links about us archives search home
SustainabiliTankSustainabilitank menu graphic
SustainabiliTank
Languages:
English flagItalian flagGerman flagSpanish flagFrench flagPortuguese flagJapanese flagKorean flagChinese flagArabic flagRussian flag

Reporting from the UN Headquarters in New YorkReporting from Washington DCReporting from UNFCCC Meetings
Other UN CitiesThe US StatesThe New Climate
Global Warming issuesPolicy Lessons from Mad Cow DiseaseUN Commission on Sustainable Development
 

Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 29th, 2007

 top1.jpg

top3.jpg

TRANSATLANTIC ISSUES N°14

Iran: The Big Gamble

By Kassem Ja’afar

April 2007
Iran: The Big Gamble

It had to be a leaked document from the I.A.E.A which revealed to the world in mid April the true extent of Iran’s nuclear programme and its current status. Contrary to the organisations public pronouncements, made earlier that month by its head Dr Mohammad El-Barada’ei upon his recent visit to Tehran, the leaked document expressed the expert’s view that Iran’s nuclear efforts are actually far more advanced than previously thought. The document stated that Tehran currently possesses up to 1500 centrifuges capable of producing weapons-grade enriched Uranium. This marks an obvious contradiction with the opinion expressed by Dr Barad’ei a few weeks earlier when he said that Iran’s capabilities in Uranium enriching were still quite primitive.

Dr Barada’ei was speaking during visit to Tehran which came immediately after Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad triumphantly declared that his country had finally achieved a nuclear posture. The Iranian President went on to say that his country has now acquired the capability to enrich Uranium at an (industrial) level, and ominously announced that Iran has now joined the ‘Nuclear Club’. By that Ahmedinejad was obviously stating a new strategic posture for Iran not only in the Middle East but on a global scale. The so called ‘Nuclear Club’ that he referred to meant those countries which are publicly known to be nuclear powers, i.e. The United States, Russia, China, Great Britain and France, as well as India, Pakistan, Israel and more recently North Korea.
While a lot of observers preferred to dismiss the Iranian President’s remarks, and chose to consider that Tehran’s public declaration about its nuclear capabilities was exaggerated for obvious political and public relations purposes, Mr Ahmedinejad’s reference to the ‘Nuclear Club’ was interpreted by others as a very potent and pointed remark. It was clear that the Iranian leadership was trying to send a message to the world that its nuclear programme is not simply a scientific endeavour but rather a more strategically orientated programme aimed at providing Tehran with regional and global nuclear status.
Regardless of whether Mr Ahmedinejad’s remarks were accurately reflecting Iran’s current level of nuclear activity or not, it is remains imperative to point out that the Iranian nuclear programme is going ahead at full speed with no hindrance or deterrence. It is also necessary to remember that Iran’s primary goal through its nuclear programme is to achieve the status of an international player.
Recently, Iran has been succeeding in this endeavour. One only has to remember the whole fiasco of the British military personnel taken hostage by units of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). That operation did not happen by chance or as a spare of the moment incident. Indeed this cannot explain the ready presence of Iranian T.V cameras on the boats which took the British sailors and marines from their patrol craft and beamed their images to the world as legitimate prisoners of war having, according to the Iranian official story, infringed on that country’s territorial waters. It has been proven beyond military or geographic doubt that the seizure of the British personnel took place inside Iraqi territorial waters and what the Iranians were trying to achieve in that operation could be summarised in 3 main points.
1.) To prove that Iran can actually stand up to a major power, such as Britain, but obviously not the U.S., and get away with it, with impunity.
2.) To test the kind of world reaction that might result from such an incident.
3.) To time the operation to coincide with the new sanctions approved by the U.N Security Council against Tehran and also with the Arab summit taking place at the time in Saudi Arabia.

