From:      levy at tcf.org
Subject: Articles that may interest you
Date:      November 17, 2008

 First an interview for Atlantic Magazine, then an e-mail we got from Daniel Levy:

The Interview - Daniel Levy On Obama, Netanyahu and the Settlements. http://jeffreygoldberg.theatlantic.com/a…

The e-mail based on an article in Haaretz: /www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1037283.html
As per Jeffrey Goldberg of Atlantic Magazine - November 17, 2008 - Daniel Levy, the director of the Middle East Initiative at the New America Foundation (which is run by a blogger, it should be noted) and the director of the Prospects for Peace initiative at the Century Foundation, is one of the smartest analysts of the Middle East conflict in Washington, or anywhere else. He often veers too left for my taste (on only one occasion, I believe, I veered too left for his taste), but he’s a rigorous thinker and is steeped in the painful and complicated details of the ongoing crisis. Levy, who keeps his own blog, of course, has been a player in negotiations through the 1990s, and brings real-world experience — and real Israeli experience — to the conversation. As we enter the Obama era, it seemed worthwhile to send Levy some questions:

Jeffrey Goldberg:  Are you a Zionist?

Daniel Levy: The answer is a yes, albeit a more complex yes than I’d like it to be.  I would describe myself as a Zionist on at least three levels.  First, and at the most practical level, having made aliyah to Israel from the U.K., taken up citizenship, and made my life there, my Zionism meets the more classical and exclusionary definitions.  Second, I do consider the Jews to be a people, and support that people’s right to self-determination in a nation-state, Israel.  Finally, and in many ways derived from both of the above, I consider Israel to be central to my own Jewishness and my identity–more than a religious affiliation, it’s a national and cultural affiliation to modern Israel, the language, to Tel Aviv, etc.

Where it gets complex is this–sixty years after the establishment of the state, and alongside all its accomplishments, the onus is now on Israel and its founding ideology, Zionism, to demonstrate in practice that it can be non-expansionist in territorial terms toward its neighbors, and that it can confer genuine equality on the non-Jewish citizens of the state.  Most troubling of course is that for more than two-thirds of its existence, Israel has imposed a hostile occupation on another people, the Palestinians of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, and to be blunt, that occupation will have to end for Israel to survive.  To the extent to which a Zionist narrative has been used to drive forward and justify the post-’67 settlement enterprise (and the discrimination within Israel), it is a Zionism that actually works against the interests of Israel, and not, of course, the Zionism that I am signing up for.

JG: You write about the occupation in a way that suggests you believe it was Israel’s fault from the outset.  Whose fault do you believe it is?  Put another way, do you think the Khartoum declaration of late 1967–the so-called “three noes” — set the stage for the tragedy that followed, or is it not relevant?

DL: The Khartoum noes represent a more complex issue than is often assumed.  The setting is, of course, after the ‘67 war, with Israel in control of vast swaths of Egyptian and Syrian territory, as well as the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.  Israel expresses a readiness to talk peace and understandably interprets the three noes of Khartoum as, well, being a negative answer.  But historians suggest it wasn’t that simple.  See this long quote below from pages 258-259 of Avi Shlaim’s book The Iron Wall:

“Israel’s leaders watched with keen anticipation to see what conclusions the Arab leaders would draw from their military defeat.  The conference ended with the adoption of the famous three noes of Khartoum: no recognition, no negotiation, and no peace with Israel.  On the face of it these declarations showed no sign of readiness for compromise, and this is how Israel interpreted them.  In fact, the conference was a victory for the Arab moderates who argued for trying to obtain the withdrawal of Israeli forces by political rather than military means.  Arab spokesmen interpreted the Khartoum declarations to mean no formal peace treaty, but not a rejection of a state of peace; no direct negotiations, but not a refusal to talk through third parties; and no de jure recognition of Israel, but acceptance of its existence as a state.  President Nasser and King Hussein set the tone at the summit and made it clear subsequently that they were prepared to go much further than ever before toward a settlement with Israel.  At Khartoum, Nasser and Hussein reached a genuine understanding and formed a united front against the hard-liners…The Khartoum summit thus marked a real turning point in Nasser’s attitude to Israel.  At Khartoum, Nasser advised, and indeed urged, King Hussein to explore the possibility of a peaceful settlement with Israel.  This was, of course, not known in Israel at the time.  As far as Israel was concerned, the Khartoum declarations closed every door and every window that might lead to a peace settlement.  On October 17 the cabinet took a decision that amounted to an official cancellation of the decision of 19 June.”

The famous three noes are explained as being an opening position and that Jordanian King Hussein actually had something of a mandate from Nasser’s Egypt to begin exploratory talks with Israel.  We know those took place.  We also now know that Egypt itself was putting out peace feelers prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  In the end, of course, that Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was reached, but only after another needless war–something that might unfortunately be repeated with Syria now.

***

But here’s the bigger picture: the UN in 1947 in UNGAR 181 calls for a division of mandatory Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state according to a territorial ratio of approximately 55 percent to 45 percent.  After the War of Independence, Israel is in control of not 55, but 78 percent of the land, and builds its state in that area.

After the ‘67 war, Israel controls 100 percent.  I would argue that Israel’s big achievement today is that we have reached a situation where the Arab world is saying yes to the 1949-67 division of 78:22–not the 1947 plan, but also not one centimeter more than the ‘67 lines.

Some may argue that if Israel already got a yes to 78 percent, we can surely get it to 80 percent, or 85 percent, or even more–I think that is neither realistic nor desirable, and in attempting to achieve it, we are liable to commit national suicide.

So my bottom line is that Israel needs to take yes for an answer, which means ending the occupation. And let’s face it, the fact that the occupation is so entrenched, especially the civilian settlements and their supportive infrastructure–none of that can be considered a sensible or legitimate response even to the traditional interpretation of the Khartoum noes.  Does it justify Palestinian violence?  No.  Is the post-’67 settlement enterprise a huge mistake for the Zionist project and an albatross around the neck of Israel?  Absolutely yes.

