Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 18th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
How Elves and Dragons Are Doing a Fantastic Job of Protecting Iceland’s Environment
Originally Icelanders used mythological creatures as a way to deter people from coming to their island, now they protect it.
By Sola Agustsson / AlterNet
April 13, 2015
In Iceland, where my father is from, it’s perfectly reasonable for people to think elves exist. Over half the population believes in, or at least entertains the existence of these invisible, magical and often mischievous creatures. I have relatives who are marine biologists, professors and agnostics who will not deny that elves, the huldufólk, or “hidden people,” reside in communities underneath rocks, living in detached harmony with humans and the natural world. For the most part, elves ignore humans until they interfere with their habitat.
When developers try to destroy rocks that are known elf homes or churches, things get spooky. A notorious example is the Álfhólsvegur (elf-hill) road in Kopavogur, which was eventually moved to accommodate the elves after machinery continued to mysteriously break down and construction accidents began to frequently occur in the 1930s. Fifty years later, plans to rebuild the same road were again halted when the same issues resurfaced, and workers refused to go near the hill with any machinery. Similar cases of construction machinery malfunctioning or natural disasters occurring when people attempted to disturb elf homes have led many Icelanders to abandon development over elf sites.
Over the last few decades, elves have gotten political representation in Iceland. An emerging group of elf advocates have formed alliances with environmentalists, and have managed to prevent major roads and homes from being built over rocks where elves are rumored to live.
Elf advocates have not always been successful in defending their invisible friends, as in the case of the Ófeigskirkja boulder, which was eventually moved after an 8-year battle with developers. Some argue that the process of protecting elf territory, and taking elf issues seriously, gives elves time to adjust to leaving their homes. “It cannot be denied that belief in the supernatural is occasionally the reason for local concerns and these opinions are taken into account just as anybody else’s would be…Issues have been settled by delaying construction projects so that the elves can, at a certain point, move on,” the Iceland Road and Coastal administration stated.
It’s difficult to imagine why elves garner so much respect in Norse culture. In America, we think of elves as Santa’s pointy green factory workers. But according to 18th- and 19th-century legends, Icelandic elves are anything but servile. They have been known to seek revenge on people who betray them, but also provide good fortune to those who pay them respect. Roughly the same size as humans, they are invisible, and have been described by scholar Terry Gunnell as “beautiful, powerful, alluring, and free from care.”
Some Icelanders go as far as to allegedly have sex with elves. “Sex with humans is boring,” writes self-proclaimed elf sex expert Hallgerdur Hallgrímsdóttir, who is fed up with dating her own kind. “Elf sex is possibly the safest sex on earth. They don’t carry sexually transmitted diseases and you can’t get pregnant or make an Elverine pregnant unless you both want to, which is not unheard of.”
The island of fire and ice, full of geysers, waterfalls, glaciers, fjords, natural hot springs, and vast mossy fields, is a landscape people want to preserve, and one that fosters the belief in supernatural forces. Elves and other mythological beings came to represent a way of understanding the natural environment, and also human consciousness. “Many things indicate that the hidden people originate in our unconscious: They resemble us in many ways, though they are more spirit-like and invisible, and to see the elves, must to either be given permission by them, or have a special ability. They can have supra-human capacities; and they can be both better and worse than humans,” says Haukur Ingi Jónasson, a theologian and psychoanalyst.
Though defending elf homes is not merely about Icelandic belief in superstition, but also in respecting the natural, non-human world. “Icelanders are few in number, so in the old times we doubled our population with tales of elves and fairies,” says President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson. Even Icelandic-born singer Bjork admitted to believing in elves when asked by TV host Stephen Colbert: “It’s sort of a relationship with nature, like with the rocks. (The elves) all live in the rocks, so you have to. It’s all about respect, you know.”
“Iceland is full of álagablettir, or enchanted spots, places you don’t touch – just like the fairy forts and peat bogs in Ireland. They’re protected by stories about the bad things that will happen if you do. This word of mouth, passed down over generations, is usually more effective than an official preservation order,” says Terry Gunnell, professor of folklore at the University of Iceland.
Iceland’s rising tourist industry could be one factor in maintaining the existence of not just elves, but other Icelandic mythic characters, such as trolls, sea monsters, and dragons.
One example is the Lagarfljótsormur, the Icelandic version of a Loch Ness monster. Resembling an aquatic brachiosaurus, myths of this serpent date back to 1345, though most sightings of the monster have occurred in the 20th century. Stories of the wormlike monster breathing poisonous fire and killing civilians abound, and sightings of the creature are said to foreshadow natural disasters. In 2014, the Fljótsdalshérað municipal council declared that the Lagarfljótsormur exists, though some speculate that this was a ploy to attract monster-seeking tourists.
Originally Icelanders used these mythological creatures as a way to deter people from coming to their island. Thirteenth-century cartographers depicted Icelandic coasts as utterly terrifying, laden with sea monsters, mermen, serpents and other unclassifiable mutants in order to dissuade explorers from settling there. On some ancient maps, the northern region of Dreki is ominously marked “Here be Dragons,” and is rumored to be populated by sea monsters.
Coincidentally, this same area is also thought to have untapped oil resources of interest to private companies who have recently gotten licensing rights to search for oil there. In a 2014 agreement, oil companies agreed to pay 10,000 ISK per square kilometer per year for the exclusive right to search for any useable resources.
While elf activists have been vocal about disturbing elf territory, there have yet to be sea dragon advocates rushing to defend the fire-breathing aquatic monsters of the Dreki region, or the Lagarfljótsormur for that matter. Elves have been known to cause mischief, but sea monsters have been less than desirable residents in Iceland, having been rumored to eat children.
