Sugarcane ethanol: a sweet solution for Europe’s fuel addiction?

Corporate Europe Observatory ?? {we would like to know what Observatory and What Corporations it Represents}

Brazil’s agribusiness is lobbying to make the case, but people and the environment are paying the price.

{This last  title is correct - Brazil agribusiness does lobby in Europe for opening the door to exports of ethanol for the octane-boosting market as an additive to gasoline. The subject must be understood in this context. As we were involved in this for 30 years, we learned to smell rat when articles do not present the full truth. Sorry Roberto Savio, we like you, but this time you represent the wrong cause. We rather smell here petroleum and not cachaca. Our comments will be presented in this type of paratheses - Pincas Jawetz - of www.SustainabiliTank.info}
In spite of overwhelming criticism of agrofuels as a ’solution’ to climate change, sugarcane ethanol is often seen as the one more positive exception. The Brazilian government is lobbying hard in Brussels in favour of high EU agrofuel targets and for better market access for sugarcane ethanol.

However, sugarcane is far from a sustainable source of energy. {this per coment in the article - that we regard as not even a half backed truth.}

Certification initiatives such as the ‘Better Sugarcane Initiative’ are top down approaches that lack support from small producers or affected communities. {??}

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In July, responding to high profile concerns, the European Parliament’s Environment Committee voted in favour of cutting the proposed 10% target down to 4% by 2015. Many calls are now going out to the Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) Committee to drop the proposed 10% agrofuel target in their upcoming vote on the issue on 11 September.

That same ITRE Committee however voted on 1st September to significantly dilute proposals for fuel efficiency standards for cars. Car manufacturers will be able to use agrofuels as a ‘get out clause’ to avoid having to abide by standards. This shows clearly that agrofuels are being promoted in the EU largely to make up for the lack of real measures to reduce emissions from cars and fuels, or to change the transport model. EU decision makers have turned agrofuels into an escape route for the car and the oil industry, who will have to invest less in more efficient cars, or in a clean-up of oil operations.

{yes, but these arguments have nothing to do with the Brazilian sugar-cane ethanol and its use as an octane boosting additive to gasoline. The last comment is related to the fact that in a replacement of 10% low octane gasoline part of the total gasoline pool, one increases the octane value of the gasoline by 3 points. Had one prepared the octane boosting component of that gasoline from petroleum alone, that would have required higher petroleum crude inputs - and there is here a factor equal to 1.6 in favor of the ethanol. So, by replacing 10% of that gasoline one saved X1.6 in terms of crude. If ones target is to displace fossil fuels, we have here a built in X1.6 factor when the ethanol is used this way. Now, folks from that “Corporate Observatory” - please go back to your drawing boards and ask Mr. Savio to retract your diatribe, so he is not accused for your lack of sincerity. You must figure that the achievements of the renewable energy biofuel are in their use - and that must be a “cradle-to-grave” analysis if you want to convey your ideas about efficiency of fossil fuel replacements.}

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Brazil’s push for EU target:

Brazil is the world’s largest producer of sugarcane and its government has been at the forefront in pushing sugarcane onto the agrofuel agenda. Backed by the sugarcane industry, Brazil is keen to see the EU introduce higher targets for agrofuels. It claims that Europe can fuel its cars on ethanol made from sugarcane, reducing greenhouse gas emissions without affecting food prices; and without deforestation or damage in rural communities.

The Brazilian government is keen to see EU tariff barriers for ethanol swept aside, and is pushing for this in WTO negotiations, in order to allow ethanol from sugarcane to become a competitive alternative to gasoline. Brazil is also expected to push for EU and US tariff reductions on ethanol from sugarcane at the International Biofuels Forum scheduled to take place in Sao Paulo in November.

Since these attempts to slash tariff barriers have failed so far, Brazil has turned to bilateral accords of various kinds with EU member states like the Netherlands and Germany. And in January this year, the Swedish government applied for EU approval to import Brazilian ethanol at a lower tariff rate than the present tariff.[1]

Ethanol from sugarcane is presented as a climate-friendly source of fuel - but the indirect effects of expanding sugarcane plantations in Brazil are overlooked. And what are the other impacts of this monoculture crop? Can sustainability standards really address the fundamental problems, and are current initiatives in this respect mainly serving business, or communities?  {I cannot check that reference, but it is clear to us that if it has any relevance it belongs to next section and not to this one.}

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The dark side of sugarcane:

Sugarcane is grown as a monocrop, predominantly in southern and central Brazil as well as in parts of Asia and Africa. It relies on heavy quantities of inputs, particularly fertilizer. Harvesting is often done by hand, and working conditions are notoriously harsh.

A number of studies in Brazil have shown that demand for land for sugarcane is leading to the conversion of grasslands and wooded savannah for crops, releasing stored carbon dioxide, and displacing previous users like cattle farmers who move into tropical forests.

One recent study has estimated that, if of the effect of land conversion was taken into account, it would take sugar cane ethanol sourced from previously wooded Cerrado lands in Central Brazil 17 years to repay its climate debt - that means that for those 17 years, the level of greenhouse gases emitted because of land conversion will be higher than the emissions from burning fossil fuels. Given the rate at which sugarcane depletes the soil, there is no guarantee that converted land will still be supporting sugarcane in 17 years time - this carbon debt may in fact never be paid.[2]

Sugarcane also has devastating effects on biodiversity - with the Cerrado savannah of Central Brazil, where sugarcane is grown, being one of the world’s most biodiverse and also most threatened habitats. Sugarcane expansion is also affecting Brazil’s Atlantic Forest, and indirectly the Amazon, as cattle farmers move into the forest in the search for new pasture.