We can argue about the history, but the imperative today is to seize the opportunity to entrench the ‘67 borders, a two-state reality, and to end the occupation (with agreed, minor, and mutual land swaps involving the West Bank and East Jerusalem, but respecting the 78:22 principle).

***

JG: Man, you know nothing turns me on more than long quotations from Avi Shlaim.  There’s an unbiased observer for you.  Anyway, next question: Who’s to blame today?  Or put another way, why is the process so locked-down right now: Israeli political paralysis, Palestinian religious extremism, the continued presence of settlements in the West Bank, American disinterest, all of the above?

DL: In answer to your latest delightful question, I’m not too keen on playing the blame game.  I could agree to all of the reasons you gave and add lots more.  But I think we need to get beyond who is to blame and to think constructively and creatively about how to get out of this mess.  The situation is not good.  Neither Israelis nor Palestinians benefit, and while scoring points can always be fun, it doesn’t get us very far.  In fact, I would even say that blame is secondary to a bigger problem which is that we are locked into a process that is increasingly incapable of delivering–and we need to recognize that.

I would suggest that there are two basic design faults to what we call the peace process, whether that be Oslo or Annapolis or everything in between.  One, the two parties have gone about as far as they’re going to go to finding solutions in bilateral negotiations.  What is left to do–the final points of closure on core issues–is obviously the hardest bit, and I don’t think the parties can do that alone, especially not with the current leaderships one both sides.  There is almost a perverse incentive at work to postpone hard decisions and to negotiate indefinitely–that is the path of least resistance in terms of domestic politics for Israeli and Palestinian leaders.

Two, the Palestinians are expected to successfully build their own economy, security forces and institutions of governance while in a pre-state condition of pervasive foreign (Israel) occupation that includes an expanding civilian settler population–that needs to be protected by the IDF.  The idea is that the Palestinians prove themselves and then Israel makes progress–it has not and cannot work that way.

So both sides are struck.  The process suffers from the laws of diminishing returns as we keep trying this failed and flawed method and it does no favors to Israel as it creates circumstances in which we are unable to extract ourselves from a predicament which severely damages our interests.  I would suggest that what we need now is effective external intervention to break this impasse, and realistically this would have to be U.S.-led.

JG: Okay, external intervention is needed.  What, exactly, does President Obama do?  How does he get the Israelis to remove settlements?  How does he strengthen the PA and marginalize Gaza?

DL: To an extent, it does depend on what kind of an Israeli government an Obama presidency is working with.  If the Israeli leadership at the time is not clear in its willingness to remove settlements, withdraw on the West Bank, and implement a two-state solution, then I would recommend not investing in a peace process just for appearances’ sake.  Such a process would, after all, not succeed, further undermining both hope and credibility, and the last thing we need is another failed process.  Under such circumstances–and most people will assume that this is the scenario of a Netanyahu premiership (although I’d at least test the proposition that Netanyahu can be a pragmatist after all)–I would suggest that the Obama administration makes its explicit declarative intention as being to keep the two-state option alive and viable.  That means focusing on preventing new settlements, outposts, and settlement-expansion (and also on allowing the Palestinians to reconstitute a reformed PLO and Palestinian national movement).  A singular American focus on settlements–and that can be lots of talking and monitoring and upbraiding, it doesn’t have to be linking aid–can have a fascinating, liberating, and even decisive impact on the internal Israeli debate about settlements.  The Obamaites could also ask Bill Clinton a thing or two about handling Netanyahu, as he played no minor role in Netanyahu’s first term as PM being cut short to barely 30 months.

On the other hand, if one is dealing with an Israeli government that has identified an Israeli national interest and even Israel’s survival with a West Bank withdrawal, two-state solution, and settlement removal–as is the case with the outgoing Olmert government and with Prime Ministerial candidate Tzipi Livni, then I’d suggest a different tack.  The key in this scenario would be for the U.S. to come up with creative ways for addressing the legitimate Israeli concerns regarding what happens in the territories from which Israel withdraws–how does one guarantee a predictability of especially security, but also of governance outcomes once Israel and the IDF is no longer there.  So it’s about providing compelling, attractive, and even enticing answers to the questions that postpone the needed Israeli withdrawal.

I say creative because the current way to answer that question is all about building Palestinian capacity without changing the basic circumstances.  And I am convinced that cannot work.  The alternative package that the U.S. would have to take a lead in putting together would lean heavily on an international role for a period of time in the newly de-occupied Palestinian state–with a particular focus on guaranteeing security-related issues.  Yes, I am talking about an international force, but only once there’s an agreed border and as a post-occupation partial replacement for the IDF–and the U.S. would not be the main provider of troops (numbers anyway are not large).

That’s the kind of plan the new administration should be thinking about, while in addition, American diplomatic engagement would also almost certainly be needed to finalize an Israeli-Palestinian agreement (American proposals and hard work to carry the sides across the finishing line), and additional incentives, both bilateral and international as appropriate, for both parties–including in the security arena, costs of relocating settlers, and Palestinian refugee compensation.

As for the PA, Gaza, etc., virtually everything we have done so far in supposedly strengthening the moderates and intervening on behalf of one side has been either counter-productive or ineffective.  One can’t marginalize Gaza –it’s part of the two-state solution.  And we’re most certainly going to have to bring Hamas inside the tent to make this work.  I think that’s doable and the first imperative for the U.S. is to leave the Palestinians to do their own internal politics, and to reconstitute their own reformed national movement.  I’m not suggesting U.S. mediation, but the removal of what amounts to a U.S. veto on Palestinian national reconciliation.  Our basic demand from a newly unified Palestinian national leadership should be: no use of terror and agreement on an authorized interlocutor for U.S.-mediated peace talks with Israel.

None of this will be easy, including the internal Palestinian stuff.  The Egyptians are working on that right now, but the prospects are not good, although they would be improved if the U.S. sent signals that they approve of these talks, and if other actors, such as the Saudis, were encouraged to support these mediation efforts.