Still, many Icelandic environmentalists are wary of disturbing the arctic region. Though beliefs in these otherworldly characters may seem ridiculous, the traditions have promoted a worldview of existing in harmony with the natural world rather than merely dominating it.
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 17th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
The Fix: Jon Stewart on why Cheney, and not Obama, is softer on Iran.
by Hunter Schwarz April 17, 2015 for the Washington Post.
In an interview with Hugh Hewitt last week, Dick Cheney said President Obama was basically about to give Iran nuclear weapons.
“This is a totally radical regime that is the premier sponsor of state terrorism in the world and Obama’s about to give them nuclear weapons,” Cheney said. “I can’t think of a more terrible burden to leave the next president than what Obama’s creating here.”
On “The Daily Show” Thursday, Jon Stewart, wearing a detective hat, wanted to prove the former vice president wrong.
“Really?” he asked. “You can’t think of an administration that left a more terrible burden?”
He showed a clip Cheney on the board of Halliburton in 1998, arguing that the United States should lift sanctions in Iran, and a 2004 Houston Chronicle report noting that, before Cheney left Halliburton to become Bush’s running mate, Halliburton opened an office in Tehran.
“You, sir, were arguing for the United States to lift sanctions on Iran so your company Halliburton could get contracts with this radical regime, contracts worth millions of dollars,” he said to a red balloon with a frowny face meant to represent Cheney.
But the balloon floated away before he could question it more.
Hunter Schwarz covers the intersection of politics and pop culture for the Washington Post
For those that want to have more fun with Dick Cheney – just watch out he does not shoot you – in true fact -
please watch in private: www.washingtonpost.com
AND ALTERNATE’S REPORT ON THE SAME TOPIC:
News & Politics
Jon Stewart Crushes Dick Cheney for Misleading the Public About Iran
A certain former vice president has some explaining to do.
By Allegra Kirkland / AlterNet
April 17, 2015
There are certain politicians Jon Stewart clearly relishes mocking. There’s his southern belle Lindsey Graham impression; Mitch McConnell as slow, bewildered turtle; and as an old-standby, Dick Cheney as evil Sith lord. Stewart dedicated much of last night’s episode to debunking the misleading statements made by Cheney, or as Stewart calls him, a man who is “rotten to his very core, which is in itself a tiny black hole from which no joy or light could escape.”
Cheney recently appeared on conservative radio to excoriate Obama for the Iran deal, claiming that the president is “about to give” nuclear weapons to the “premiere sponsor of state terrorism in the world.” Apparently in Cheney’s mind, anyone who strengthens the strategic position of Iran is attempting to weaken America. In an elaborate skit, Stewart assumes the disguise of a Sherlock Holmes character to uncover the mystery of who initiated the buildup of Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
The results of his sleuthing? The U.S. invasion of Iraq, masterminded by Cheney and former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, strengthened Iran’s regional position, allowing the country to build up 20 times the number of uranium-enriching centrifuges than they had when the Bush administration first entered office.
Allegra Kirkland is AlterNet’s associate managing editor. Her writing has appeared in the Chicago Reader, Salon, Daily Serving and The Nation.
DOES ANYONE STILL DOUBT THAT IT WAS THE CHENEY/BUSH ADMINISTRATION THAT MASTERMINDED THE NEW MIDDLE EAST WHERE THE MAJOR LOCAL POWER IS IRAN ON ITS WAY TO BECOME A GLOBAL POWER AS WELL?
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 17th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
Invitation to the 2nd annual United Nations Sustainable Energy for All Forum
SE4ALL Forum <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Kindly find attached an invitation from Dr. Kandeh Yumkella, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sustainable Energy for All and Chief Executive Officer of the Sustainable Energy for All initiative, for the 2nd annual United Nations Sustainable Energy for All Forum that will take place on 17-21 May in New York.
Important information on registration, as well as preliminary documents such as agenda and concept note will be made available on the Forum website at www.se4allforum.org.
Sustainable Energy for All Forum Team
Vienna Energy Forum 2015
The Vienna Energy Forum 2015 (VEF 2015) will emphasize the multiple benefits of the post-2015 development and climate agendas and showcase the best practices and actions on the ground that can contribute to both agendas. Energy practitioners, policymakers and thought leaders will discuss the interconnections of sustainable energy and inclusive development in the areas of partnerships, finance, policy, technology, capacity building and knowledge management. The event will also explore the consequences of trends such as population growth and urbanization, as well as addressing the resulting increase in energy demand. Other topics will include South-South cooperation, and energy, water, food and health linkages. The event is organized by the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) initiative, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and Austrian Foreign Ministry.
The Vienna Energy Forum 2015 (VEF 2015) will take place only a few months before the Sustainable Development Goals Summit in New York (September 2015) and the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris (November 2015). By emphasizing the multiple benefits of the Post-2015 Development and the Climate Agenda and by showcasing best practices and actions on the ground, the VEF 2015 aims at contributing to both.
Building on the findings from the VEFs held in 2009, 2011 and 2013, as well as the overarching goals of Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL), the VEF 2015 will provide a high-level platform for thought leaders, policy makers and energy practitioners to engage in a multi-stakeholder dialogue on pivotal sustainable energy issues connected to inclusive development, including partnerships, finance, policy, technology, capacity building and knowledge management.
18-20 June 2015
Hofburg Palace, Michaelerkuppel, 1010
+43 (1) 26026-0
+43 (1) 2692669
vef2015 at unido.org
Registration is open now here!
read more: energy-l.iisd.org/events/vienna-e…
Key questions to be addressed at the VEF 2015:
• What are the main benefits of sustainable energy to inclusive development and productive capacities?