Sugarcane expansion is leading to land conflicts, as rural communities are forced off land to make way for the plantations. Small-scale farming has become unviable in the plantation areas and many small farmers feel they have no financial choice but to sell up.[3] Sugar plantations are displacing small farms, food crops and subsistence food systems - leading to food shortages and price rises.[4]

In a report by Maria Luisa Mendonca, farmer Gaudino Correia explains the problems with leasing out the land. “The contracts are for 12 years, and after that the sugarcane has destroyed everything. The mill uses heavy machines to prepare the land, and it causes soil erosion. They burn sugarcane, and the ashes spread throughout the region. I did not want to lease out my land, and now I’m surrounded by sugarcane. Here there is no more land for farming, and therefore food prices have risen a lot. My neighbours have stopped producing corn, beans, coffee, and milk, and leased out their lands. I still plant corn, beans, and produce milk, but for small producers the price did not increase, only for the middleman and for consumers.”[5]

Indigenous leaders say that their traditional lands are being taken for plantations, despite a programme to recognise indigenous territories.[6] The Fact Finding Mission of NGOs to Brazil, organised by the organisation FIAN in spring 2008, found that “..the process of expansion of sugar cane plantations has postponed the demarcation of indigenous lands in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, further worsening the violations of the right to land and food of indigenous peoples, particularly the Guarani Kaiow, are subjected to.”[7]

Working conditions on the plantations are harsh, with poor accommodation and food, little health care and in some remote areas effective imprisonment. There are reports of workers dying because of overwork, of plantations using slave labour and child labour at harvest time.[8]

The heavy reliance on nitrogen fertilisers adds to sugarcane’s climate impacts and results in water pollution, leading to eutrophication of coastal waters and estuaries. Pesticides also increase the pollution, building up in rivers and streams. Sugarcane cultivation damages the soil, depleting the nutrients and leading to erosion.

Burning of sugarcane fields is widespread, causing damage to the soil, adding to greenhouse gas emissions as well as causing serious problems for the local population including respiratory diseases related to smoke and ash, fire risk, heat, air pollution.[9]

Furthermore, for every litre of ethanol, 10-13 litres of a residue called vinhoto or stillage are produced. At least 170 billion litres of stillage are deposited in Brazil’s sugar growing regions, contaminating rivers and groundwater.[10]

Certifying “Better” Sugarcane ethanol?

Given the problems associated with many sources of agrofuel, certification schemes have been put forward as a way of identifying “sustainable” sources of the fuel. A number of voluntary schemes have been developed by the private sector, sometimes in partnership with some NGOs.

Round tables on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and Responsible Soy (RTRS) are still being developed, while there are also proposals for a Round Table on Sustainable Biofuels. But such initiatives appear to provide little guarantee that the accredited feedstocks are in fact “sustainable”; they often lack involvement of affected communities or small scale producers.[11] By providing the new ’sustainable’ agrofuel market, as well as the traditional markets (that are often growing too) with green labels, they even facilitate and legitimise the overall monocrop expansion.

The so far little known “Better Sugar Cane initiative” (BSI) - a partnership of a number of producers, retailers, traders and investors, is less active and has a lower profile than the Round Tables. Founded in 2005 by World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC), it appears to have made little progress in defining what constitutes “better sugarcane”.

[12] The push for agrofuels has nevertheless provided a new dynamic for the BSI. The Initiative has been put forward by some within the EU as a suitable platform for developing sustainability criteria for sugarcane. It has recently gained three new members from the energy sector, BP, Shell and Greenergy. Another recent member is UNICA, a lobby group that represents the interests of some major sugar cane producers and distributors.[13] As we will see, UNICA is currently undertaking strong lobbying efforts in Brussels to push for the 10% agrofuel target in the EU.

BSI was set up to develop baseline criteria for sourcing and producing sustainable sugar cane, although, like the other Round Tables, it is a voluntary scheme. As yet, however, it has not published any standards or any form of framework for monitoring the chain of custody. Nor do its staff appear to be particularly qualified in issues concerning sustainable agriculture.

BSI’s project manager, David Wilders, previously worked as an overseas representative for the South African Sugar Association (SASA), representing the interests of the South African sugar industry. The heads of two of the technical working groups in charge of formulating standards were consultants for SASA.

Most of BSI’s members come from industry and the steering committee is dominated by big companies including Cargill, Tate and Lyle, Coca Cola, British Sugar, and the oil giants Shell, and BP, alongside European and American NGO’s such as WWF and Ethical Sugar. No trade unions or rural community organisations from sugar-growing areas are involved. Ethical Sugar in the past claimed to be trying to engage with grassroots organisations, but with little sign of success.

Power with a price tag:

One reason for this limited involvement could be the considerable cost. Joining the BSI Steering Committee, and therefore having voting rights, costs US$25,000, and becoming a ‘Special Advisor’ is US$10,000. This is extraordinarily undemocratic and unheard of in any of the other Roundtables.

The only Brazilian stakeholder wealthy enough to get involved is UNICA. UNICA’s executive board members include Bioenergia, the Brazilian representative of Louis Dreyfus (a global commodity processing and trading company), and two powerful sugar conglomerates in Brazil, the Santa Elisa and Cosan groups.

