This weekend, as expected, the TV was plastered with the Russians in Georgia and the Beijing Olympics.

President Bush and Secretary Condaleezza Rice said that Russia will not get away with this like it happened in Hungary.

On CNN, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the man with the Kosovo and Bosnia experience, said this was not Kosovo. The Russians were ready to stage this action already two years ago. It happened now because there was a Russian provocation and there has been indeed a real ethnic cleansing going on in Ossetia and in Abkhazia that caused many thousands of refugees pouring continuously into Georgia. The US says the number is 150,000 displaced people.

Holbrooke looks back into history and thinks of Budapest of 19956, Prag of 1966, Afghanistan of 1968 - so this is the invasion of Georgia that was executed in similar methodology.

Dmitry Simes, President of the Washington DC Nixon Center, and Rose Gottemoeller, Director of Carnegie, Moscow, agree to the above and say that the fact that this happened again at the time of the Olympics, just shows the Putin self confidence and that Putin does not worry that this will harm Russia’s Sochi Winter Olympics of 2014. That area is in fact just across the border from were fighting was going on now.

Governor Bill Richardson stressed that this is not time for high US talk, simply, “we have no leverage on Russia,” so we have to engage them and not isolate them. He knows the area, problems, has been there - all as part of his UN Ambassadorship.

Georgia was incorporated into Russia in 1801 and stayed under Russian rule for 190 years. They re-emerged as an independent state only in 1991. The Ossentians always considered themselves different from the Georgians - and also not similar to the Russians. The same goes for Abkhazia and Azaria as per Rick Stengel, editor of Time Magazine, who was this Sunday’s coordinator of the GPS program that is usually brought out by Fareed Zakaria.

So, can one ostracize Russia from world business? Will this bring about a renewal of the Cold War?

He does not think that Russia has become a revisionist State and that it is fighting for a larger Russia. His idea is that the area is specially complicated - something like the Balkans, and that there were many reasons to what went on.

———

***

Cold Friends, Wrapped in Mink and Medals.

By BILL KELLER
Published in The New York Times August 16, 2008

Writing in The Financial Times last week, Chrystia Freeland recalled Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 essay “The End of History?,” which trumpeted the definitive triumph of liberal democracy. The great nightmare tyrannies of last century — the Evil Empire, Red China — had been left behind by those inseparable twins, freedom and prosperity. Civilization had chosen, and it chose us.

Related
Map
Russia Marches, Neighbors Check Their Cards (The New York Times, August 17, 2008)
Specter of Arrest Deters Demonstrators in China (The New York Tines, August 14, 2008)

Chrystia Freeland’s Article: The New Age of Authoritarianism  www.ft.com August 12, 2008)

So much for that thesis. Surveying the Russian military rout of neighboring Georgia and the spectacle of China’s Olympics, Ms. Freeland, editor of The Financial Times’s American edition and a journalist who started her career covering Russia and Ukraine, proclaimed that a new Age of Authoritarianism was upon us.

If it is not yet an age, it is at least a season: Springtime for autocrats, and not just the minor-league monsters of Zimbabwe and the like, but the giant regimes that seemed so surely bound for the ash heap in 1989.

The Chinese have made their Olympics an exultant display of athletic prowess and global prestige without having to temper their impulse to suppress and control. From the dazzling locksteps of that opening ceremony, to the kowtowing international V.I.P.’s, to the carefully policed absence of protest, this was an Olympics largely free of democratic mess.

Individualism has been confined between lane markers. The pre-Olympics promises that attention would be paid to international norms of behavior went unredeemed. The New York Times’s Andrew Jacobs followed one citizen who decided to take up the government’s Olympic offer of designated protest zones for aggrieved parties who had filed the proper paperwork. Zhang Wei applied for the requisite license and was promptly arrested for “disturbing social order.” Take that, International Olympic Committee.

The striking thing about Russia’s subjugation of uppity Georgia was not the ease or audacity but the swagger of it. This was not just about a couple of obscure border enclaves, nor even, really, about Georgia. This was existential payback.

It turns out that if 1989 was an end — the end of the Wall, the beginning of the end of the Soviet empire, if not in fact the end of history — it was also a beginning.