• What are the main drivers of the increasing energy demand across sectors and how can these be addressed in an integrated way?
• How can we strengthen the potential of sustainable energy so that it results in concrete actions supporting the Post-2015 Development and the Climate Agenda?
• What are the areas of greatest potential in energy efficiency, and what can be done to accelerate action and investment in energy efficiency, the ‘hidden fuel’ that has some of the most promising prospects to advance the goals of climate security and sustainable growth?
• Which innovative financing mechanisms can we use to promote renewable energy systems? How do we scale up investments in renewable energy technologies to meet the SE4ALL goals?
• How do we energize multi-stakeholder partnerships, private sector involvement and regional cooperation to promote sustainable energy for all?
• How can the nexus perspective be operationalized to support integrated approaches to energy, water, food, ecosystems and human health?
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 17th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
The “Possible Military Dimensions” Bomb That Could Blow Up the Iran Deal.
Friday, 17 April 2015 10:46 By Gareth Porter — Truthout | News Analysis
At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Fusion Energy Conference 13-18 October 2008, Geneva, Switzerland. Iran and the IAEA were close to reaching agreement on a framework for Iranian cooperation. Further information comes from IAEA October 28, 2008, from Geneva. Iran and the IAEA were close to reaching agreement on a framework for Iranian cooperation but it blew away because of the disagreements on credibility.
The United States and Iran may have agreed now on a vague framework for resolving issues between them, including the lifting of sanctions, but the final stage of the negotiations will bring a diplomatic confrontation over the sequence and timing of lifting sanctions.
And the most difficult issue in the coming talks will be how the “Possible Military Dimensions” or “PMD” – the allegations of Iranian nuclear weapons work that have been at the center of the entire Iran nuclear crisis for several years – is to be linked to lifting certain UN Security Council sanctions.
On that linkage Iran will insist that its cooperation in providing access to the International Atomic Energy Agency must be reciprocated with the lifting of certain sanctions on an agreed-upon timetable, regardless of how long the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) takes to make up its mind, and what judgment it renders, according to a source in close contact with the Iranian negotiating team (as per Mr. Porter).
The US “fact sheet” on the “parameters” of an agreement says, “All past United Nations Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneously with the completion by Iran of nuclear related activities addressing all key concerns,” and the list that follows includes “PMD.”
However, nothing was officially agreed on in Lausanne on how Iranian cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the PMD issue would be linked to sanctions relief, according to the source close to the Iranian negotiators. But the source said that an informal understanding was reached that the linkage would involve the lifting of UN Security Council sanctions directly involving Iran’s imports for its nuclear and missile programs.
Iran is prepared to cooperate to complete the IAEA investigation of past allegations, the source said, but will demand concrete limits that provide assurances that the process will not be prolonged indefinitely.
Iran continues to insist that the evidence being used to impugn its intentions was “manufactured.” Nevertheless, Iran “would be ready to give access to the IAEA on PMD even though that goes beyond NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty],” the source told Truthout.
But the source said Iran would not agree to make the lifting of those UN sanctions contingent on any IAEA judgment about the PMD issue. Instead, Iran will demand a list in advance of everything the IAEA wants. “We would give the IAEA access to everything on the list,” said the source.
Once the IAEA completed its visits and its environmental sampling, however, Iran will consider that the process is finished. “We don’t care what the IAEA analysis would be or how long it took,” the source said. “What Iranians cannot accept is that [the PMD issue] becomes an indefinite instrument for the Israelis, because they want to find out about Iranian capability and ask for this or that military site and a new inspection.”
The negotiations on the PMD-sanctions linkage will be part of a broader set of negotiations in which Iran will insist on a detailed set of arrangements on sanctions relief in return for each of its concessions in the agreement, according to the source. “Each of the elements listed in the US fact sheet must have a step-by-step plan with a timetable and proportionate reciprocation,” said the source.
Obama Under Pressure He Helped Create
The Obama administration has been under heavy pressure from the Israelis and their supporters in Washington to insist that Iran confess to having carried out nuclear weapons research and development as a condition for sanctions relief.
That pressure is the result of several years of news media coverage that has treated allegations that Iran carried out research and development on nuclear weapons, published by the IAEA in 2011, as established fact. The media have constantly repeated the theme that Iran has been “stonewalling” the IAEA to cover up its past nuclear weapons experiments.
Absent from the media narrative is the fact that the allegations that the IAEA is demanding that Iran explain are all based on intelligence that is now known to have come from Israel and which the IAEA itself suspected of being fabricated, from 2005 to 2009.
But the Obama administration itself helped to make PMD a hot button issue in American politics. It made Iran’s alleged refusal to cooperate with the IAEA investigation of the purported intelligence alleging an Iranian nuclear weapons research and development program the rationale for imposing punishing sanctions on Iran.
The US administration has been wary of demanding an actual admission of guilt, which it knew was unrealistic, but it has been unwilling to completely dismiss the position of the Israelis and their followers either. Last November a “senior Western official” told Reuters that the United States and the other five powers would try to “be creative” in finding a formula to satisfy both those who were insisting that Iran must “come clean” about its nuclear past and those who said it was not realistic to expect a confession.
In an April 8 interview with Secretary of State John Kerry, the host of “PBS NewsHour” Judy Woodruff asserted that the IAEA wanted Iran to “disclose past military-related activities” but that Iran was “increasingly looking like it’s not going to do this.” Woodruff then asked, “Is the US prepared to accept that?”
Without challenging the premise that Iran is expected to “disclose past military activities,” Kerry responded, “No. They have to do it. It will be done.”