It is in fact perhaps unlikely that grassroots organisations would chose to sit down with multinational like Cargill, currently vice chair of the steering committee. In 2007, 900 sugar cane workers and peasants lead a protest against Cargill’s CEVASA operations in Sao Paulo State, which they said were responsible for the death of 17 women working on the plantations, as well as having destroyed opportunities for subsistence farming in the rural communities.[14] Shell, another member of the steering committee, has a number of lawsuits pending in the US and the UK for its involvement in human rights and environmental violations in Argentina and Nigeria, including torture and murder.[15]

 { as we debunked the energy question above, we must also look at this seeming NGO proposed criticism that we smell rather comming from the economy sector that is reased by fossil carbon oil. Like decent NGOs we also think that corporations must be held accountable for their deeds, but we also think that people must get employment - so having a sugar-cane agriculture is important if you have a poor, unschooled population that must find employment. Checking into the working conditions - YES, cutting the employment from under their feet - NO.

Further, we talk here about sugar-cane in Brazil, not palm tres in Malaysia, so please stick to the point. We also do not talk here about Genetically Engineered plantations - the world has many problems - but the one and only problem the Brazilians came to Brussels to fight for - is their right to make money from displacing some of the reliance on fossil carbon  spewing petroleum fuels, with much more benevolent biologically recycled CO2 that its efficiency is calculated in cradle to grave arithmetics.}

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GM ‘better’ sugarcane?

There is little clear indication of the BSI’s position on genetically modified sugarcane. GM sugar cane varieties are currently being tested in Brazil. [16] If the experience of the other Roundtables is anything to go by, industry is unlikely to accept the exclusion of GM crops from ’sustainable’ certification, regardless of environmental and social impacts of GM crops.

A number of BSI members, including BP, Shell, and Cargill are involved in collaborations or have investments in the biotech companies such as Monsanto, Du-pont, and Bayer [17] - while SASA has been linked to open field trials of GM sugar cane.[18]

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Promoting sugarcane in Brussels:

The Brazilian government and the producers’ organisation UNICA have been actively lobbying in Brussels ahead of key votes on agrofuels.

UNICA hired the lobby consultancy firm Fleishman-Hillard in May 2008 to help push its call on the EU to stick to the original Commission proposal for a 10% agrofuel target by 2020. In a press release, the newly appointed UNICA representative in Brussels, Emmanuel Desplechin, declared that “Sugarcane ethanol, produced with environmental and social care, will quickly become a global energy commodity. Sugarcane production can boost economies in developing nations and contribute significantly in the search for solutions to the global challenges of energy security and climate change”.[19]

With Brazilian interests expanding into African countries (who have privileged access to the EU market), the Brazilian government has also mobilised African farmers and government representatives to help make their case to MEPs.

The Argentinean, Brazilian, Indonesian, Malawian, Malaysian, Mozambican and South African embassies to the EU sent a joint letter to members of the Environment Committee saying that the sustainability criteria “should not disproportionately penalise countries rich in biodiversity with unjustified, wide-ranging restrictions on the sustainable use of their territories”. Due to the ‘uncertainties’, the letter argues that the crucial issue of indirect land use change should be postponed to a ‘future stage’. Whereas the European Commission (EC) has always refused to include social impacts, most environmental impacts and indirect land use change in the Renewables Directive, these embassies claim in their letter that the EC has “convincingly demonstrated” that the 10% target can be “reached on a sustainable basis”.

One UNICA representative, who gave a presentation at a seminar on agrofuels in the European Parliament, despite not being on the panel, argued that sugarcane ethanol would mean a democratisation of production and access to energy, and denied that it contributed to deforestation and arguing that food production was continuing to increase alongside increasing production of sugarcane in Brazil.

Using full-page advertisements in the Brussels weekly paper European Voice ahead of key votes in July and in September, UNICA supported their claims that a 10% target would “help fight climate change” by arguing that sugarcane captured more carbon than pasture land - overlooking scientific evidence on the quantity of carbon dioxide stored and released from the soil, and not looking at indirect impacts.

The advertisement also claimed that sugarcane production had no impact on the Amazon, despite the strong evidence that it is displacing other types of agriculture and cattle ranching into the Amazon basin. In addition, other agrofuel monocrops that Brazil could export to the EU, in order to meet this agrofuel target, are directly impacting the Amazon, in particular soy expansion. At the same time, sugarcane production is damaging other precious ecosystems, like the Cerrado and the Atlantic Forest - earlier this year Brazil’s Environment Minister Carlos Minc fined 24 sugar and ethanol mills in the North East of the country, declaring them an environmental “disaster of disasters” responsible for the loss of 85,000 hectares of Atlantic rain forest.[20]

The Brazilian sugarcane industry is taking various other steps to improve its image, like promoting a privately-run scheme encouraging small farmers to produce “sustainable” ethanol in the State of Sao Paulo - by reducing chemical use, harvesting mechanically and not using child labour. But the scheme, the first to have included small producers, will apply to just 50 suppliers and cover 3,500 hectares [21] - out of a total area of some 7.05 million hectares of sugarcane in Brazil, over half of which is used for ethanol.

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Conclusions:

The Brazilian government and the Brazilian sugarcane industry have a lot to gain from the EU agrofuel market and they have spared little expense in promoting their case. But the reality of sugarcane ethanol in Brazil reveals a rather grim picture. Climate benefits are assumed often without taking into account indirect land use change.