It gave birth to a bitter resentment in the humiliated soul of Russia, and no one nursed the grudge so fiercely as Vladimir V. Putin. He watched the empire he had spied for disbanded. He endured the belittling lectures of a rich and self-righteous West. He watched the United States charm away his neighbors, invade his allies in Iraq, and, in his view, play God with the political map of Europe.

Mr. Putin is, in this sense of grievance, a man of his people, as visitors to the New York Times Web site can see in the sampling of breast-beating commentary from Russian bloggers. It is safe to assume that Mr. Putin’s already stratospheric popularity at home has grown to Phelpsian proportions, not least among the long-suffering military.

In China, 1989 was the year that a spark of liberal aspiration flickered on Tiananmen Square, and was decisively extinguished. That was another beginning, or at least a renewal: of Chinese resolve. In May of that year, in the midst of the Tiananmen euphoria, Mikhail S. Gorbachev visited Beijing, and two visions of a new communism stared each other in the face.

The protesters on the Chinese pavilion held banners welcoming Mr. Gorbachev as a champion of the greater freedom they sought. Meanwhile, the visiting Russian delegation marveled at the abundance in Chinese stores, the bounty of a policy that chose economic liberalization without political dissent.

The Chinese and Russians scorned each other’s neo-Communist models, but in some ways they have evolved toward one another. Both countries now tolerate a measure of entrepreneurship and social license, as long as neither threatens the dominion of the state. Both countries have calculated that you can buy a measure of domestic stability if you combine a little opportunity with an appeal to national pride. (The Chinese “street” felt no more sympathy for restive Tibetans than the Russian blogosphere felt for Georgia.) And both have discovered that if you are rich the world is less likely to get in your way.

President Bush was mocked from both sides for his seeming impotence. Neoconservatives were appalled by photos of President Bush sharing a laugh with Mr. Putin in Beijing while Russian armor gathered at the Georgian border. For a president who has made the export of democracy his signature doctrine, that looked to the stand-tough crowd like a “Pet Goat” moment.

Others argued that this was a crisis Mr. Bush tacitly encouraged by talking up Georgia’s rambunctious president as a friend and NATO candidate. By midweek, possibly goaded by the wailing of neoconservatives and the aggressively anti-Putin rhetoric of Senator John McCain, Mr. Bush had abruptly amped up his opprobrium and dispatched an American airlift of humanitarian aid. And by the weekend there was a cold war chill in the air.

But Mr. Bush’s predicament is not just his. The question of how to deal with these reinvigorated autocracies bedevils the Europeans and will surely rank high among the legacy issues that confound Mr. Bush’s successor.

This time it is not — or not yet — the threat of nuclear apocalypse that limits the West’s options toward our emboldened Eastern rivals. The Chinese, in fact, are acting as if they have gotten past the saber-rattling stage of emerging-power status; they lavish diplomacy on Taiwan and Japan, and deploy the might of capital instead. The Russians may be in a more adolescent, table-pounding stage of development, but Mr. Putin, too, prefers to work the economic levers, bullying with petroleum.

The United States, meanwhile, is mired in Iraq and Afghanistan, estranged from much of the world, and bled by serial economic crises.

History, it seems, is back, and not so obviously on our side.

Bill Keller, executive editor of The Times, covered the last years of the Soviet Union for the newspaper.

***

——————

The New Age of Authoritarianism.
By Chrystia Freeland
Published: August 12 2008 in The Financial Times.

In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, democracy was on the march and we declared the End of History. Nearly two decades later, a neo-imperialist Russia is at war with Georgia, Communist China is proudly hosting the Olympics, and we find that, instead, we have entered the Age of Authoritarianism.

It is worth recalling how different we thought the future would be in the immediate, happy aftermath of the end of the cold war. Remember Francis Fukuyama’s ringing assertion: “The triumph of the west, of the western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to western liberalism.”

Even in the heady days of 1989, that declaration of universal - and possibly eternal - ideological victory seemed a little hubristic to Professor Fukuyama’s many critics. Yet his essay made such an impact because it captured the scale, and the enormous benefits, of the change sweeping through the world. Not only was the stifling Soviet - which was really the Russian - suzerainty over central and eastern Europe and central Asia coming to an end but, even more importantly, the very idea of a one-party state, ruthlessly presiding over a centrally planned economy, seemed to be discredited, if not forever, then surely for our lifetimes.

