone Africa,
London with arm-twisting the Commonwealth and Berlin given the job of
seducing Pacific islands.
Before last autumn’s federal election in Germany,
then-foreign-minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier was meeting regularly
with the Association of Small Island States and 20 Aosis ministers
visited the country last year specifically to discuss climate issues,
while Ethiopia’s surprise intervention at Copenhagen proposing a deal
that mirrored almost word for word a European Commission proposal from
September came as the result of UK and French behind-the-scenes
intercession.
While this sort of member-state activity is likely to continue, the
Lisbon Treaty has given the commission a powerful new diplomatic
weapon it intends to use to the fullest.
Sidelining the UN:
Related to this, the major task will be to break the remarkable unity
shown by developing nations. The UNFCCC’s principle dating back to
Kyoto of “common but differentiated responsibility,” is understood by
developing nations to mean that those countries that caused the
problem should pay for solving it and make binding commitments to CO2
reductions.
The third world has said that it would be happy to develop along a
low-carbon path itself, but that the rich north will have to pay for
this and that their emissions cuts should in any case be voluntary.
The World Bank, unhelpfully, has estimated the cost of all this to be
$400 billion a year. Meanwhile, wealthy nations, would rather that the
developing world, but specifically China and to a lesser extent India,
agree to binding, verifiable CO2 cuts without the price tag.
The key advantage of the Copenhagen Accord for rich countries is that
it “weakens or even does away with the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities,” as the South Centre, a Geneva-based
think-tank close to developing world governments, warns – another
reason why the Basic countries, upon reflection, have taken a distance
from the deal.
In many ways, Copenhagen was a victory for the developing world, in
that it managed to hold off against pressure to junk the Kyoto
Protocol and in the end ensured that the Copenhagen Accord was only
“noted” by the UN plenary instead of endorsed, making it a document
floating in a legal limbo.
For this reason, the US has called for a junking of the UN process,
hoping that it can win other countries to its perspective via more
manageable arenas such as the G20 or the Major Emitters Forum, where
there are far fewer than the UN’s 192 nations to deal with and the
‘awkward squad’ of left-wing Latin American nations and the G77 group
of nations are absent. Both Jonathan Pershing, America’s chief
negotiator, and US climate envoy Todd Stern have said the UN should be
sidelined.
EU leaders however “are less neurotic about the UN than the Americans
are,” in the words of the Centre for European Policy Studies’ climate
specialist, Christian Egenhofer.
At the same time that President Barroso admitted to pulling his hair
out at the UN process, he also said there is no other option. “We need
to have a more efficient and results-oriented process in the future
…With unanimity, it is easier for one country to block – it’s the
basic logic of the system,” he said in early January, adding however:
“It’s very easy to criticise the UN …but the UN is what the members
make out of it.”
Although some Spanish presidency officials at one point said that
climate negotiations should pass through the G20 instead, everyone
else, from Mr Runge-Metzger to Ms Hedegaard believe this cannot be
done. “Some ask: ‘Shouldn’t we give up on the UN process?’ I say:
‘No.’ We would waste too much work,” she told the European Parliament.
Instead, according to Mr Runge-Metzger: “The next step for the EU is
to get the accord translated into the UN process,” to try to lock in
agreement in other fora and then feed this into the main UN
negotiations. The key is to appear to be endorsing the UN process
while still pushing for other fora to do the heavy lifting.
One arena in particular that climate watchers should keep an eye on is
the UN High-Level Panel on Climate Change and Development, announced
by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon last September and to be launched
early this year. Made up of a handful of current heads of government,
along with experts, senior government officials and community leaders,
the panel will be a much more manageable entity, but will also have
the imprimatur of the UN.
Border tariff:
Meanwhile, EU officials are briefing heavily against the awkward
squad, attempting to paint them as obstructionist and
unrepresentative. Reporters are reminded of G77-chair Sudan’s
authoritarian government, while Ethiopia, which has authoritarian rule
but is on side, is never criticized. With Yemen, the birthplace of the
infamous underpants bomber, holding the 2010 presidency of the group,
this will be an even easier public relations hatchet job.
But it was not just a handful of countries, but the entire Africa
Group of Nations that forced a suspension of proceedings when they
twice walked out of the UN complaining of rich country shenanigans.
Latin America and the loudmouthed-or-eloquent (depending on who you
asked) Oxford-educated G77 negotiator Lumumba di-Aping, famous for his
line that an offer of $10 billion in climate finance “is not enough to
buy us coffins,” were only the most vocal of a host of frustrated
countries.