EU targets will further promote sugarcane monoculture expansion. Sustainability criteria cannot address indirect impacts resulting from this expansion. However, certification schemes are now used to legitimise EU agrofuel targets. The “Better Sugar Initiative” promotes itself as a credible platform, but is in fact dominated by the interests of the sugar business and does not include small farmers, landless people and labour organisations.

The car and oil industry should not be given an escape route in the form of agrofuels. The European Parliament should not be seduced to support a 10% target by sweet promises of ’sustainable’ sugarcane ethanol.

{Politics aside, we agree with the last item in these conclusions - the fact that efficiency and conservation come ahead of the effort to provide fuel for the existing infrastructure. We also agree wholeheartedly that a change in lifestyles is required so we need less liquid fuels - period. But, when it comes to replacing 10% of the gasoline pool with ethanol, and this provides a 1.6 times higher replacement value then as presented by simple volumetric replacement calculations - this is a winner. we do not see how Roberto Savio gave his hand to this whynning diatribe.}

Notes {given by the original article - please look them up at your own peril}:

1. http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/10165/a/96….
2. Land Clearing and Biofuel Carbon Debt, Joseph Fargione et al, Science, February 2008.
3. De-polluting Doubts, p.4, Lucia Ortiz, FoE Brazil.
4. Fact-Finding Mission Report on Impacts of the Agrofuels Expansion on the Enjoyment of Social Rights of Rural Workers, Indigenous Peoples and Peasants in Brazil, May 2008, www.fian.org.
5. Sugarcane plantations destroy the Cerrado in Brazil, Maria Luisa Mendon�a, Brasil de Fato, July 2 2008.
6. Fact Finding Mission Report.
7. Fact Finding Mission Report.
8. De-polluting Doubts; Fact Finding Mission report; Martinelli and Filoso .
9. Expansion of sugarcane ethanol production in Brazil: environmental and social challenges, Martinelli and Filoso, 2008; De-polluting Doubts.
10. Human Rights in Brazil 2007, A Report by the Network for Social Justice and Human Rights, MailScanner has detected a possible fraud attempt from “www.corporateeurope.org” claiming to be www.social.org.br/relatorioingles2007.pdf.
11. Paving the Way for Agrofuels, TNI 2007, www.tni.org.
12. www.bettersugarcane.org.
13. www.bettersugarcane.org
14. http://www.viacampesina.org/main_en/inde….
15. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn….
16. http://www.financialexpress.com/news/GM-….
17. http://www.grain.org/seedling/?id=488.
18. http://www.biosafetyafrica.net/portal/DO….
19. http://www.investegate.co.uk/Article.asp….
20. Brazil Environment Minister Fines Cane Mills, Reuters 2 July 2008.
21. http://uk.reuters.com/article/environmen….

Source:  TNI http://www.tni.org

 http://www.other-net.info/index.php

Some EU states to hold back on Georgia mission: EU foreign ministers are today to adopt the mandate, composition and financing of the bloc’s mission to Georgia,  says Elitsa Vucheva from brussels, the EUobserver, September 15, 2008.

EU ministers will on Monday (15 September) gather in Brussels to decide the composition of the bloc’s peace mission to Georgia, while a question mark remains over where exactly the EU force will be deployed.

France and Germany are expected to contribute the largest number of troops, with Berlin saying it would contribute “around one-fifth” of the 200-member mission and a French defence ministry source telling the AFP news agency that France could send around 70 people.
The UK will on Monday announce “substantial numbers” to join the EU mission, reports the Telegraph. Poland has signaled it wants to play a large role. Romania plans to send 20 personnel, while most other EU states are expected to commit “between two and 20 people” each.

Some countries, on the other hand, have expressed less enthusiasm. Belgian foreign minister Karel De Gucht told daily La Libre Belgique that his country would like to delay its participation to “the first changeover, within six months” in order to first see where exactly the mission will be deployed.

“Nicolas Sarkozy has said that [EU troops] will be deployed in a dismembered Georgia, but that they could go to South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well. However, Russian [foreign] minister Lavrov says this is out of the question,” Mr De Gucht said.

“If Europeans can only deploy in the security zone, that gives me a bad feeling, as, basically, we will have to protect borders which we have not recognised,” he added, referring to the borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which earlier proclaimed independence from Georgia.

Deploy where?

Speaking to journalists in Brussels on Friday (12 September), a French EU presidency source said that the long-term goal would be to deploy the EU mission across the entire Georgian territory “as recognised by international law.”

However, he stressed, the priority is to deploy in the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia first and to make sure that Russia withdraws from Georgia by 10 October, as earlier agreed. Russian troops started to pull out from Georgia proper over the weekend, international media report.

But Russia - which has recognised the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia - has rejected the presence of EU troops in the breakaway regions.

“South Ossetia and Abkhazia are now sovereign states. The governments of these two countries must agree in order for international observers to be sent on their territories,” Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told Le Figaro.

The EU monitoring mission is expected to be deployed before 1 October.

The bloc’s foreign mnisters are also to discuss who will be appointed EU special representative for Georgia, as agreed earlier in September, with Pierre Morel – currently the EU special representative for Central Asia - the front-runner for the job, an EU official told EUobserver.

[Comment] Transport - go green or go under.
RUPERT WOLFE MURRAY, from Romania - an Olinion on EUobserver, September 10, 2008.