That collapse brought freedom and prosperity to millions of people who had lived under Soviet rule. Moreover, the implosion of Soviet communism inspired hundreds of millions of others around the world to embrace freer markets and demand more responsive governments. The great global economic boom of the past 20 years, which has brought more people out of poverty more quickly than at any other time in human history, would not have been possible had the Soviet way of ordering the world not been discredited first.

Yet today, in much of the world, the spread of freedom is being checked by an authoritarian revanche. That shift has been most obvious in the petro-states, where oil is casting its usual curse. From Latin America to Africa to the Middle East, the black-gold bonanza has given authoritarian regimes the currency to buy off or to repress their subjects. In Russia, oil has fuelled an economic boom that prime minister Vladimir Putin, and some of his foreign admirers, mistakenly attribute to his careful demolition of the chaotic democracy of the 1990s.

For Russians, that argument is strengthened by the fact that the rising economic power of the moment - China - is unashamedly sticking to its faith in one-party rule. The end of the cold war made it tempting to believe that as countries opened up their markets, and became richer in the process, they would inevitably open up their societies, too. George W. Bush, US president, reiterated that hopeful thesis on his Asia tour last week, insisting: “Young people who grow up with the freedom to trade goods will ultimately demand the freedom to trade ideas.”

But the Chinese mandarins and the Russian siloviki are taking a different view - and acting on it. As China scholar David Shambaugh recounts in his new book, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation , the CCP studied the collapse of Soviet communism with great care. And rather than seeing it as proof of the inevitable, global triumph of western liberalism, the Chinese comrades treated the Russian example as a textbook case of what a ruling Communist party ought not to do.

In this version of history, sinologist Andrew Nathan tells me, 1989 is also a turning point, but not because that was when communism’s most notorious wall came down. Instead, the key event of that year was the bloody suppression of protesters in Tiananmen Square: “As a propaganda position they have put it out that we had a crackdown in 1989 and we saved the party and we saved the country,” he says. “We didn’t have a failure of will like the Russians. Without that, we wouldn’t have been a great, modern power.” That’s a point of view Mr Putin has embraced, too, describing the collapse of the Soviet Union as a tragedy and his own reconstruction of a neo-authoritarian state as the only way to restore Russian “greatness”.

The west has been remarkably sanguine about this resurgence of authoritarianism, and one reason is that, this time, the comrades have money. Even as the Kremlin repeatedly confiscates the assets not just of its own businesspeople but of foreign ones, too, investment bankers, and plain old investors, are flocking to a Moscow flush with petro-roubles. The same is true of the Gulf states. China, on a path to become the world’s largest economy, is the most attractive of all.

But the Age of Authoritarianism is bad news for all of us, not just the human rights campaigners that businesspeople and practitioners of realpolitik love to dismiss. Like all overly rigid objects, authoritarian regimes conceal a tremendous fragility in their apparent strength - and their leaders know it. It is this realisation that has driven Mr Putin’s systematic destruction of all forms of civil society - an eminently pragmatic measure, although it has mystified some outside observers, who wonder why so popular a leader needs to be so heavy-handed. China’s chiefs have figured this out, too, hence their anxiety about everything from the Muslim Uighurs to the internet to the former Soviet Union’s “colour revolutions”.

Of course, another way to ensure popular support for your authoritarian regime is by playing up nationalist sentiment. We are more tolerant of our home-grown bullies if we think we need them to fight our enemies abroad - as even democratic America has demonstrated in recent years. Mr Putin has understood this all along, launching a brutal attack on Chechnya even before his coronation as president in 2000.

Russia’s expert taunting of the hotheads in Georgia, followed by immediate and massive retaliation the moment Tbilisi took the bait, is the latest evidence that, for the Kremlin, neo-imperialism is an essential bulwark of neo-authoritarianism. Bringing down the walls really did make the world safer. Now that so many leaders are building them back up again, figuring out how to contain the 21st century’s monied authoritarians is our most pressing foreign policy dilemma.

 chrystia.freeland at ft.com

An Austro-Hungarian firm with licence to print Mugabe’s money.