That’s enough for now.  There is of course much more to say on what needs to be done on the regional level, and of how to use the Arab Peace Initiative as a central ingredient for peace making and as an incentive for Israel.  But let’s save that for later.

***

JG: Over the next four years, what are the chances that we’ll see another Arab-Israeli war, in either Lebanon, Gaza or the West Bank?

DL: Unfortunately, the chances of another war are not insignificant, although there is no inevitability to there being further war and if we act smart this outcome can be avoided.  However, if one looks at the trajectory of hostility to Israel, instability in the region, and misguided Israeli policies, then that makes for a worrying trend line.

Hezbollah, of course, maintains its own militia in Lebanon and that would be the focus of any future Israeli-Lebanon clash–as it was two years ago.  I would argue that the smartest move Israel could make regarding Lebanon would be to remove those excuses (or reasons) that Hezbollah uses to justify its maintenance of an independent armed capacity that actually resonate inside Lebanese politics.

What would that mean?  Israel could hand over the Shebaa Farms (which are of no value and which Israel has no intention of keeping anyway), could start ending IDF over flights of Lebanon, and could allow the Lebanese armed forces to equip itself as a more serious national army (although not with offensive capacities that would threaten Israel).  These measures would create a situation whereby Hezbollah would be faced with a dilemma, as its justifications for its current military posture would be removed.  Hezbollah would then have to rely on external explanations (such as the Palestinian cause), or risk being seen as explicitly serving an Iranian, not Lebanese, agenda.  Such moves by Israel would actually limit Hezbollah’s room for maneuver, and I would suggest that they would make future clashes less likely.  Of course, Hezbollah and the state machinery of Lebanon may become indistinguishable–Hezbollah is already part of the government and could assume a more leading role.  But in most ways that only complicates their decision-making further when it comes to entering conflict with Israel.  Bottom line: there are things Israel, the U.S., and the international community can be doing to help stabilize Lebanon, to limit Hezbollah’s choices, and to make confrontation less likely.

On the Palestinian front, there is ongoing, if often low-intensity, conflicts. If anything the default position is still the war footing.  The current ceasefire is testimony to that–a secession of hostilities of limited duration.

Absent a resolution to the basic conflicts, new rounds of violence, whether more or less intense, can be expected to break out.  Netanyahu’s suggestion for economic peace is of course a joke and will certainly not prevent this violence.  But as I discussed earlier, the Annapolis model is also not working and that too will collapse into violence (and expect some of the Palestinian security forces to be involved in the violence) if its failings are not corrected.  The most important preventive action to be taken in this regard would be to remove the casus belli and to end the 1967 occupation with the kind of provisions and in the fashion that I described above.

Of course, that does not mean there will be no threat to Israel’s security, or that everyone will be happy, but: 1, this is a precondition without which further conflict is pretty much guaranteed; and 2, it offers the most promising sustainable security environment for Israel and places Israel in a far stronger position to deal with future threats (defending Israel from an agreed upon border, no settlers to protect, increased regional and international legitimacy, basic neutralizing of Palestinian grievance narrative, etc.).

In addition, there are other threat scenarios–Syria may not wait forever for a peace deal, neither Egyptian nor Jordanian stability are guaranteed, and Iranian bellicose rhetoric continues–but Israel is in a far better position to manage all of these if we can get beyond our current occupation predicament with the Palestinians, and if we can do that then I think Israel will have an answer for any of these uncertainties.  I believe we can get it right; I’m just deeply worried that we won’t.

_____________________

The above assumes a two State Solution of the Israeli Palestinian conflict which entails first a solution of the internal conflict of the Palestinians, and which presents the danger that rather then Hamas led Gaza becoming a PLO led component of the Palestinian Southern entity, the Palestinian Northern entity of the West Bank, becomes a Hamas dominated entity as well - and the whole Palestinian State becomes more of a problem then the expected solution.

At SustainabiliTank.info we rather believe in a three States Solution, where Israel makes its agreements with the West Bank and leaves the rebellious “Hamas-in-Gaza” which we like to call - Hamasstan - plainly hanging in the air until someone creates internally  the sense needed to bring them to the table under a formula already proved in the other/larger entity that was created first. We believe this to be a better staged evolution then the one described without such stages by David Levy.  ( PJ at SustainabiliTank.com )

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Four Middle East Crises on Obama’s Horizon.
By Daniel Levy, in Haaretz of November 16, 2008.

No one should be surprised that president-elect Barack Obama’s first press conference, three days after his historic November 4th victory, was devoted almost exclusively to the economy. Obama was also quick to remind reporters that there is only one president at a time, and his turn does not begin until January 20. Israel’s upcoming February 11 election? Recent American presidents have had a decidedly mixed record of intervention in Israeli elections. President Bill Clinton hastily convened the March 1996 Summit of Peacemakers at Sharm el-Sheikh, but it did not save Shimon Peres in the polls that May. Clinton was more effective in ensnaring a peace-shy prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the Wye River Memorandum - paving the way to Netanyahu’s downfall and Ehud Barak’s May 1999 election victory. Before that, president George H.W. Bush tripped up Yitzhak Shamir on the issue of settlements, assisting Yitzhak Rabin in Israel’s 1992 vote.

A new president, however, is unlikely to dip his hand in the shark-infested waters of Israeli politics, certainly not on Day 1, especially since the possible impact would be hard to predict. The Obama team would be best advised to simply remind Israelis of its own standpoint: a commitment to two states and to advancing the peace process “from the minute I’m sworn into office” (Obama in Amman, July 2008). To forget this pledge until after February 10 would in itself be an intervention of sorts, and an unwelcome one. Will Kadima, Labor or Meretz be able to ride the wave of Obama expectations? That will be for them to attempt and for the voters to decide.