EUOBSERVER / COMMENT – Are there any political leaders in the EU who say we must (urgently) move towards renewable-energy-transport and that road-building can no longer be our top transport priority?

The issue is getting urgent and we must prepare for the risk of oil depletion and global warming, which could result in a six-metre rise in sea levels.

(Rupert Wolfe Murray is an independent consultant based in Romania.)

Even a small risk of oil running out should be enough to make us urgently review our transport sector. The economic arguments are powerful: There is big money to be made by “electrifying” Europe’s transport fleets and the car industry is indeed quietly moving towards the electric car. But the political will is missing.

The “Peak Oil Theory” of global oil supplies “peaking” in 2012 was not taken seriously by the mainstream until recently. That attitude is starting to change. Shell Oil recently sponsored an advert in Time Magazine that quoted a former US energy secretary as saying: “We can’t continue to make supply meet demand for much longer. It’s no longer the case that we have a few voices crying in the wilderness. The battle is over. The peakists have won.”

If oil did peak, the consequences for our transport system, food supply and economic system would be devastating. Although there is growing interest in renewable energy, it is still considered somewhat marginal, uncompetitive and untested. There is no sign of a “rush to renewables” that could be compared to the “dash to gas” that took place in the UK during the 1980s. We are still tinkering at the margins.

The EU’s new transport policy must be based upon renewable energy. The first challenge is a conceptual one: People need to understand that a transport system can function on electricity just as efficiently as it now does on oil. The case for a renewable transport system needs to be communicated to the public and a massive investment plan worked out.

It is becoming increasingly clear that a combination of wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power could provide us with a carbon-free power supply. The most exciting developments seem to be taking place in the solar energy industry, where prices are falling rapidly.

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European electrical grid to northern Africa:

A German utility recently commissioned a study into extending the European electrical grid to northern Africa – a potential major supplier of solar energy. Apparently Morocco could provide all of Europe with electricity if three percent of the country was covered with solar panels. Cost is a major barrier here, but if we consider that global companies will spend $3.4 trillion on IT this year according to Gartner, a consultancy, it is clear that the cash is available.

Another barrier to the development of electricity as a replacement fuel is the challenge of storing electricity. The electric car could provide a solution to this problem. The concept is simple: electric cars would charge up at night, when electricity is cheap, and during the day the grid could draw off some electric power from individual cars, when extra power is needed.

According to the Zero Carbon Britain group, if Britain’s car fleet became electric, it would provide the grid with more than enough reserve energy to meet any surges in demand.

Electric cars, bicycles and improved public transport could take care of almost all transport requirements at the urban level. But what about long distance transport? There is talk of biofuel and hydrogen fuelled planes, but the future for these fuels does not look promising.

***

The train from Naples to New York:

A strong transport policy would confront the energy and transport lobbies and phase out aviation altogether, replacing it with high-speed trains and wind-powered ships. A French train recently broke the 500-km-an-hour speed record.

If the Russians and Americans took the plunge, they could build an “Intercontinental Peace Bridge” across the Bering Straits and it might be possible to one day get a train from Naples to New York.

What about freight? Our economic system has become so dependent on big trucks that it is hard to think what could replace them. Europe’s freight-train infrastructure has become so neglected – with the exception of Germany – that upgrading it would cost trillions of Euros.

But there is another alternative: the airship. Interest in airships is currently growing and scientists say that future “freight airships” could pick up containers directly from a factory yard, fly across the world and deliver inside another factory yard. We need to urgently develop these future forms of transport before it is too late.

Rupert Wolfe Murray is an independent consultant based in Romania and author of the blog: www.productive.ro/blog

———–

Melting ice cap pushes Arctic up EU agenda.
New transit routes across the Arctic present great commercial opportunities and enormous environmental risks.
LEIGH PHILLIPS, EUobserver, September 10, 2008.

EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS - The rapid melting of the polar ice cap in the Arctic offers Europe a “first-time opportunity” to access new trade routes and massive oil and gas deposits, the European Commission has said - developments that are pushing the EU’s polar strategy up the policy agenda.

Speaking in Ilulissat, Greenland, on Tuesday (9 September) to a conference of the Nordic Council of Ministers dedicated to Arctic issues, the EU’s fisheries and maritime affairs commissioner Joe Borg said: “As the ice recedes, we are presented with a first-time opportunity to use transport routes such as the Northern Sea Route.

“This would translate into shorter transportation routes and greater trading possibilities, and will provide a better opportunity to draw upon the wealth of untapped natural resources in the Arctic,” Mr Borg told the council, an intergovernmental forum for co-operation between the Nordic countries established after the Second World War.

The Nordic Council brings together EU member states Denmark, Finland and Sweden alongside Norway and Iceland - both outside the bloc - as well as the autonomous territories of Greenland, the Faroe Islands and the Aland Islands.

:

In his speech, Mr Borg also highlighted a document published earlier this year by the commission jointly with the EU’s chief diplomat, Javier Solana, that mapped out the latest thinking from Brussels on the security implications of climate change.

The seven-page paper authored by Mr Solana and commissioner for external relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, distributed to EU government leaders in March, argued that the European Union should boost its civil and military capacities to respond to “serious security risks” resulting from catastrophic climate change.

The paper, Climate Change and International Security, underlined the risks and opportunities presented by the melting Arctic, alongside concerns about increased numbers of migrants, territorial disputes, water shortages in Israel and decreases in crop yields in the broader Middle East. Political radicalisation as a result of climate insecurity, sea-level rises and extreme weather events also present security challenges, according to the report.