The Mugabe regime’s final lifeline is a small Vienna-based software company that helps it to keep printing the money it relies on for its survival, was revealed July 24, 2008, by  The Independent of London, as per information from Zurich.

Jura JSP, an Austro-Hungarian firm with just 50 employees, has been dealing with the pariah government in Harare, enabling it to keep ahead of its hyperinflation crisis. Officials at the company confirmed yesterday that it supplied the licences and software used to design and print the Zimbabwe dollar, but would review this position if required to do so by the EU.
Fresh EU sanctions announced yesterday do not cover all companies dealing with the Mugabe regime, but other firms named and shamed for profiting from the Zimbabwe crisis have cut all links. The software company enables the regime to print the money it uses to pay the army, police and security agents which keep Zanu PF in power. Without access to paper money, Mr Mugabe would face an immediate crisis.

Inflation is running at nearly three million per cent and the country issued a 100 billion dollar banknote this week, worth only about 7p. The economist say John Robertson said inflation was the greatest threat to the ruling party and the rate was likely to climb to 100 million per cent within the next month. “If the software is withdrawn there is no language to describe what would follow,” he said.

Paper is running out at the state-run mint Fidelity Printers and Refiners after the Bavarian company Giesecke and Devrient stopped deliveries last week following pressure from the German government. Now Austria and Hungary are expected to come under diplomatic pressure to follow Berlin’s lead.

After withstanding years of intense international criticism, targeted sanctions and domestic pressure, a move against the software supplier could be a decisive blow against Mr Mugabe, analysts said. And with crucial negotiations getting under way in South Africa today between the government and the opposition, the timing could be critical. David Coltart, an opposition senator, said: “If the company does stop supplying then that will show the regime that there is no place to hide and that the game is up… That may then even assist the negotiations.”

In Harare, supplies of paper money are already running out. The embattled Central Reserve Bank has capped daily withdrawals to 100 billion dollars per person, but this is barely enough to buy a bus ticket or a loaf of bread. Long queues appear from first light at banks throughout the country in a daily battle to survive.

The regime’s answer to economic meltdown – driven by its own looting of state and private assets – has been to print more and more worthless money, creating unprecedented hyperinflation and the prospect of trillion or quadrillion dollar notes in the coming months.

While Mr Mugabe and his circle of cronies have proven deaf to international calls to hold free and fair elections, his government continues to rely on its control of the central bank and the Fidelity money presses which until recently ran 24 hours a day to keep up with the crisis. Trades union leaders appealed to the government yesterday to lift the cap on withdrawals of Z$100bn, describing it as a “joke”. As recently as 2006 the central bank was still issuing a Z$50 note.

A new list of Zimbabwean targets for sanctions, including asset freezes and travel bans, by the European Union includes the central bank governor, Gideon Gono, the attorney general Bharat Patel and the cricket chairman Peter Chingoka.

Most of the 37 targets posted on the EU website are security officers, “directly involved in the terror campaign” waged around the disputed elections.

We received an e-mail showing how little costs to buy gasoline (in German called Benzin) and diesel fuel if you live in a so called developing oil-exporting country or in the USA

Date: July 4, 2008

1 Liter = 0.264174 gal (US Liq)
US$ 1 = Euro 1.5682 as of 7/4/2008

The Austrian e-mail evokes the following list. We went then and looked up other countries and found that Austria is actually a bargain when compared to other developed economies.

The Austrian 1.32 Euro/liter is 2.16 times what the complaining American sissies are paying, but only 78.7% of what Norwegians are paying or 80.7% of what the Dutch are paying.

On the other hand Japan at 0.99 Euro/liter is another chaeap-shot so is Canada at 0.88 Euro/liter.

And you know already what we think? Those that pay more for their gasoline have also decreased their dependence on oil by efficiency methods and conservation - they also developed alternatives to oil and have started building the economy of the future. So, it is actually the US that is falling behind while it transfers its funds to the Gulf States hoping that the increased National Debt will devalue the US$ to the point that it remains valueless paper in their hand.The problem is that they do not sit on the money anymore. They actually buy assets with that money - among that buying spree they also buy up chunks of America. So what then? Will they agree to American taxation without representation - or the US will eventually find out that Bush made a Faustian Deal with the US oil companies and with his Arab friends.