- (2) Another upcoming Middle East election the new American president will have to navigate is in Iran, where presidential polls are scheduled for June 2009. The tricky balancing act here will be, on the one hand, not to lose time testing direct engagement with Iran, an Obama election pledge, while, at the same time, doing nothing that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could use to strengthen his own re-election efforts. Paradoxically, a less threatening, more open-for-business tone from the U.S. may be the best way to undermine Ahmadinejad. Direct talks with Ahmadinejad are very unlikely to feature on the immediate Obama to-do list, and would almost certainly be ill advised. In any event, he is not the key address for diplomatic approaches. That would more likely be supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Expect discreet feelers and exploratory contacts with key Khamenei confidants, such as Ali Akbar Velayati and Ali Larijani, and expect not to know that they are taking place.

Israel’s best posture on this is surely to avoid any public disagreement with the U.S. on Iran, to ensure that Israel has input into the agenda for talks, and to give American-Iranian negotiations a real chance, as the best option for addressing our concerns.

- (3) For Syria, a two-year waiting game ends on Inauguration Day. President Bashar al-Assad apparently decided some time ago that his best bet was to wait out the implacable opposition of French president Jacques Chirac and American president Bush. Syria has recently prepared for this day, for instance by relaunching peace talks with Israel via Turkish mediation, by assuming a constructive role regarding Lebanon, and by moving closer to Europe, most notably to Chirac’s successor, Nicolas Sarkozy.

In some senses, Syria is seen as low-hanging fruit for a U.S. re-engagement that would reshuffle Middle East alliances in its favor. After all, Syria is a relevant player when it comes to Iraq, Iran, Lebanon and the Palestinian arena. A reorientation of Syria’s policies will not take place overnight or following a brief diplomatic flirtation. But a new approach to U.S.-Syria bilateral relations, with reasonably calibrated benchmarks and including American support for Israeli-Syrian talks, stands a good chance of success. Look out for early indications of that change.

- (4) Finally, how to deal with Palestinian internal politics? One of the more devastating legacies of the Bush years was the failure to constructively navigate the Palestinian transition away from the strongman rule of Yasser Arafat and the single-party domination of Fatah. A stable Palestine and sustainable peace and security for Palestinians and Israelis cannot be built on a divided Palestinian house. The American position has been one of encouraging Palestinian division. That needs to change urgently, not by an Obama administration directly engaging Hamas, but by it discreetly signaling an end to the American veto on Palestinian national reconciliation along lines similar to the Saudi-brokered Mecca deal of February 2007. Given the stop-start Palestinian talks now being brokered by Egypt, there might be some urgency to the American policy re-think on this issue - the peace process is deeply flawed in its absence.

- (5) Of course, Iraq will loom largest when president-elect Obama turns his attention to the Middle East - and therein lies the core challenge: Will the next administration, unlike its predecessor, appreciate both the extent and the nature of the interconnectivity between the region’s varied crises? The signs at least are encouraging.

Daniel Levy, a senior fellow at the New America and Century Foundations, was previously an adviser in the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, and the lead Israeli drafter of the Geneva Initiative.

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As we said earlier - we do not think that the internal reconciliation within the Palestinian side should be allowed to hold back attempt at progress in the other areas. We really do not believe that the administration of Gaza will change before there is a success with the  easier dialogue between Israel and a Palestinian West-Bank entity.  The problem is that settlements were removed from Gaza, but this made things worse.

Hamastan Is Here to Stay.     { we prefer the Hamasstan spelling }
By David Bedein
 www.IsraelBehindTheNews.com, since 1987, at the Beit Agron Press Center in Jerusalem, where he also heads the Center for Near East Policy Research and serves as the Middle East correspondent for the Philadelphia Bulletin, www.thebulletin.us.

Report: Top Syrian officer killed in Damascus explosion.
London-based al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper says senior military officer is among 17 fatalities of car bomb which rocked Syrian capital. Attack believed to be meant for city’s intelligence services building
Roee Nahmias, September 28, 2008, Israel News.
A high-ranking Syrian military officer was killed in the car bomb explosion which struck Damascus on Saturday, the London-based Arabic-language newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat reported Sunday.

Seventeen people were killed Saturday morning when a car bomb exploded in the Syrian capital. The blast, which Syria’s interior minister dubbed a “terror attack”, occurred at an intersection leading to the Sit Zeinab shrine, popular with Shiite pilgrims from Iran and Lebanon.

According to the al-Sharq al-Awsat report, the car bomb was meant to hit a Syrian intelligence services building, located near Damascus’ international airport, where Syria’s “Palestinian directorate” is believed to be located.

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem was quick to assign blame Saturday, saying Israel was the one which stood to gain the most from the attack.

“Unfortunately, in the years following the American war on terror, terror has managed to spread even further. Such incidents can take place anywhere and do not indicate that there was a security breach,” he said.

The terror attack in Syria was condemned by the US, Europe and the Arab world.

Opposition website: Syria blast may be ‘work accident.’
Syrian opposition website suggests Damascus explosion may be result of security forces’ mishap; Lebanon PM condemns attack as ‘terror crime’

The Damascus blast that left 17 people dead earlier Saturday may have been a result of a “work accident” by Syrian security forces, an opposition website reported. A local resident told a website reporter the car bomb that exploded in the Syrian capital may have been meant to explode in Iraq or Lebanon.

The opposition website reported that Syrian television images make it appear that the explosion took place in a building belonging to the security establishment. However, at this time the reports are mostly speculations and the cause of the blast remains unclear.

Meanwhile, Syrian opposition figures told Ynet that the explosion may in fact be a staged incident aimed at heightening fears of a growing radical Islamic threat, thereby presenting the Syrians with a pretext to deploy troops in Lebanon.

Saturday evening, senior Lebanese figures, including Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, condemned the explosion. The Lebanese PM issued a statement saying that “this crime is despicable and unacceptable.”

Siniora referred to the blast as a “terror crime” and said such incidents must be rejected, particularly when they take place in an Arab capital.

According to television reports, the car that exploded in Damascus Saturday was rigged with at least 200 kg (440 pounds) of explosives, and also injured 14 people.

 The reports also said that “an investigation by the Syrian Counter-terrorism Unit was underway to identify the attackers.”