It must be said that Tehran did achieve these objectives. It did establish a de facto right for its forces to operate in areas which are regarded by international consensus as Iraqi territorial waters with no condemnation whatsoever from the International community. It also showed how flimsy world reaction could be towards such an incident. It took the Security Council days of debate to reach a watered down statement on the affair which didn’t even call for the immediate release of the British sailors and marines, let alone refer to them as illegally seized hostages. As for the regional reaction one can only refer to the fact that while the whole saga was going on in Tehran, the Iranian foreign minister Mr Muttaqi Manushaher was being feted as an honoured guest of the Arab summit in neighbouring Saudi Arabia. Needless to say Iran’s neighbours were both alarmed and abhorred by Iran’s action. However they also felt that Iran’s presence in the region will be a heavy load which they will have to deal with regardless of what the international community decides to do with Tehran in the future.

Iran’s boldness can only be explained by the feeling amongst the leadership in Tehran that they are winning the high stakes game that they are currently waging. This was demonstrated by Dr Mohammad Jawad Larijani, a senior security advisor to President Ahmedi-nejad and the brother of Dr Ali Larijani, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator and head of its national security council. In a recent interview Dr Larijani said that Tehran does not believe that the US or the World has a credible military option against it. He also stressed that nothing will stop Tehran from pursuing its nuclear objectives.
Iran does indeed feel on top of the game. In the wake of last summer’s war in Lebanon between Israel and Hizbollah, Tehran felt that it has become a direct player in the Arab-Israeli conflict for the first time in its history. Hizbollah is not only backed, financed and armed by Iran; it is in effect an extension of Iranian military power and political influence in South Lebanon and beyond. When Hizbollah fights Israel, Iran considers itself to be fighting Israel. This has become strategic fact which cannot be denied, and whose implications can no longer be ignored.
Equally, Iran looks at its strategic, political and economic alliance with Syria as another extension and projection of its power and influence beyond its borders and throughout the Middle East region, affecting both the Arab-Israeli conflict in its general framework, and the situation in the Palestinian territories through its proxy alliances with such groups as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Added to this of course is the Iranian escalating presence in Iraq where Tehran now firmly believes that it has managed to gain the upper hand by keeping the US and Britain bogged down in an apparently ever deepening and irresolvable political and security quagmire, and where it also believes that the current Iraqi political establishment is firmly on its side.
With increasing evidence that Tehran is now supplying aid, both military and financial to radical Shiite groups such as The Mehdi Army led by Sayyid Moqtada Sadr, as well as extreme Sunni groups fighting against the multinational forces in Iraq, the situation there becomes ominously reminiscent of that in South Lebanon where Tehran supports Hizbollah’s fight across the borders with Israel. It also rings dangerous bells for the coalition forces in Afghanistan where the Taliban (though a different sort of organization to Hizbollah) are similarly increasing the pace and extent of their insurgency, and where contrary to common wisdom they seem to be getting support in their fight from the Iranian regime.
One can explain all these phenomena as simply an Iranian self defence mechanism whereby Tehran, with its regional allies and extensions, is simply reacting to the threats it feels against its interests. However one can also interpret these moves as part of a grand Iranian scheme to extend and project its power and influence throughout the region.
When coupled with Tehran’s incessant quest to obtain a nuclear posture, regardless of whether such a posture included a declared nuclear weapons programme or otherwise, Iran must be aiming at far higher stakes than what a lot of western observers give it credit for. The Iranians do not believe that they need to explode a nuclear device to prove their status as a regional super power. On the contrary their behaviour and their actions so far indicate that their objective is simply to prove that Iran is a power to be reckoned with, and a state which is virtually ‘untouchable’. Such a posture for the Iranian regime would be a strategic achievement which would extend and project Tehran’s influence and role as a player throughout the Middle East and with the world as a whole. This is the gamble Tehran is currently playing for, and so far it seems it’s going its way. At least until further notice.
Kassem Ja’afar is a freelance Middle East analyst based in London and a former BBC correspondent.

Leave a comment for this article

###