Commissioner Borg emphasised the centrality of the Arctic in EU security thinking: “This document highlights the growing geopolitical importance of the Arctic region … [with the] opening up [of] new waterways and international trade routes, and the increased accessibility to the enormous hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic region.

“This accessibility, in conjunction with territorial claims, is changing the geo-strategic dynamics of the region with potential consequences for international stability and for European security, trade and resource interests,” he added.

Regional governance:

Later this year, the commission is to present a communication dedicated to the Arctic region that will tackle issues related to climate change as well as regional governance.

The communication is to propose three main actions. Firstly, the commission is to propose measures supporting scientific research and monitoring with the aim of safeguarding the Arctic environment.

The commission is also interested in the exploitation of Arctic resources such as hydrocarbons and other commodities. The commissioner underscored that this must be done in a sustainable manner, but he also said that the communication hopes to outline how all regions that border the Arctic could gain equal access to such bounty.

“We should seek to apply the principles of a level playing field and reciprocal market access in the Arctic,” he said.

The commissioner also said the EU should seek to ensure equal access to any new fishing opportunities via new regulation and work towards an international fisheries conservation and management scheme for the Arctic - something which has never been implemented.

The third element of the commission’s new thinking on the Arctic is developing the governance of the region.

Noting that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and work performed by the Nordic Council, the Arctic Council and other bodies have already played something of a function in this area, the commissioner said: “Nevertheless, we should be open to develop this system further,” he said, adding that international environmental treaties that apply to the Arctic should be revisited.

In June, the Nordic Council published an extensive study of EU-Arctic policies, and called on the bloc to establish a self-standing Arctic-dedicated unit within the European Commission. The document also suggested the EU needed to “establish, intensify and possibly formalise international co-operation with Arctic regional bodies”.

‘Crazy situation’

Environmentalists agree with the commission that the melting ice cap is a brute fact and that in the absence of appropriate governance, there could be a ‘scramble for the Arctic’ without movement by the EU in this direction.

“There is no environmental management framework for the Arctic,” Neil Hamilton, the director of the WWF’s Arctic programme.

“There is overlapping legislation in various countries, but nothing Arctic-specific, with a result that everyone is looking to Arctic exploitation instead of sustainable development.

“We have a crazy situation where every one is rushing to get into fishing, shipping and oil and gas, but no one’s looking at the manner in which it will occur.”

“It’s not that there should be no exploitation at all,” qualified Mr Hamilton. “Instead, there should be effective management, which we take to mean collaborative management between the different countries.

“Done right, it could be a model for oil and gas extraction for the world.”

But green groups are clear that the emphasis should be on sustainable development, rather than the rush for resources.

“On the other hand, if you open up shipping routes, it could have significant global implications.

“The worst-case scenario would be oil spills in the Arctic, which are impossible to clean up, given the conditions there. And a spill in the Arctic would be catastrophic.”

Middle East peace talks =Palestinians lose faith in two-state solution:
Study group calls for new form of resistance to Israeli occupation with goal of single, bi-national state.
Rory McCarthy from Jerusalem, for the guardian.co.uk,
Thursday September 04, 2008.

A group of prominent Palestinian figures has proposed a radical change in strategy to demand a single, bi-national state if the current round of Middle East peace talks fails.

The Palestinian Strategy Study Group, an EU-funded project written by 27 leading Palestinian figures from across the political spectrum, argued that the current two-state framework for peace talks is failing to bring the promised independent state. Instead, it suggested ending the negotiation process that has gone on now for nearly 20 years, reconstituting the Palestinian Authority into what might become a “Palestinian Resistance Authority”, and developing a form of “smart” resistance.

“The central aim will be to maximise the cost of continuing occupation for Israel, and to make the whole prospect of unilateral separation unworkable,” it said. The final, and most striking proposal, is to shift to a “single state outcome” as the Palestinians’ preferred goal. This, it said, would regain the strategic initiative for the Palestinians.

“Although many Palestinians may still prefer a genuine negotiated two-state solution, a failure of the present Annapolis initiative will greatly strengthen those who argue against this,” the report said. “Most Palestinians are then likely to be convinced that a negotiated agreement is no longer possible.”

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It is not the first time a bi-national state has been proposed as a Palestinian goal, but the new report signals a marked shift in Palestinian thinking at a time when the latest peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians are yet again struggling to make any headway. Questions are now being asked on both sides about the future of the two-state solution that for so long has been the framework of Middle East peacemaking.

The greatest disquiet is on the Palestinian side, where even moderates are now beginning to sense the two-state formula is moving out of reach.

“I feel that a two-state solution is losing currency amongst both our peoples and with the world community beyond,” said Salam Fayyad, the Palestinian prime minister and former World Bank and IMF economist, in a speech he wrote for a meeting of former Israeli diplomats yesterday and which was delivered by Riad Malki, the Palestinian foreign minister.

Malki himself admitted that, despite 10 months of talks between Israeli and Palestinian leaders, which began in Annapolis, in the United States, not a single word of agreement had been put on paper. The Annapolis process, the first such peace talks in seven years, were supposed to produce a peace agreement by the end of this year - a goal that has proved wildly unrealistic.