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Olmert to visit Russia next week: Shortly before leaving office, prime minister scheduled to leave for Moscow for meeting with Russian President Medvedev. Leaders expected to discuss Russia’s arms supply to Syria, Iranian nuclear threat and Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Roni Sofer, September 29, 2008,  Israel News.

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is scheduled to leave for Moscow next week for a meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

The outgoing prime minister’s trip is planned for next Monday and Tuesday, following an invitation extended to Olmert by Medvedev.

The two leaders are expected to discuss a number of issues, including Russia’s arms supply to Syria, Moscow’s objection to additional sanctions on Iran and Israel’s peace process with the Palestinians.

Sources in the Prime Minister’s Office said the meeting had been planned for some time, after several phone conversations between Olmert and Medvedev after the latter took office.

The officials stressed the Russian president was aware of the political situation in Israel and of Olmert’s resignation, as well as the attempts to form a new government headed by Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, but that he insisted on inviting the Israeli prime minister to Moscow nonetheless.

Israel and Russia disagree on a number of issues, including Syrian President Bashar Assad’s attempts to purchase advanced arm systems, including the S-300 – a land-air system which may threaten Israel Air Force planes in longer ranges. This system may also threaten Israeli aircraft flying over Lebanon.

Another issue on the agenda is Moscow’s objection to a fourth round of sanctions on Iran in response to the Islamic republic’s ongoing nuclear plan.

The Russians are also interested in helping advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, although their offer to host the negotiations as part of the Annapolis peace conference was rejected so far.

In light of the expected timetable for the establishment of a new government, this will likely be Olmert’s last visit abroad as prime minister.

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Military Aid: Syria-Russia naval cooperation grows: Russia says it is renovating Syrian port for use by its fleet; two countries’ naval chiefs meet, Associated Press.

    Russia announced Friday it was renovating a Syrian port for use by the Russian fleet in what could signal an effort for a better foothold in the Mediterranean amid the rift with the United States over Georgia.

***

Syria was Moscow’s strongest Mideast ally during the Cold War. The alliance largely waned after the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, though Russia has continued some weapons sales to Damascus. Syrian President Bashar Assad has increasingly reached out to Russia recently, including Seeking weapons and offering broader military cooperation.

‘Great geopolitical significance’  - The two countries’ naval chiefs also met in Moscow on Friday and discussed “further strengthening mutual trust and mutual understanding between the two states’ fleets,” A Russian naval official, Igor Dygalo, told Itar-Tass. The Tartus renovations could signal an intention to have a long-term Russian naval presence there.

In late August, Russia’s ambassador to Damascus, Igor Belyev, said that Russian ships already patrol the area, but “a new development is that the Russian presence in the Mediterranean will become permanent.”

Syrian media made no mention of the Russian announcement Friday, and Syrian officials could not be reached for comment.

Russian military experts said Tartus would be a considerable boost for operations in the Mediterranean. “It is much more advantageous to have such a facility than to return ships patrolling the Mediterranean to their home bases,” Former Black Sea Fleet commander Adm. Eduard Baltin said, according to the Russian Interfax-AVN service. The former first deputy commander the Russian Navy, Adm. Igor Kasatonov, said Tartus “is of great geopolitical significance considering that it is the only such Russian facility abroad.”

***

Somali Pirates’ Unexpected Booty: Russian Tanks.
By Nick Wadhams / Nairobi Friday, Sep. 26, 2008

The pirates who seized a Ukrainian freighter on Friday may have netted one of their biggest prizes in more than 15 years of terrorizing the Somali coastline — the vessel was carrying 33 T-72 battle tanks to Kenya.

It appears almost certain that the pirates had no idea of the cargo aboard the Belize-flagged Faina, which Ukrainian Defense Minister Yuri Yekhanurov told the Interfax news agency was being sold to Kenya. He said the cargo included grenade launchers and ammunition. Hours after the hijacking, Russia announced it was sending a warship from its Baltic Fleet to patrol the Somali coast.

Attacks on cargo vessels along the Somali coast have spiked recently, with at least 14 ships and 300 crew members currently held by pirates in lawless Somalia, according to the London-based International Maritime Bureau (IMB). But the seizure of the tanks also raises questions about their ultimate destination and purpose: The Kenya office of the Seafarers Assistance Programme said the ship had picked up its cargo of military equipment in the Baltic Sea and was sailing to Mombasa. Kenyan government spokesman Alfred Mutua said his government had purchased the hardware. “The cargo in the ship includes military hardware such as tanks and an assortment of spare parts for use by different branches of the Kenyan military,” he said in a statement.

A French intelligence official tells TIME that the hijackers probably had no clue about the Faina’s cargo, and might find they “might get more than they’d bargained for” — and would probably try to ransom the shipment back to the freighter’s owners. “They see a ship out there alone, consider the surrounding conditions favorable, and they move,” the official explained. France has been closely involved in trying to beef up patrols in the Gulf, even introducing a resolution to the U.N. Security Council.

Experts believe that the pirates may not have the capacity to offload the cargo — and there may not be much local interest in tanks, anyway. They’d be quickly noticed in Somalia, and their destination would reveal the identity of anyone financing the hijackers.

It wouldn’t be the first time that pirates in Somalia may have stumbled upon a cargo that was bigger than they could imagine. Last August, pirates seized the MV Iran Deyanat, a ship owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines. Somali officials contend that the ship had been carrying weapons destined for Islamic insurgents, a claim denied by Tehran. Ironically, the activities of the pirates may be lifting the lid on the illicit trade in weapons around the Horn of Africa.

But for the pirates of Somalia, it was just another working day — the Faina was the third ship taken in the course of a week in an area about 200 miles off Mogadishu, suggesting an advanced detection capability on the part of the pirates. The Faina is a huge, well-protected vessel, underscoring both the audacity and capability of the buccaneers.