Fabricated Intelligence and IAEA Investigation
The George W. Bush administration pressed documents supposedly from the laptop computer of an Iran scientist involved in an Iranian nuclear weapons research program on the IAEA in mid-2005. But Mohamed ElBaradei, then IAEA director general, refused to regard the documents as legitimate evidence because they had never been authenticated, and Bush administration officials refused to answer questions about their origins. In his memoirs published in 2011, ElBaradei writes, “The problem was, no one knew if any of this was real.
Information now available shows that the documents were created in Israel. According to a senior German office official, those documents were given to Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the BND, in 2004 by the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK), the armed exile Iranian opposition group that had been an Israeli client organization for several years.
A popular Israeli history of the most successful covert operations by Israel’s Mossad, originally published in Hebrew in Israel, asserts that Mossad provided some of the documents to the MEK that later become the centerpiece of the case against Iran.
ElBaradei also reveals in his memoirs that the IAEA received another series of purported Iranian documents directly from Israel in summer 2009. Among them was a two-page document in Farsi describing a four-year program to produce a neutron initiator for a fission chain reaction. The former IAEA chief inspector in Iraq, Robert Kelley has recalled that ElBaradei found that document to be lacking credibility because it had no chain of custody, no identifiable source, and no official markings or anything else that could establish its authenticity. But ElBaradei’s successor as IAEA director general, Japanese diplomat Yukiya Amano, gave the IAEA’s imprimatur to the entire collection as well as the earlier set of documents in an annex to the November 2011 report. After his election, Amano assured US officials that he was “solidly in the US court” in his handling of the Iran file.
The IAEA has never revealed that Israel was the source of the latter set of documents. The IAEA justified its decision to keep the identity of the member states that provided intelligence secret by citing the alleged necessity to protect “sources and methods.” The decision to maintain silence on the source has served to shield both Israel and the IAEA itself from questions about the obvious political motives behind the purported intelligence.
The other major purported intelligence find published by the IAEA was the claim from Israel that Iran had installed a large steel explosives containment cylinder at its military base in Parchin in 2000 for nuclear weapons-related testing. But no corroborating evidence has ever been produced, and Robert Kelley has challenged the IAEA’s adoption of the Israeli intelligence claim on the grounds it was technically implausible.
Relations between Iran and the IAEA on cooperation over the PMD issue have gone through three major phases. In a series of meetings in early 2012, Iran and the IAEA were close to reaching agreement on a framework for Iranian cooperation. Iran agreed on an IAEA visit to Parchin, where the bomb test cylinder was said to have been located, as part of the process. But the talks broke down over the IAEA’s insistence that the investigation would never have an end point, and that the Agency would have the right to return to any question or site, even after Iran had provided the necessary access and other cooperation.
A second phase of relations began when Iran and the IAEA reached agreement on a “Framework for Cooperation” in February 2014. Iran agreed to provide information and access in regard to a list of PMD issues, starting with the “Exploding Bridgewire” (EBW) issue.
But after Iran provided documentary evidence to show that its research in the field was for its oil and gas industry and not for nuclear weapons, Amano refused to acknowledge publicly that Iran had discredited one of the arguments about the intelligence documents.
The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akhbar Salehi, claimed that the IAEA had promised in the agreement to close issues once Iran had provided required information, and the IAEA did not challenge his claim. Amano insisted, however, that the IAEA would not issue any assessment until it had completed its investigation of all of the issues.
Iran apparently concluded from that experience that the IAEA would keep Iran on the hook as long as the United States and its allies wanted to maintain leverage over Iran. The Obama administration has now confirmed that conclusion by holding the lifting of sanctions hostage to Iran’s “cooperation” on PMD writes Porter.
US officials have never explained how they would expect Iran to satisfy the IAEA if the intelligence at issue was indeed fabricated.
Heinz Fischer: “Ich halte Netanjahus Kritik für falsch”
von Arian Faal, Wiener Zeitung
The Austrian President in above interview states clearly that Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu is wrong in his opposition to the deal President Obama and the heads of the other four powers are trying to strike with Iran. The point being th prospective deal is indeed the best that can rationally be expected from Iran.
Further, President Fischer expects the deal to be agreed upon and signed by all involved by July 1st 2015, and he expects to go on a State visit to Iran after the agreement has been obtained. He will thus be the first of a EU-Member-State leader to go to this newly cleaned Iran.
Foreign Minister Sebastien Kurz wrote on his Facebook page today, April 17, 2015 about the return of the negotiations to Vienna
in a race with time as the agreement will be signed eventually in New York before the end of June.
Minister Kurz already told the Kurier yesterday that the Vienna negotiations that deal with the details that can allow the removal of sanctions will be hard and sensitive. Experts and politicians will be here next week for two days – the first time since last November. The Iranian deputy Foreign Minister is expected. But the Kurier article is not optimistic indeed that it all will be wraped up before the end of June and mentions the news from Tehran that an extension will be required.
Ende der Sanktionen
Diesmal soll es also weniger um den großen Wurf – an dem war man ja im November in Wien gescheitert – sondern um die heiklen Details gehen. Die politischen Direktoren der UN-Vetomächte sowie Irans Vize-Außenminister Araqchi werden erwartet.
Im Mittelpunkt steht vor allem die Frage, wann und wie die Sanktionen gegen den Iran im Falle einer Einigung aufgehoben werden sollen. Teheran will sie natürlich umgehend loswerden, um der ohnehin angeschlagenen iranischen Wirtschaft endlich neue Auftrieb zu geben. Im Westen will man weiterhin eine stufenweise Aufhebung und dazu die Möglichkeit, im Falle eines iranischen Vertragsbruchs sofort zu den Boykottmaßnahmen in voller Härte zurückzukehren. Darauf drängt auch der US-Kongress in Washington, der sich ohnehin eine Entscheidung über die Sanktionen nach einer Einigung Ende Juni vorbehält.