Our advice to our Austrian readers is thus - DO NOT COMPLAIN ABOUT THE TAX ON FUEL - BUT MAKE SURE THE MONEY IS USED SO THAT EVENTUALLY YOU WILL HAVE TO BUY LESS OF IT.

The following is what we got in the mail - then look at what we added for the sake of analysis. if our other readers want to get the actual numbers in US dollars, please use the above conversion factors.

BENZINPREISE INTERNATIONAL

Benzin that is Gasoline - but much of the posting is about Diesel - this because in Europe the motor-fuel of choice is high quality Diesel.

Afghanistan Normalbenzin € 0,43

Algerien Diesel € 0,11

Aserbaidschan Diesel € 0,31

Ägypten Diesel € 0,14

Ãthiopien Super € 0,24

Bahamas Diesel € 0,25

Bolivien Super € 0,25

Brasilien Diesel € 0,54

China Normal € 0,45

Ecuador Normal € 0,24

Ghana Normal € 0,09 !!!!!!!

Grönland Super € 0,50

Guyana Normal € 0,67

Hong Kong Diesel € 0,84

Indien Diesel € 0,62

Indonesien Diesel € 0,32

Irak Super € 0,60

Kasachstan Diesel € 0,44

Katar Super € 0,15

Kuwait Super € 0,18

Kuba Normal € 0,62

Libyen Diesel € 0,08 !!!!!!!

Malaysia Super € 0,55

Mexico Diesel € 0,41

Moldau Normal € 0,25

Oman Super plus € 0,20

Peru Diesel € 0,22

Philippinen Diesel € 0,69

Russland Super € 0,64

Saudi Arabien Diesel € 0,07 !!!!!!

Südafrika Diesel € 0,66

Swasiland Super € 0,10 !!!!!!

Syrien Diesel € 0,10 !!!!!

Trinidad Super € 0,33

Thailand Super € 0,65

Tunesien Diesel € 0,49

USA Diesel € 0,61

Venezuela Diesel € 0,07 !!!!!

Vereinigte Arabische Emirate Diesel € 0,18

Vietnam Diesel € 0,55

Weißrussland Diesel € 0,51

EU und dem Finanzminister sei dank ist der Österreicher bzw. Europäer dumm
genug sich abzocken zu lassen (Mineralölsteuer und Mehrwertsteuer auf
Benzin).

Bitte dieses E-Mail weiter zu schicken damit wenigstens einige Leute
erkennen wie stark Österreich geneppt wird.

Benzinpreise auf der eigenen Webseite

And looking at international prices for July 4, 2008 at - http://benzinpreis.de/international.phtm…

Land Normalbenzin in € Superbenzin in € SuperPlus in € Diesel in €

Österreich 1,26 1,29 * 1,28 1,32 *

UK 1,40 1,46 1,50 1,58

Finnland 1,47 1,50 1,50 1,36

Frankreich 1,39 1,34 * 1,44 1,37 *

Irland 1,26 1,26 1,15 1,43

Island 1,35 1,40 1,47 1,50

Israel - 1,05 - -

Italien 1,36 1,46 1,34 1,45

Japan 0,99 1,08 - 0,79

Kanada 0,88 0.87 0.82 0.90

Neuseeland 1,03 0,97 - 1,46

Niederlande 1,56 1,61 1,69 1,31 **

Norwegen 1,60 1,61 1,46 1,56

Schweden 1,37 1,39 1,36 1,47

Schweiz 1,24 1,21 * 1,23 1,37 *

Ungarn 1,29 1,26 1,20 1,31

Budapest to house EU Techonology Institute - the Europe’s answer to MIT.
RENATA GOLDIROVA, June 19, 2008 EUobserver/Brusells.

EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS - Hungary’s capital, Budapest, has been selected to house the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT), the union’s flagship project to boost innovation, research and higher education.

On Wednesday (18 June), ministers in charge of competitiveness met in Brussels to put an end to the wrangling over the institute’s seat. Last month, they failed to agree due to a Polish veto on the matter.