“It is an astonishing ship to take, and it defeats a number of the previously held conceptions that they’d go for slow-moving ships,” James Wilkes, managing director of the London-based Gray Page Limited, a maritime consulting group in London, told TIME. “This ship is built like a castle; how they managed to make it stop, I don’t know. I can imagine that they possibly laid quite a bit of weapon fire on the ship.”

Some reports have tied the pirates to the Islamic insurgents battling the Ethiopian- and U.S.-backed Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, but experts say no concrete evidence has emerged to back this claim. Wilkes and others say the hijackers are more likely simply in the increasingly lucrative business of demanding — and receiving — ransom payments from shipowners.

“If there was another alternative, the owners would not pay, but right now there is no alternative,” says Cyrus Mody, a manager at the IMB. “Once the pirates are on board they are pretty much in control. The fact that the pirates are going to be paid a ransom obviously makes it that much more attractive and lucrative, especially in a country where there is no government, no law enforcement and no policing to address the situation.”

The brazen attack was a reminder of the limits of the protection offered by the U.S.-led coalition of warships patrolling the Somali coast. In a statement issued Friday from Bahrain, Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, commander of the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet, explained that the patrols don’t “have the resources to provide 24-hour protection” in waters between Somalia and Yemen. He urged private shipping companies to “take measures to defend their vessels and crews,” which could include hiring security for their vessels.

—With reporting by Bruce Crumley/Paris

—————–

First permanent post for American G.I.s in Israel.
BY MATTHEW KALMAN, SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS.
Sunday, September 28th 2008,

JERUSALEM - The United States has stationed 120 American troops and an early-warning radar system in Israel - marking the first permanent U.S. military presence there.
Soldiers and technicians from the U.S. European Command flew to the Nevatim military base in the Negev Desert last Sunday, bringing with them advanced radar systems designed to help protect Israel against a potential ballistic missile attack from Iran, according to the weekly Defense News.
Once operational, the system is expected to double or even triple the range at which Israel could detect, track and ultimately intercept Iranian missiles, Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, director of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency, told Defense News.
The Forward Based X-Band Transportable Radar will be linked to U.S. satellite tracking stations and Israel’s Arrow-2 defensive rocket system, enabling the Israelis to detect and destroy any incoming Iranian missile before it enters Israeli air space.
Japan deployed the same system two years ago to detect potential missiles launched from North Korea.
The U.S. European Command has deployed troops and Patriot air defenses for joint exercises and Iraq-related wartime planning, but has never before permanently deployed troops on Israeli soil, according to Defense News.
“This is a major upgrade in bilateral preparations for the threats facing Israel,” an Israeli defense official said.
A British newspaper reported Friday that President Bush refused to okay a preemptive strike by Israel against Iran’s fledgling nuclear facilities.
In Israel, the X-Band is seen as a consolation prize.
Iranian state TV has reported testing of its Shehab-3 long-range ballistic missile, which is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead 1,242 miles - more than far enough to hit Tel Aviv.
At a recent military parade in Tehran, banners adorning six Shehab-3 missiles declared: “Israel must be wiped off the map,” and “We will crush America under our feet.”
The United Nations recently renewed economic sanctions against Iran designed to halt its nuclear program and stop Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Israeli leaders fear that a nuclear Iran, driven by its violently anti-Jewish leaders, will try to destroy Israel.

Middle East peace talks =Palestinians lose faith in two-state solution:
Study group calls for new form of resistance to Israeli occupation with goal of single, bi-national state.
Rory McCarthy from Jerusalem, for the guardian.co.uk,
Thursday September 04, 2008.

A group of prominent Palestinian figures has proposed a radical change in strategy to demand a single, bi-national state if the current round of Middle East peace talks fails.

The Palestinian Strategy Study Group, an EU-funded project written by 27 leading Palestinian figures from across the political spectrum, argued that the current two-state framework for peace talks is failing to bring the promised independent state. Instead, it suggested ending the negotiation process that has gone on now for nearly 20 years, reconstituting the Palestinian Authority into what might become a “Palestinian Resistance Authority”, and developing a form of “smart” resistance.

“The central aim will be to maximise the cost of continuing occupation for Israel, and to make the whole prospect of unilateral separation unworkable,” it said. The final, and most striking proposal, is to shift to a “single state outcome” as the Palestinians’ preferred goal. This, it said, would regain the strategic initiative for the Palestinians.

“Although many Palestinians may still prefer a genuine negotiated two-state solution, a failure of the present Annapolis initiative will greatly strengthen those who argue against this,” the report said. “Most Palestinians are then likely to be convinced that a negotiated agreement is no longer possible.”

———–

It is not the first time a bi-national state has been proposed as a Palestinian goal, but the new report signals a marked shift in Palestinian thinking at a time when the latest peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians are yet again struggling to make any headway. Questions are now being asked on both sides about the future of the two-state solution that for so long has been the framework of Middle East peacemaking.

The greatest disquiet is on the Palestinian side, where even moderates are now beginning to sense the two-state formula is moving out of reach.

“I feel that a two-state solution is losing currency amongst both our peoples and with the world community beyond,” said Salam Fayyad, the Palestinian prime minister and former World Bank and IMF economist, in a speech he wrote for a meeting of former Israeli diplomats yesterday and which was delivered by Riad Malki, the Palestinian foreign minister.

Malki himself admitted that, despite 10 months of talks between Israeli and Palestinian leaders, which began in Annapolis, in the United States, not a single word of agreement had been put on paper. The Annapolis process, the first such peace talks in seven years, were supposed to produce a peace agreement by the end of this year - a goal that has proved wildly unrealistic.

***
Another group, the Israel-Palestine Centre for Research and Information, published a policy document this week with proposals for the Palestinians to change the status quo. Among the options it said were available were dissolving the Palestinian Authority, calling for a one-state solution and making a Kosovo-style unilateral declaration of independence.

However, it noted that the chief risk of calling for a single, bi-national state was that nothing would change and the status quo would simply worsen given how deeply unpopular the idea is among Israelis. “With so little support from the more powerful neighbour, it seems unlikely that the Palestinian call for unity will bring many positive results in the near term,” it said. Instead, it concluded: “We feel that a tightly coordinated non-violent campaign toward statehood is the best option.”