Inzwischen aber wachsen die Zweifel, dass die auch tatsächlich zustande kommt. In Teheran spricht inzwischen sogar Revolutionsführer Khamenei von einer weiteren Verlängerung.
(Kurier) Erstellt am 16.04.2015.
And coincidenta;;y, when looking up the Kurier I found an April 3, 2015 article that shows the Austrian Oil Company OEMV is alreadty sharpening its pens to reach out to Iran, to fulfill agreement for oil and gas they started before the sanctions hit. So – this is a sign of high Austrian interest in the success of these negotiations and the end of sanctions.
OMV wartet noch ab
Ob die OMV, die vor den Sanktionen große Gasförder-Pläne im Iran hatte, auch bald wieder ins Iran-Geschäft zurückkehrt, ist noch offen. OMV-Sprecher Robert Lechner: „Wenn ein so großer Player im Energiebereich zurück auf die internationale Bühne kommt, muss man das zunächst neu bewerten. Derzeit ist es aber noch zu früh, konkrete Schlüsse zu ziehen.“ Die OMV unterhält noch immer ein Büro in Teheran.
Die OMV muss allerdings gegen riesige Konkurrenz antreten. Denn trotz des niedrigen Ölpreises dürften sich die Branchen-Riesen um Investitionen in neue Öl- und Gasfelder anstellen. Alexander Pögl von der Ölmarkt-Beratungsfirma JBC: „Grundsätzlich werden internationale Investoren vor der Tür stehen, so viele Möglichkeiten für einen Explorationszugang gibt es nicht.“ Der Iran verfüge zwar wegen der Sanktionen derzeit über große Lagerbestände, müsse aber nach deren Verkauf rasch in neue Fördertechnologien und -gebiete investieren.
In der österreichischen Wirtschaft und Politik findet derzeit geradezu ein Wettlauf statt, wer zuerst nach Teheran fliegt. Offiziell will man darüber nicht viel sagen. „Die Einladung des Iran an Bundespräsident Heinz Fischer ist aufrecht“, heißt es aus der Hofburg zum KURIER. Gut informierte Diplomaten erwarten, dass die Reise noch heuer stattfindet.
Autor: Franz Jandrasits
(kurier) Erstellt am 03.04.2015, 18:00
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 16th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
Beit Guvrin-Morasha National Park
A New Unesco World Heritage Site
UNESCO declared the Beit Guvrin-Maresha National Park in the Judean Lowlands as a World Heritage site on April 14, 2015, and thereby brought to eight the number of such sites in Israel – that hold this distinctive and prestigious certification.
Calling Beit Guvrin a “microcosm of the land of the caves,” the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization noted that the site “situated on the crossroads of trade routes to Mesopotamia and Egypt, bears witness to the region’s tapestry of cultures and their evolution over more than 2,000 years”.
The archeological site contains about 3,500 underground chambers distributed among distinct complexes carved in the thick and homogenous soft chalk of the region. The quarried caves served as cisterns, oil presses, baths, dovecotes, stables, places of religious worship, hideaways and burial areas.
Today the caves, which are located in the Judean lowlands south of Beit Shemesh and east of Kiryat Gat, host tourists and visitors from all around the world and play host to several musical and cultural events throughout the year.
The other Israeli sites on the list include Masada; the Old City of Acre; the White City of Tel Aviv; the biblical tels of Megiddo, Hatzor, and Beersheba; the incense route of desert cities in the Negev; and Baha’i holy places in Haifa and the Western Galilee.
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 16th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
Legal Battle Begins Over Obama Bid to Curb Greenhouse Gases.
By CORAL DAVENPORT – The New York Times – APRIL 16, 2015
WASHINGTON — President Obama’s most far-reaching regulation to slow climate change will have its first day in court on Thursday, the beginning of what is expected to be a multiyear legal battle over the policy that Mr. Obama hopes to leave as his signature environmental achievement.
In two separate but related cases to be jointly argued in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the country’s two largest coal companies, along with 14 coal-producing states, have challenged a proposed Environmental Protection Agency regulation, which the agency issued under the authority of the Clean Air Act, to curb planet-warming carbon pollution from coal-fired power plants. If put in effect as E.P.A. officials have proposed, the rule is intended to fundamentally transform the nation’s power sector, shuttering hundreds of coal plants and expanding renewable energy sources such as wind and solar.
Thirteen states and the District of Columbia are backing the Obama administration’s proposal. No matter the outcome of the case, it is widely expected that it will be appealed, and that more lawsuits will follow — and that its fate will ultimately end up before the Supreme Court.
In the two cases, Murray Energy v. E.P.A. and West Virginia v. E.P.A., the plaintiffs contend that the E.P.A. lacks the authority to issue the rule in the first place, and so should stop working on the rule before making it final.
Among the lawyers arguing on behalf of the coal companies is Laurence H. Tribe, a renowned Harvard scholar of constitutional law, who was also a mentor to Mr. Obama when he attended law school. Republicans who opposed the rule have cheered Mr. Tribe’s role in the case.
Legal experts say it is also possible that the judges could throw the case out, since the rule has only been proposed and thus contains language that could change when released in the final form.
“Is industry right that the agency lacks the authority to regulate? The challenge is extremely unusual, since the rule is proposed, and not final,” said Jody Freeman, the director of Harvard University’s environmental law program and a former senior counselor to Mr. Obama. “For a court to entertain that would go against decades and decades of precedent.”