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Another group, the Israel-Palestine Centre for Research and Information, published a policy document this week with proposals for the Palestinians to change the status quo. Among the options it said were available were dissolving the Palestinian Authority, calling for a one-state solution and making a Kosovo-style unilateral declaration of independence.

However, it noted that the chief risk of calling for a single, bi-national state was that nothing would change and the status quo would simply worsen given how deeply unpopular the idea is among Israelis. “With so little support from the more powerful neighbour, it seems unlikely that the Palestinian call for unity will bring many positive results in the near term,” it said. Instead, it concluded: “We feel that a tightly coordinated non-violent campaign toward statehood is the best option.”

One of the key obstacles on the Palestinian side now is the bitter infighting between the two leading factions, Fatah and Hamas. Since last year, Hamas, the Islamist group that won elections in 2006, has been in full control of Gaza and daily seems to be dividing ever further from its rival Fatah, which effectively controls the West Bank. Even if a peace agreement was reached this year, it is hard to see how it might be implemented in Gaza without reconciliation between the rival factions, and for now that seems out of their grasp.

On the Israeli side, opinion is more mixed. In general the two-state solution is still broadly regarded as a reasonable goal, although there are many on the rightwing who say Israel should not give up the land it captured in 1967 or who say Israelis have a Biblical right to settle in the West Bank that cannot be negotiated away.

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Ehud Olmert, the Israeli prime minister who will step down later this month, has pursued negotiations, arguing that a two-state solution is attainable. On Sunday he will discuss with the cabinet a plan to pay compensation to encourage some of the more distant settlers in the West Bank to move either to Israel or to settlements within the West Bank barrier.

Tzipi Livni, the foreign minister who is likely to replace him as head of the ruling Kadima party, also argues in favour of negotiations and has been deeply involved in the latest talks, although she has said she would resist pressure to hurry the negotiations. Ehud Barak, the defence minister, suggested yesterday that some of the Palestinian areas of Jerusalem might become the future capital of a Palestinian state, an idea which has not always been palatable to Israelis.

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Yet there are others beginning to voice different ideas. In a newspaper column in the Yedioth Ahronoth this week, Giora Eiland, a former head of the National Security Council and former national security adviser under Ariel Sharon, said the gap between Israel and the Palestinians was “enormous” and growing.

“The maximum that the Israeli government [any government] will be able to offer the Palestinians [and survive politically] falls short of the minimum that the Palestinian government [any government] can agree to accept [and survive politically],” he wrote. Eiland argued that a final status peace deal “will not be achievable in the foreseeable future” and that new ideas should be considered. He suggested returning control of the West Bank to Jordan, who controlled it before the 1967 war.

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At www.SustainabiliTank.info, we go even further - we are advocating a Three State Solution.  That is sort of a Hamasstan in the Gaza Strip - to be started under the supervision of Egypt, and a Palestine-West-Bank State that will start out with organized help led by Jordan. The aim of the two “supervising states” will have o be well defined in advance - not as annexation - but as a management for obtaining future total independence. If in the end this leads to some sort of confederation that involves also Israel, so much the better. But without first preparing the ground for some sort of clearly defined Palestinian economies (and I mean two of them in parallel) there is no future for any sort of solution.       A united -one-Palestinian entity is not in the cards, so a two State solution is also very difficult.

Chinese company wants to buy Brussels Airlines and its Airport.
VALENTINA POP, September 5, 2008.

Chinese airline Hainan may challenge a bid by Lufthansa to buy Brussels Airlines, with the Asian firm already in talks to snap up Belgium’s Charleroi airport.

German carrier Lufthansa remains the favourite bidder for Brussels Airlines, but some shareholders in the Belgian company believe the offer is too low and are looking at other partners, such as British Airways and Hainan, Sueddeutsche Zeitung reported on Friday (5 September).

Late last week, Lufthansa said it was in “constructive negotiations” to acquire a 45 percent stake in Brussels Airlines for €65 million, expecting to close the deal within the next few weeks. The remaining stake was then to be taken over after two years.

But shareholders in Brussels Airlines believe the carrier is worth at least €200 million. Brussels Airlines is the heir to the bankrupt Sabena, with a 30 percent share having been taken over in 2006 by Richard Branson’s Virgin Express.

Hainan’s interest in Brussels Airlines is fortified by its bid for Charleroi airport, a low-cost hub 46 km south of the Belgian capital.

Hainan is among the three companies shortlisted to buy up the currently publicly owned Charleroi airport, with the Chinese company saying it is one of their priorities and promising further developments of the low cost terminal, La Libre Belgique reported on Tuesday.

The move has sparked internal competition between Charleroi and the main Brussels airport, Zaventem, out of which Hainan operates a number of flights. Unidentified sources close to the deal told the Belgian newspaper that the managers of Zaventem had launched a “sabotage and denigration campaign” of Charleroi airport, in order to distract the Chinese.

La Libre Belgique also reported that the Flemish region and the Brussels Airport Company (BAC) who manages Zaventem gave Hainan Airlines financial advantages worth €1.5 million.

The newspaper draws a comparison with the aid offered by the Charleroi airport and the Walloon region to the Irish carrier Ryanair, aid deemed illegal by the European Commission in 2004.

After having read the newspaper report, the Walloon minister for transportation, Andre Antoine, said: “Nobody is stupid. The aim of the manoeuvre is to attract the Chinese to Zaventem, not Charleroi.”

Zaventem is Brussel’s main international airport.