One of the key obstacles on the Palestinian side now is the bitter infighting between the two leading factions, Fatah and Hamas. Since last year, Hamas, the Islamist group that won elections in 2006, has been in full control of Gaza and daily seems to be dividing ever further from its rival Fatah, which effectively controls the West Bank. Even if a peace agreement was reached this year, it is hard to see how it might be implemented in Gaza without reconciliation between the rival factions, and for now that seems out of their grasp.

Hamas has long argued against negotiations with Israel. “We don’t see any fruits from the political negotiations,” Ghazi Hamad, a Hamas advisor said in a recent interview in Gaza. “So we have to make an evaluation for the whole Palestinian national project. Since Madrid in 1991 until now it’s been 17 years but we’ve seen nothing on the ground. How can I convince people that we are going in the right direction?”

On the Israeli side, opinion is more mixed. In general the two-state solution is still broadly regarded as a reasonable goal, although there are many on the rightwing who say Israel should not give up the land it captured in 1967 or who say Israelis have a Biblical right to settle in the West Bank that cannot be negotiated away.

***

Ehud Olmert, the Israeli prime minister who will step down later this month, has pursued negotiations, arguing that a two-state solution is attainable. On Sunday he will discuss with the cabinet a plan to pay compensation to encourage some of the more distant settlers in the West Bank to move either to Israel or to settlements within the West Bank barrier.

Tzipi Livni, the foreign minister who is likely to replace him as head of the ruling Kadima party, also argues in favour of negotiations and has been deeply involved in the latest talks, although she has said she would resist pressure to hurry the negotiations. Ehud Barak, the defence minister, suggested yesterday that some of the Palestinian areas of Jerusalem might become the future capital of a Palestinian state, an idea which has not always been palatable to Israelis.

***

Yet there are others beginning to voice different ideas. In a newspaper column in the Yedioth Ahronoth this week, Giora Eiland, a former head of the National Security Council and former national security adviser under Ariel Sharon, said the gap between Israel and the Palestinians was “enormous” and growing.

“The maximum that the Israeli government [any government] will be able to offer the Palestinians [and survive politically] falls short of the minimum that the Palestinian government [any government] can agree to accept [and survive politically],” he wrote. Eiland argued that a final status peace deal “will not be achievable in the foreseeable future” and that new ideas should be considered. He suggested returning control of the West Bank to Jordan, who controlled it before the 1967 war.

—————–

At www.SustainabiliTank.info, we go even further - we are advocating a Three State Solution.  That is sort of a Hamasstan in the Gaza Strip - to be started under the supervision of Egypt, and a Palestine-West-Bank State that will start out with organized help led by Jordan. The aim of the two “supervising states” will have o be well defined in advance - not as annexation - but as a management for obtaining future total independence. If in the end this leads to some sort of confederation that involves also Israel, so much the better. But without first preparing the ground for some sort of clearly defined Palestinian economies (and I mean two of them in parallel) there is no future for any sort of solution.       A united -one-Palestinian entity is not in the cards, so a two State solution is also very difficult.

From:  liasieghart at hotmail.com
Subject: Yemen, cogeneration and the CDM an outline of opportunity
Date: September 4, 2008

The Clean Development Mechanism has been instrumental in the development of a number of cogeneration projects around the world, but none yet in Yemen, where the scope for projects is certainly present. Lia Carol Sieghart looks at the role that cogeneration could play as part of efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the country. The Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, at the 3rd Conference of the Parties (COP 3) to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Kyoto, Japan. This treaty significantly bolstered the Convention by committing parties from developed countries, known as Annex 1 Parties, to legally binding limits on GHG emissions. They may also acquire emission reduction credits by taking advantage of the three ‘flexibility mechanisms’ defined under the Protocol.These mechanisms are:

• International Emissions Trading (IET)
• Joint Implementation (JI)
• Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The latter is the only mechanism that involves developing countries. The CDM allows Annex 1 Parties (or entities from those Parties) to invest in project activities that reduce GHG emissions and contribute to sustainable development in non-Annex 1 countries.The CDM has seen an exponential growth since the Kyoto Protocol came into effect in 2005. The end of 2007 provided a milestone with the 100-millionth certified emission reduction credit being issued. In April 2008 the 1000th project, an energy efficiency project, was registered with the Executive Board. At present there are more 3000 projects in the UNFCCC pipeline.Nevertheless, the number of host countries playing a vital role is still very limited. The geographic dispersion of registered projects remains imbalanced. So far the main share of projects is with Asia and Latin America. Most projects are registered with India as a host country, followed by China, Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia and Chile. India and China in particular have been early movers and have grasped the investment opportunities provided by the CDM. The vast majority of projects registered are in the energy sector. Taking into consideration the projects under validation and those requesting registration, it seems that this distribution pattern will not change significantly during the first commitment period.

  There are many reasons why the CDM has so far fallen short of its full potential, many of which are country-specific while others are repeatedly reported from various countries. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 18 countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, but to date only 20 projects have been registered (Table 1). This amounts to ~2 % of the total of registered project activities.

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  The MENA Region population comprises about 6% of the total world population, almost equivalent to the population of the European Union. Most MENA countries are experiencing a rapid population growth. The region is economically diverse – the spectrum ranges from oil-rich economies to countries that are resource-scarce in relation to population.

  By 2050, the MENA countries will reach an electricity demand of the same magnitude as Europe (3500 TWh/y). In some of the countries, electricity demand is expected to triple from almost 1500 TWh/y at present to 4100 TWh/y in 2050. Correspondingly, the effects of climate change will become more severe. The fossil fuel-based power sector offers enormous potential for CO₂ emission reductions, both through energy efficiency improvements in existing applications as well as utilization of state-of-the-art technology for new capacity additions.