If the court does entertain the case, it will enter into more unusual legal territory. The coal companies and the E.P.A. dispute the interpretation of ambiguously worded amendments to the Clean Air Act passed in 1990. Under those amendments, legal experts say, it is not clear whether the E.P.A. has the authority to use one section of the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas pollution from power plants, since the agency has already used a different section of the law to regulate different pollutants from power plants.
When the 1990 legislation was passed, the House version of the law appeared to prohibit such “double regulation,” experts say, but the Senate version appeared to allow it. The final version of the legislation left the question unclear.
In arguing that it has the authority to regulate different pollutants from the same sources, the E.P.A. will point to the 1990 Senate language. In arguing that the agency lacks the authority, the coal companies will point to the House language.
Continue reading the main story
Jack McHenry 3 minutes ago
West Virginia is leading the charge against life as we know it on planet Earth? Really, West by God Virgina? What’s wrong with this…
Geoffrey James 3 minutes ago
Opponents or the regulations are optimistic about the outcome because the three judges hearing the appeal were appointed by Republican…
whatever 3 minutes ago
I see this as a good thing, since I believe the coal lobby will lose. The U.S. courts — even the right-leaning Supreme Court, which sided…
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“It’s an extremely technical argument about how the statute was put into the U.S. code 25 years ago — it’s basically a clerical error,” said Kevin Desharnais, an expert on environmental law with the firm Mayer Brown.
Patrick Morrissey, attorney general of West Virginia, which is leading the states’ petition against the E.P.A., said the agency is trying to exploit the ambiguity in a law to enact sweeping regulations that could transform the American energy economy. “They are trying to bring life to a clerical error,” he said. “Now it’s being used to put forth a major transformation to American energy policy — and to cause harm to West Virginia.”
Opponents of the rule say they are optimistic about the outcome in part because of the judges presiding over the case. All three were appointed by Republican presidents — two by President George W. Bush, and one by his father.
Typically, a rule is proposed by the E.P.A., which then takes public comment on the proposal. The E.P.A. may then adapt the rule before issuing the final version. The Obama administration proposed the coal plant rule last June, and is expected to release the final version this summer.
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 15th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
Welcome to Foreign Policy Editors’ Picks for April 14 2015, FP’s round-up of the day’s best articles of the day.
Today, we look at Iran and Saudi Arabia’s power struggle, the aftermath of the Garissa attack in Kenya, and why the United States and Nigeria failed to bring the Chibok girls back.
KILL>CAPTURE: The Obama administration’s explicit policy is to capture suspected terrorists, not kill them. So why is the opposite taking place? FP’s Micah Zenko explores what’s behind the president’s affinity for drones:
Read more at foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/14/kil…
Outmuscling the kingdom: The War in Yemen has exposed a naked struggle for influence between Riyadh and Tehran in the Middle East — and the Islamic Republic is coming out on top:
Read more at foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/14/yem…
BIG TROUBLE IN LITTLE MOGADISHU: In the wake of the Garissa University attack, Somali expats in a Nairobi neighborhood are caught between an increasingly indiscriminate al Shabab and a heavy handed police force:
Read more at foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/14/ken…
THE OTHER KIND OF GRIDLOCK: Despite the White House’s objections, Democrats sided with Republicans to unanimously approve a bill that could scuttle a final nuclear deal with Iran. FP’s John Hudson reports: Read more at: THE OTHER KIND OF GRIDLOCK: Despite the White House’s objections, Democrats sided with Republicans to unanimously approve a bill that could scuttle a final nuclear deal with Iran. FP’s John Hudson reports:
Read more at foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/14/cor…
STILL NOT BACK: One year ago, the Chibok girls were kidnapped by Boko Haram. FP’s David Francis reports on how the United States and Nigeria failed to rescue the 219 abducted girls:
Read more at foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/14/why…
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 13th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
Juan Cole | US History of Coup-Making Overshadows Obama’s Outreach to Iran, Latin American Left
Cuban president Fidel Castro and then vice-president Richard Nixon at a press reception in Washington in 1956. (photo: Keystone/Getty Images)
from RSN – Reader Supported News | 12 April 2015
Juan Cole, Informed Comment
Cole writes: “Some observers count 51 US military or covert interventions in Latin America since 1890. Quite apart from the Cold War covert ops, the US intervened militarily in Cuba no less than four times in the late 19th and first third of the twentieth century.”
READ MORE - readersupportednews.org/opinion2/…
Cornel West on Growing Resistance: “They’re Marching and They Will Not Stop”
Michael Cabanatuan, SF Gate
Cabanatuan writes: “‘You live in a society where black lives have such a low priority that people think you can just shoot them like a dog, go home and drink tea,’ West said. ‘White supremacy is alive in the U.S. and we have to hit it head on.’”
READ MORE - readersupportednews.org/news-sect…
Another Day Another Unarmed Black Man Shot, Killed by American Police
Tom McCarthy, Guardian UK
McCarthy writes: “Police in Oklahoma said they do not intend to further investigate an incident in which a volunteer, undercover 73-year-old ‘reserve deputy’ mistook his gun for a Taser and shot and killed a suspect who was wrestling on the ground with a sheriff’s deputy.”
READ MORE - readersupportednews.org/news-sect…
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 12th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
From: Avaaz.org [mailto:email@example.com]
Sent:Sunday, 12 April 2015
Liebe Freundinnen und Freunde,
Uruguay hat eines der besten Nichtrauchergesetze der Welt — und dafür wird das Land nun von Philip Morris verklagt. Der Tabakgigant könnte den Fall sogar gewinnen, es sei denn, wir schreiten ein.