Slovene education minister Mojca Kucler - who was responsible for steering the dossier through the European Council, which represents EU states - praised “efforts invested by member states for the common good of the EU” and described the institute as “a special milestone in the European research policy”.

The European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso has also welcomed the ministerial deal, saying that the EIT will add to Europe’s capacity to bridge the innovation gap with its major competitors, the US and Japan.

In 2006, the 27-nation EU invested 1.85 percent of GDP into research and development, far from its 2010 goal of three percent. By contrast, the US spends around 2.7 percent.

According to EU education commissioner Jan Figel, the work of the institute would be organised through so-called knowledge and innovation communities - partnerships of universities, research organisations and companies.

The commission believes that such networks could help transform education and research and attract bright young brains from within and beyond Europe.

“It is not going to be one dot on the map,” Mr Figel told EUobserver, referring to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which inspired the EIT concept. “We offer co-operation so the EU becomes more innovative,” he said.

Budapest was the only applicant able to meet the two criteria set by ministers - that the winner should be a “new” member state and not already be home to an EU agency.

But regarding the latter point, EU diplomats feared Poland’s behaviour at the negotiation table.

The country, also bidding for seat, had previously threatened not to withdraw its own application, unless it won some level of participation. It wanted, for example, the new institute’s governing board to meet in the Polish city of Wroclaw, one diplomat told EUobserver.

Besides Budapest and Wroclaw, three other applicants were keen to host the administrative headquarters of the institute - Germany’s Jena, Spain’s Sant Cugat del Valles, while Slovak capital Bratislava joined forces with Vienna in launching a cross-border bid.

The Budapest-based institute will operate with a total budget of €2.37 billion from 2008-2013, with €308.7 million of that coming from EU coffers. The rest of the monies are supposed to come from public and private partners as well as from the new institute’s own activities.

————–

We hope that, for the sake of coherence, the Budapest headquarters of EIT will find ways to cooperate with the Bratislava-Vienna group also. The Wroclaw push seemed out of place and was rather a clear effort at grand-standing.
We realize that  the City of Wroclaw is involved in such issues as the organisation of a European Citizens’ Forum (over two days) entitled: Towards a Europe of solidarity, but we insist that an EIT will have to deal with such technical issues as the development of technologies in view of changes that will have to happen because of global warming/climate change.  The institute will need laboratories and not just talk-estivals. Poland seems to have misread this intent.

The referendum: populism vs democracy: The idea of the referendum as an instrument of the people’s will rests on pre-democratic foundations, says George Schöpflin on www.OpenDemocracy.net

16 - 06 - 2008

The result of the Republic of Ireland’s referendum on 12 June 2008, a rejection of the European Union’s “reform treaty” agreed at the Lisbon summit in October 2007, has precipitated a crisis for the union whose resolution is hard to foresee. For the victorious “no” side, and for those elsewhere who support the use of referenda to decide on constitutional or other matters, the outcome in Ireland is also on three grounds a vindication of the institution of the referendum:
▪ it restores democracy to the people
▪ it allows the people to tell political elites to be responsive
▪ it restores “the people’s will” to the storehouse of democratic instruments.

These propositions - which can be summarised as the seduction of direct democracy - are misconceived. The championing of referenda they embody proceeds from a series of four untenable assumptions, which are worth itemising in some detail.

George Schőpflin is a member of the European parliament for Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Union) and was Jean Monnet professor of politics at University College London.

An unsafe vehicle:

First, in complex modern societies there is no such thing as “the people”. The concept is a leftover from the time when democracy had to be legitimated in the eyes of anti-democrats; its residue today leaves it open to political manipulation. The homogeneity it implies can hardly be reconciled with the reality of an enormously varied modern society composed of millions of members with multiple motivations and choices, used to exercising individual rationality in the marketplace. How can they be compressed into something with a single voice, namely “the people”?

In too many cases - European integration among them - referenda function as an instrument not of democracy, but of populism. They can assist democracy only in a few special circumstances: for example, to resolve an issue that is more ethical than political (legalising divorce or abortion, say); or to unblock a political system (offering autonomy or independence to the population of a particular region and thus perhaps helping to avoid civil war or ameliorate division).