  Given the surging growth in energy demand, the region needs to develop sustainable energy patterns, increase energy accessibility – particularly for marginalized populations in rural areas – and encourage efficient use of energy. Countries need to embark on a less carbon-intensive development path. Utilizing the CDM can provide a vital trigger in this process.

  CHP has a clear opportunity to expand quickly. CHP installations, by combining electricity production with a heat recovery system, provide reliable and cost-effective opportunities for GHG emissions reduction and an important contribution to meeting heat and electricity demand. Cogeneration projects also have the potential to bring energy efficiency measures to large industries in the region, while the MENA oil industry and refinery capacity offers further significant cost-effective potential for heat recovery and cogeneration.

  THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

  The Republic of Yemen lies to the south of Saudi Arabia, bounded by the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The 2004 census recorded a population of 19.72 million, with an average annual population growth rate of 3.2 % and one of the highest birth rates in the MENA Region. Yemen remains one of the poorest countries in the world, and currently ranks 49 on the UN’s list of the 50 Least Developed Countries. Yemen’s GNI per capita is US$760, compared to, for example, US$12,510 in Saudi Arabia, US$23,990 in the United Arab Emirates and US$9070 in Oman². According to the Country Social Analysis (2006) by the World Bank the GDP growth rate has been falling steadily in recent years. Inflation has been averaging at almost 12% since 2002, rapidly increasing the cost of living.

  The country, a non-OPEC member, is the smallest oil producer in the Middle East³. Nevertheless, the economy is highly dependent on the oil sector, with the country’s oil exports accounting for approximately 85% of export revenues and 33% of gross domestic product (GDP). Yemen’s energy use relies heavily on fossil fuels. Thus, there is potential to reduce GHG emissions in the energy sector, the oil and refinery industry and in the industrial sector.

  GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN YEMEN

  The 2001 First National Communication to the UNFCCC used 1995 as a reference year for Yemen’s GHG emissions inventory due to the high uncertainty of 1994’s information as a result of the April–July 1994 civil war. The total GHG emissions (CO₂, CH⁴, N²O) of the country, in 1995, amounted to 18.7 million tonnes CO₂eq, (CO₂=11.4 million tonnes, CH⁴=128,000 and NO₂=15,000). Taking CO₂ removal into account, the total net emission of CO₂ is 845,000 tonnes. These figures are exclusive of the emission from the international bunker (114,350 tonnes CO₂) and from combustion of biomass (353,290 tonnes CO₂).

  Yemen’s emission profile by gas type for 1995 shows that CO₂ accounts for 61% of the total national GHG emissions (113,580 tonnes CO₂), N²O 25% (465,700 tonnes CO₂eq) and CH⁴ 14% (269,400 tonnes CO₂eq). Table 2 shows gas emissions by various sectors.

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  If we look at the industrial processes, there are many that create GHG emissions as a by-product of the process itself. Cement production generated the most emissions (99.3%). Other production processes with minor emissions are lime production, limestone use and soda use (food & beverages). The total GHG generated by these processes was estimated at 547,000 tonnes CO₂eq, which accounted for 2.92% of the country’s total GHG emissions. The production of cement in Yemen in 1995 was 1,089,000 tonnes that resulted in CO₂ emission of 543,000 tonnes CO₂eq representing 4.8% of the country’s total CO₂ emissions (energy sector, industrial processes etc), while it represents around 2.9% of the total GHGs.

  The CO₂ emission from cement production was calculated by multiplying 1995 cement production (1,089,000 tonnes) by the emission factor (0.4985 tonnes of CO₂ per tonne of cement produced). The SO₂ emitted from cement production was obtained by using an emission factor of 0.3 kg SO₂/tonne cement, thus leading to 330 tonnes SO₂ in 1995.

  THE YEMENI ENERGY SECTOR

  Yemen’s 100% state-owned Public Electricity Corporation (PEC) formed in 1991, under the Ministry of Electricity, is the sole public utility with the mandate for generation, transmission, distribution and sale of electricity in the country. The entity operates approximately 80% of the country’s generating capacity as part of the national grid. The remainder is generated by small off-grid suppliers and privately owned generators, predominantly in rural areas⁴. In urban areas diesel generators are also used as back-up systems. The efficiency of diesel generators can be up to 40%. Electricity demand amounted to 3294 GWh in 2005, an increase of 9.6% annually since 2000.

  The Yemeni population has the lowest access to electricity in the region, with only 53%⁵ of the total population having access. Of the 72% of the Yemeni population living in rural areas, only 23% have any access to electricity, which compares unfavourably with 85% of the urban population that have access to electricity. Out of this 23%, about 10%–14% is connected to the national grid system while the remainder is estimated to have some access from other sources, typically a diesel generator that operates only a few hours in the evening. Even for those connected to the grid, electricity supply is intermittent, with regular rolling blackouts in most cities.

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  Yemen has been experiencing a chronic power supply shortage. An estimate for the electric power deficit in 2006 was 220 MW, a figure that is expected to increase to 250 MW in 2008. With the 2005 increase in diesel prices, the cost of diesel generation has become economically unsustainable thereby significantly increasing the demand for a lower-carbon, more-efficient, lower-cost and reliable energy future.

  The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP, 2003–2005) states the following: ‘Indicators show the failure of electric power in Yemen in keeping pace with demand [is] due to the ageing of the power stations and the distribution networks, which is reflected in the high losses that are currently estimated at about 38%, well above the internationally prevailing levels. This situation prevents the full utilization of machinery and equipment in the different productive and service units, or burdens the private sector facilities with the cost of setting up their own generating plants, not to mention the inability to systematically fulfil domestic lighting requirements. This situation is expected to continue over the medium term due to the increase of demand at high rates, and thus increases the adverse aspects on investment opportunities and the growth of output, income and employment, clearly showing the importance of strategic investment by the private sector in this field.’

  In the industrial sector, power is purchased either from the national grid or off-grid from privately owned diesel generators with poor electrical efficiency ranging from 25% up to 35% especially in light industry. Heavy industry, e.g. the cement sector – the most energy intensive of an