Es ist erschreckend: Ein Konzern könnte mit einem tödlichen Produkt Gesetze kippen, die unsere Gesundheit schützen. Die Richter sind bereits unter Beschuss geraten, weil sie die öffentliche Meinung bei ähnlichen Fällen nicht beachtet haben. Sorgen wir dafür, dass das jetzt passiert: Wenn wir einen riesigen Aufruf starten und erstklassige Rechtsexperten engagieren, die unsere Stimmen in den Gerichtssaal tragen, können sie nicht weghören. So könnten wir verhindern, dass ihr Urteil einen schlimmen Präzedenzfall schafft.
Zeigen wir den Gerichten, dass es hier nicht nur um Uruguay geht — wenn Tabakgiganten ihren Willen durchsetzen, schaffen sie damit überall freie Bahn für Rechtsklagen. Mindestens 4 weitere Länder sind bereits ins Visier von Unternehmen geraten und auch in vielen anderen Ländern sind Nichtrauchergesetze bedroht.
Die Zeit ist knapp — vor Gericht werden bereits die Argumente angehört. Klicken Sie, um die öffentliche Gesundheit und unsere Demokratie vor der Habgier großer Unternehmen zu schützen. Unsere Namen werden dem Gericht überreicht:
In Uruguay müssen Zigarettenschachteln zu 80 Prozent mit gesundheitlichen Warnhinweisen und Schockbildern versehen werden. Das Rauchen war dort zu einer Krise ausgeartet, die täglich etwa sieben Uruguayern das Leben kostete. Doch seit es das Gesetz gibt, wird von Jahr zu Jahr weniger geraucht! Nun behauptet der Tabakriese Philip Morris jedoch, dass die Warnhinweise keinen Platz für seine Markenzeichen lassen.
All dies ist Teil einer weltweiten Strategie von Philip Morris: Länder zu verklagen und einzuschüchtern. Der Konzern hat Australien bereits einen teuren Gerichtsfall aufgedrückt, und wenn er jetzt gegen Uruguay Erfolg hat, könnte Philip Morris in über Hundert weiteren Ländern Klagen einleiten — darunter Frankreich, Norwegen, Neuseeland und Finnland. Denn in all diesen Ländern werden gerade neue lebensrettende Gesetze erwägt.
Experten sagen, dass Philip Morris gute Gewinnchancen hat. Schließlich wird das Verfahren hinter verschlossenen Türen vor einem internationalen Schiedsgericht behandelt, das letztes Jahr bei zwei Dritteln der Fälle zugunsten von Unternehmen geurteilt hat. Und das Urteil ist verbindlich, obwohl viele der Richter keine unparteiischen Rechtsexperten, sondern Privatpersonen mit Verbindungen zur Unternehmenswelt sind. Bringen wir sie also dazu, über die verheerenden Auswirkungen nachzudenken, die ihr Urteil für die weltweite Gesundheit haben könnte.
Uruguay hat sein eigenes Team von Rechtsexperten, doch diese konzentrieren sich zurecht auf ihre jeweiligen Verteidigungsargumente. Wir können jedoch ein einzigartiges rechtliches Argument zum Tragen bringen: dass dieses Urteil einen Präzedenzfall für jedes Land schaffen würde, in dem Rauchergesetze und ähnliche Handelsabkommen existieren. Wir können den Richtern außerdem zeigen, dass die Menschen hinter ihnen stehen, wenn sie zugunsten Uruguays und der öffentlichen Gesundheit urteilen.
Je mehr von uns unterschreiben, desto schwieriger ist es für die Richter, unseren Aufruf zu ignorieren. Klicken Sie unten, um mitzumachen, und verbreiten Sie diese Email:
Wenn Großkonzerne das Gemeinwohl in tödliche Gefahr bringen, tritt unsere Gemeinschaft in Aktion. Sei es bei Monsanto oder bei H&M — wir haben immer wieder dafür gesorgt, dass Profite nicht über das Wohl der Menschen gestellt werden. Und jetzt können wir das noch einmal tun.
Emma, Maria Paz, Katie, Mais, Alice, Ricken, Risalat und das ganze Avaaz-Team
Philip Morris klagt gegen Rauchverbot in Uruguay (Die Welt)
Rechtsstreit um Geld oder Leben (Deutsche Welle)
Wie Konzerne Staaten vor sich hertreiben: Philip Morris vs Uruguay (Die Zeit Online)
Und auf Englisch:
Philip Morris verklagt Uruguay wegen Schockbildern auf Zigarettenschachteln (NPR)
Jüngste Trends bei Investitionsschutzabkommen und Investor-Staat-Streitbeilegung (UNCTAD)
Das Spiel der Schiedsgerichte (The Economist)
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Posted in Archives, Austria, European Union, Reporting From the UN Headquarters in New York, Reporting from Washington DC, Uruguay, Vienna
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 12th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
Middle East Forum
Promoting American Interests
Middle East Quarterly – Spring 2015
Why Yemen Matters
How Many Qatari Nationals Are There?
by Onn Winckler
Middle East Quarterly
Qatari demographic policy is aimed at achieving a high population growth by encouraging a high natural increase rate. Qatar has no income tax, and its citizens are recipients of generous subsidies and extensive social welfare programs, many of which are meant to encourage marriages and large families. These include providing loans for housing, reducing the cost of dowries, and giving family allowances that increase according to the number of children per couple.
Most states do not divulge all demographic parameters of their population. At times, this data is unavailable due to the weakness of the regime as is the case with many sub-Saharan African countries and, more recently, with Yemen, Syria, and Iraq due to their prolonged civil wars. In other countries, such as the United States, Belgium, and France, there is a lack of data on the religious composition of the population due to official separation of church and state.