An example of the latter is when the populations of the various republics of the Soviet Union voted for or against declaring their sovereignty, which led to their independence as states. Another case where the referendum was a legitimate use of the instrument was the votes in 1997 on devolution for Scotland and Wales within the United Kingdom. The referendum held on 9 March 2008 in Hungary was ostensibly about the government’s health-reform project; in reality it was about a means to articulate the deep disquiet in society about the refusal of the Hungarian government to listen to that disquiet.

Second, referenda are profoundly unsuitable ways of addressing complex issues, because they offer the illusion of a simple answer to complexity. In this sense, they pull the voters into the pre-political stance that lies at the heart of populism. Modern politics is about weighing various options, in circumstances where issues only very seldom appear in stark, good-vs-bad form. Referenda have an implicit, contextual message that says the opposite, something along the lines of “vote no” or “vote yes” and all your problems will be solved; as Tøger Seidenfaden has pointed out, referenda reduce highly complex issues to a simple yes/no answer. In a cultural sense, they “dumb down” the voters.

Moreover, voting “yes” often means accepting the word of the political elite’s saying, in effect, “trust us”. If voters wish to send a message to the elite that they are dissatisfied - for whatever reason, even one wholly distinct from the issue at stake - voting “no” is a convenient and simplistic solution. So the illusion of expressing the popular will is just that, an illusion.

Third, referenda reintroduce the tyranny of the majority, the very thing that modern democracies have sought to dilute by, for example, upgrading the role of civil society. Here again, careful analysis is needed. A great deal of politics is about making matters relatively easily intelligible, but this can readily cross the line into oversimplification, especially when sections of society will be clamouring for just that. The erosion of trust between political elites and society is also about the reluctance of the latter to come to terms with political complexity and the way in which both elites and media pander to the outdated desire for a golden age when choices were simple.

The trouble with that supposed golden age is that - whenever those who invoke it can be persuaded to identify it in terms of a definite period - majorities had no trouble in imposing their views on a minority. The evolution of various forms of lobbying, advocacy and pressure groups, and radical movements since the 1960s and 1970s is precisely about giving otherwise silent groups a voice. Referenda suppress that. It is quite plausible that a referendum on, say, recriminalising homosexuality or reintroducing the death penalty would gain a majority in several European nation-states. It is unlikely that the more vocal protagonists of “the people” expressing its view in this way would approve. Indeed, supporters of referenda as the articulation of the popular will are seldom if ever called upon to define what is a proper topic to be decided by “the people” and what is not. That too is a part of the easy ride the referendum receives in modern democracy (or, to be more precise, in a surrogate for democracy).

Fourth, referenda offer power without responsibility, in that voters can confront elites without having to face the consequences of their action. At their heart, referenda provide an opportunity for ad hoc coalitions that never have to worry about the outcome. The far left and far right coming together in France in the May 2005 referendum on the European Union’s constitutional treaty was a case in point; the two sides could never have governed together, but they could operate as a spoiler. Something similar was in evidence in Ireland in the Lisbon-treaty vote, where rightwing Catholics made common cause with leftwingers suspicious of Europe. The irony of this is that an ad hoc coalition of this kind can focus on a single issue and need never on any single occasion assume responsibility for the power that it wields.
The one-way street:

Referenda have unintended consequences in that they introduce new political actors into the system together with fresh lines of polarisation, often around issues that (regardless of the new actors’ demands) have no straightforward solution. This can also introduce and legitimate potentially destructive discourses - accusations of “sell-out” and “betrayal”, for example - that gain credibility through being voiced by these “untainted” political actors.

Besides, the task of the negative campaigners tends to be simpler than that of the supporters - they only have to argue: “if in doubt, say no”. This was much in evidence in Ireland’s referendum campaign. For all practical purposes it left the supporters of the “yes” camp having to prove their credibility, if not actually their innocence. And once a “no” campaign has won, it cannot be blamed, as it immediately evaporates, once again leaving the (elected) elite with the problem of what to do next. The organisers of “no” campaigns themselves never have to face an election.