In return, BAC said it didn’t understand the minister’s reaction and didn’t see any problems with the €1.5 million contract it signed two years ago with the Chinese company, in order to promote the Flemish region in Shanghai and Beijing. The contract does not involve directly neither BAC, nor Hainan Airlines, a press spokesman for BAC said.

La Libre Belgique reported that the contract involved some €400,000 being payed to Hainan for “marketing support” and €200,000 for language training for the pilots of the company. Only €900,000 were allocated to promoting the region in China, the newspaper says.

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[Comment / Opinion on EUobserver] After Georgia: is Ukraine next?
ANDREW WILSON, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, September 5, 2008.

EUOBSERVER / COMMENT - The war in Georgia began by exposing the security vacuum in the surrounding region. Now it has claimed its first collateral victim, after the fall of the Ukrainian government on 2 September.

The crisis has been brewing over the summer recess, but came to a head in late August after President Yushchenko’s administration accused Prime Minister Tymoshenko of trading her relative silence over Georgia for Russian support in a campaign to supplant him as president.

Ukraine president Viktor Yushchenko - the 2004 Orange Revolution feels a long time ago (Photo: timoshenko.com.ua)

When parliament reassembled, Tymoshenko joined forces with the east Ukrainian-based Party of Regions, ramming through a law to reduce presidential power, and apparently repositioning herself as a more pro-Russian candidate in the presidential race.

Parliament was also unable to agree any of several diametrically opposed resolutions on Georgia, ranging from outright condemnation of Russia to recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The crisis comes in between the emergency EU summit on Russia-Georgia in Brussels on 1 September and the regular EU-Ukraine summit on 9 September in Evian, France.

The EU therefore has an ideal opportunity to push back against Russia’s attempts to dominate the European neighbourhood by starting with Ukraine, which is also the linchpin for the whole region.

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War of words:

Many Ukrainians now hear domestic echoes of the lead-up to war in Georgia. Ukraine has its own potentially separatist region in Crimea, and the country’s Russian minority numbers some 8.3 million (the largest minority in Europe).

Half of Ukraine’s population of just over 46 million are Russian-speaking in various degrees. Although the Ukrainian constitution bans dual citizenship, the government has launched an inquiry into alleged covert Russian passport-holding in the Crimean city of Sevastopol.

Some Ukrainians note that Russia justified its invasion of Georgia, as the Nazis once justified their dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, as being necessary to “protect” a minority to whom they had just given citizenship.

Russia has begun a war of words over Ukraine’s alleged supply of arms to Georgia. And the conflict itself has shown that the Russian Black Sea Fleet, based in Sevastopol, can operate with impunity, whether Ukraine likes it or not.

Based on its analysis of Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” as a foreign-backed “NGO coup,” Russia has also been quietly building its own network of Russia-friendly NGOs in Ukraine since 2004.

Ukrainians also talk of an otkat ekonomiya (”kickback economy”), in which Russian money percolates throughout the Ukrainian elite.

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A strategy for Ukraine:

What should the EU therefore offer in Evian? The European Neighborhood Policy is a worthy enough technical process, but it does not address pressing political concerns about maintaining and securing Ukraine’s independence.

Many member states will worry about leaping straight to the contentious issue of ultimate membership for Ukraine, but the EU already recognizes Ukraine’s theoretical right to join once it has met the Copenhagen criteria; and it cannot be beyond EU leaders’ verbal dexterity to play up the prospect.

What Ukraine would value and needs most is a real sense that it is being treated distinctly in its own right. The key words are “association” and “partnership,” in whatever order or combination.

The EU has greater scope for short-term measures, which should be designed to deliver a multi-dimensional solidarity strategy for Ukraine.

The EU’s foreign ministers should invite their Ukrainian counterpart to give a briefing on Ukraine-Russia relations at their next meeting.

Ukraine should be offered a road map for visa-free travel, as well as ensuring that member states deliver on current visa facilitation measures. The new EU-Ukraine agreement should include a beefed-up solidarity clause, building on the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, whereby the EU would consult and assist Ukraine in case of challenges to its territorial integrity and sovereignty. And the EU should back Ukraine if it insists that the Russian Black Sea Fleet leaves on schedule in 2017.

The EU should also launch a comprehensive study of all aspects of Europe’s reliance on Russian energy supplies, including transit, energy security and conservation, supply diversification, and the impact of “bypass” pipelines like Nordstream and South Stream.

It should consider linking the opening of the Nordstream pipeline, which would allow Russia to cut off gas to Poland and Ukraine while maintaining deliveries to Germany, to the opening of the proposed “White Stream” pipeline to bring gas from Azerbaijan directly to Ukraine via Georgia, bypassing Russia.

The EU could even play a part in keeping the 2012 European Championship football finals on track. The decision to appoint Ukraine and Poland as co-hosts was a powerful symbol of European unity across the current EU border (Poland is a member, Ukraine is not).

UEFA is unhappy with Ukraine’s progress in building the necessary infrastructure, but Ukraine should be given time to get its act together.

Where appropriate, the EU should extend these measures to Moldova, which is now calling Ukraine a “strategic shelter,” most probably after the elections in March 2009.

Ukraine faces a crucial presidential election in 2009 or 2010. After getting its fingers badly burned at the last election in 2004, Russia is clearly tempted to intervene again. The “Russian factor” will strongly influence the campaign.

Greater Western engagement is needed to ensure that the “Europe factor” is equally prominent.