At the same time, even ardent developing world advocates privately
express their discomfort at the wealthy elites of China and India
using the poor of their own countries to advance an agenda of growth
that primarily benefits them. And it is true that the developing world
is not all of one mind. Tuvalu is bitterly opposed to the Copenhagen
Accord while the Maldives embraces it as the best it can get while the
tides are rapidly rising.
Elsewhere, the EU is also almost certain to take a fresh look at
slapping carbon tariffs on goods entering the bloc. There is no way
industry would allow a move to a 30 percent emissions reduction pledge
without such protection. “I will fight for a carbon tax levied on EU
borders,” French President Nicolas Sarkozy said earlier this month.
It’s always easy to dismiss such ambition when expressed by a man
known for his crafting of public policy by press conference, and EU
commissioner-designate for trade, Karel de Gucht has ruled a carbon
border tariff out, saying: “it will …lead to an escalating trade war
on a global level.”
But this is what a trade commissioner has to say. Many analysts
believe that a carbon tariff is inevitable and even WTO-compatible if
multilaterally agreed. The US climate bill already includes a carbon
tariff provision and, crucially, this is the stick that could be used
to force China, India and other nations to submit to its preferred
climate regime of binding reduction commitments for emerging
economies.
The EU is still essential here. Washington could not move ahead with a
tariff without Brussels on board.
It should also be remembered that many other major powers were
sidelined at Copenhagen. Japan and Russia were also absent from
Copenhagen’s endgame. In many ways, the EU’s limited influence has
been largely a product of its own climate success. Although Europe is
the world’s third largest emitter, this will likely change in the near
future. Ironically, if the continent isn’t going to be as much of a
problem in absolute (as opposed to per capita) terms as China or India
by 2030, it doesn’t have much of a bargaining chip. Washington was
always going to be far more interested in Beijing.
Copenhagen was very much the US and China show, but it won’t always be.
——–
This feature was originially written for the Nordic Council’s Analys
Norden website.
{ We wonder at the last sentence of the article because we think that unless the EU does in fact unite under one leadership it will not amount to much when the US continues to deal with the BASICs – I mean the countries that are form the basic future. The EU should aim at becoming the G3 to be added to China and the US in future global negotiations that will include also the IBSA and one or two more states. See please next article.}
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US blames Lisbon Treaty for EU summit fiasco. Mr Obama – the Madrid summit decision is being seen as a diplomatic snub to Spain.
by ANDREW RETTMAN from Brussels.
February 3, 2010, http://euobserver.com/9/29398/?rk=1
EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS writes - The US State Department has said that President Barack Obama’s decision not to come to an EU summit in Madrid in May is partly due to confusion arising from the Lisbon Treaty.
State department spokesman Philip J. Crowley told press in Washington on Tuesday (2 February) that the treaty has made it unclear who the US leader should meet and when. { that sounds very clear to me.}
“Up until recently, they [summits] would occur on six-month intervals,
as I recall, with one meeting in Europe and one meeting here. And that
was part of – the foundation of that was the rotating presidency
within the EU. Now you have a new structure regarding not only the
rotating EU presidency, you’ve got an EU Council president, you’ve got
a European Commission president,” he said.
“We are working through this just as Europeans themselves are working
through this: When you have a future EU-US summit meeting, who will
host it and where will it be held?” he added. “All of this is kind of
being reassessed in light of architectural changes in Europe.”
The Lisbon Treaty came into force on 1 December, 2009. It created the post
of a new EU Council president and EU foreign relations chief in order
to give the union a stronger voice abroad.
It kept the institution of the six-month rotating EU presidency as
well, with the member state holding the chairmanship to do the bulk of
behind-the-scenes policy work in Brussels.
The Spanish EU presidency is being closely watched to see how the EU
manages the transition to the new power structure. The EU Council
president has so far taken charge of summits in the EU capital. But
Madrid was to share the limelight with a few top-level events at home.
The state department’s Mr Crowley said the US and Spain have been in
touch “directly” to discuss Mr Obama’s decision after Madrid learned
about it through the media on Monday.
“Obviously, there’s been some disappointment expressed by the
government of Spain, and we understand that and we’ll be working with
them on that,” he said.
Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero and Mr Obama are both
expected to attend the National Prayer Breakfast in Washington on
Thursday. But no bilateral meeting has been announced so far.
The informal event sees some 3,500 celebrities, businessmen,
politicians and religious leaders get together in the US capital each
year. It is organised by the Fellowship Foundation, a Christian
fundamentalist pressure group.
Mr Zapatero, a centre-left secularist, has taken flak for his trip in
Spanish media, with the El Pais daily calling his decision to attend
the prayer event “shocking.”
raffaella@ecoharmony.com