When referenda are held on questions to do with the future of Europe, there is a further generally unidentified twist to the story. European integration operates simultaneously with three different sets of actors - the European Union, its institutions and elites; the national elites; and the supposed European demos. These three do not really connect very much. There is some connection between the EU and the national elites, but the linkage between the EU and its demos is very weak and is generally felt to be weak.

It is this political gap that provides the opportunity for negative campaigners in European matters - they believe that they can hold “their own” national political elites to account for European commitments, something not possible at the European level, largely because identification with that level does not exist.

This is the democratic deficit that must be addressed. But referenda, far from overcoming that deficit, actually intensify it. Accountability and responsibility, after all, have to be a two-way process to work at all. Referenda operate only in one direction and, for that reason, are not an appropriate or a democratically sustainable instrument in European matters.
Also by George Schőpflin in openDemocracy:

“Israel-Lebanon: a battle over modernity” (8 August 2005)

“Putin’s anti-globalisation strategy” (10 July 2006)

“Hungary: country without consequences” (22 September 2006)

“Hungary’s cold civil war (14 November 2006)

“The European Union’s troubled birthday” (23 March 2007)

Russia’s reinvented empire (3 May 2007)

Turkey’s crisis and the European Union (23 July 2007)

The new Russia: a model state (27 February 2008)

Final countdown for housing of European technology institute.

April 28, 2008, By Renata Goldirova from Brussels for the EUobserver:

The final countdown has begun on where to place the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT), the EU’s flagship innovation and education project, as the official application deadline expired at the end of last week.

Four applicants are keen to host the administrative headquarters of the institute - Hungary’s capital, Budapest, the Polish city of Wroclaw, Spain’s Sant Cugat del Valles, while Slovak capital Bratislava has joined forces with Austria’s Vienna in launching a cross-border bid.

The EIT is meant to bridge the innovation gap between the 27-nation EU and its major rivals, the US and Japan.

In practice, it should result in a network of universities, research centres and companies in order to transform education and research while developing commercially successful results - as well as to attract the best young brains from within and beyond Europe.

Slovakia-tailored ‘twin city headquarters’
For the institute to be up and running from January next year, the 27-nation bloc must unanimously agree on its future seat. The Slovene EU presidency expects this could be done during a meeting of ministers in charge of competitiveness on 30 May.

But none of the EIT-hopefuls has so far gathered clear majority support around the table, shifting backstage talks into high gear.

Slovakia is setting its hopes on the idea of a twin-city headquarters, pairing Bratislava and Vienna - cities only 60 kilometres apart and well connected to other EU capitals.

By uniting the capital of a “dynamic new EU state and an experienced old one”, the project argues it is tailored to demonstrate a “Europe-without-borders way of thinking.”

According to the Slovak ministry of education, the twin-city approach is also an example of turning the institute’s very goal - stronger ties and better networking between the union’s top universities, research facilities and businesses - into practice.

While Bratislava is home to approximately 75,000 students, Vienna accommodates some 130,000 students. There are also some 25,000 researchers working in the two capitals.

Hungary, Poland and Spain
The biggest competition to the joint EIT bid comes from nearby Hungary, as its nominee, Budapest, also offers similar benefits concerning its geographic location.

Budapest is “a traditional educational, scientific and research centre … at the same time, one of the most important logistics and business centres in the Central-Eastern European region,” reads the official candidacy paper.

The country also underlines its network of several research institutions affiliated with universities and industry as well as the fact it has produced a total of 14 Nobel Prize winners over the years.

Poland has also voiced its interest in hosting the EIT headquarters and nominated the city of Wroclaw - a well-known academic centre, home to 27 higher education schools, two scientific institutions, over 150,000 students and 9,000 academic teachers.

However, some diplomats suggest that the country has a smaller chance of succeeding in its bid, as it already houses Frontex, an EU agency responsible for security of the bloc’s external borders.

Sant Cugat del Valles in the Spanish region of Catalonia closes the list of contestants. The town often described as a rich suburb of Catalonian capital Barcelona has several education centres, and is also active in the field of high technology.

It is estimated that the total cost of establishing the EIT could reach some €2.37 billion. Brussels is set to contribute €309 million of that figure for the 2008-2013 period, with the rest coming from national grants and industry investments.