While none of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have ever published the religious composition of their indigenous populations, Qatar has lagged further behind: It does not even make public the total size of its indigenous population, considered “a national secret.” As the online editor of a Qatari-based business publication was told when approaching the Qatar Statistics Authority (QSA) for the data: “We regret to inform you that the required data is not available.”
Until the early 1980s, the Qatari authorities did not in fact have complete demographic data of their indigenous population. Since then, and certainly following the implementation of the 1986 census, this data has been comprehensive and accurate and deliberately hidden. Why are the Qatari authorities not publishing the basic data on the number of their citizens as do all other countries? The reason for this, it seems, is quite simple: The national population is too small to match the country’s political needs and aspirations. Since Qatar prefers not to naturalize vast numbers of foreigners, including Arab Sunnis, the only option has been to hide the small size of the national population through the evasive pretense of not having the data. The principal aim of this article is to explore this “secret.”
Population Growth in Qatar
The first estimate of Qatar’s population made by John Gordon Lorimer of the British Foreign Office in 1904 put the emirate’s total population at approximately 27,000. Before the discovery of oil, pearl fishing was the emirate’s economic mainstay; however, the development of the Japanese cultured pearl industry at the beginning of the 1930s, together with the Great Depression, and the onset of World War II led to a severe economic recession and an attendant sharp decline in Qatar’s population to some 16,000 by the mid-1940s. The beginning of oil exports in 1949 reversed this economic trend. Consequently, more and more people entered the emirate, and by 1950, Qatar’s total population was estimated at approximately 25,000-30,000.
The first Qatari census, taken in 1970, put the indigenous population at 45,039. However, since it was assumed by those who implemented the census that the under-enumeration (mainly of females and children) of that census was approximately 6 percent, it seems that the number of Qatari citizens at the time was closer to 47,700 (see Table 1).
According to an estimate by demographers J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, by 1975, Qatar’s national population numbered 60,300 (see Table 1), a rise of 34 percent from the 1970 official census result. This rapid population growth could not be the result of natural increase (i.e., births minus deaths) alone as it would require the unlikely annual average natural increase rate of 4.8 percent. Since Qatar’s crude death rate (CDR) in the early 1970s was approximately 18-20 per 1,000 people (see Table 3), this means that in order to achieve a natural increase rate of 4.8 percent, the crude birth rate (CBR) would have to be more than 65 per 1,000, which is unreasonable (see Table 3). Thus, taking into consideration a natural increase rate of about 3.2 percent on an annual average during the first half of the 1970s, Qatar’s indigenous population in 1975 should have totaled some 56,000, about 4,300 fewer than Birks and Sinclair’s estimate.
Since the Qatari naturalization policy at that time was very strict, it is implausible that the authorities would have naturalized more than 4,000 immigrants, namely 7-8 percent of the total Qatari citizenship, within a period of only five years. The only alternative for evaluating Birks and Sinclair’s 1975 estimate and that of the U.N. Economic Commission for Western Asia’s (ECWA), which estimated Qatar’s nationals at 65,357 in 1980 (see Table 1), is to find the number of Qatari citizens in the March 1986 census and implement a “back projection” method.
In 1985, HRD Base Ltd., a subsidiary of Lloyds Bank, estimated Qatar’s indigenous population at 84,240, namely 29 percent higher than the 1980 ECWA estimate. The nominal natural increase, namely the surplus of live births over deaths during the 1980-85 period was 15,689 (see Table 3), representing an increase of 24 percent over the ECWA estimate. This expresses a difference of 3,200 people between ECWA’s estimate of 1980 plus the natural increase of 1981-85 period and the estimate of HRD for 1985. This gap could be explained by the naturalization of foreign women married to Qatari nationals—a very common phenomenon, which the Qatari government highly encouraged—as well as by adding some unrecorded births, reflecting the fact that Qatar’s civil registration system had then been in its infancy.
The problem, however, is with the March 1986 census results. According to official Qatari data, Qatari nationals fifteen years and older numbered 54,502 (26,878 of whom were males and 27,624 females). According to figures from the U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA, formerly ECWA), Qatari nationals in the 1986 census totaled 101,859 (see Table 1). This figure implies that Qataris under the age of fifteen constituted 46.5 percent of the total Qatari citizens—a rate which is plausible based on the extremely wide-based age pyramid of the Qatari indigenous population due to the high natural increase rates during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s.
However, it is unlikely that in one year—between mid-1985 and March 1986—the number of Qatari citizens increased by 17,619 people. Moreover, if there was a massive naturalization of women who married Qatari nationals between the 1970 and the 1986 censuses, the number of Qatari women twenty years of age and older in the 1986 census data should have been much higher than that of males. This, however, was not the case. According to the census results, the number of females twenty and older was fewer than 1,000 above that of males (21,670 females and 20,734 males). Data calculated from official Qatari statistics on the rate and the nominal number of the natural increase puts the total number of Qatari citizens at 91,979 in 1984, growing to 99,642 in 1986, namely, 2,217 less than ESCWA’s figure (see Tables 1 and 2).
With the absence of data on naturalization, it is impossible to evaluate the number of Qatari nationals between the 1970 and 1986 censuses.
In light of the number of Qatari citizens calculated from the official Qatari data on the natural increase and the actual 1986 census results, the only plausible conclusion is that during the period between the 1970 and the 1986 censuses, namely, during the “bonanza oil decade,” there was massive naturalization of both males and females in Qatar.
A clear indicator of this large-scale naturalization of women of childbearing age is the sharp increase in the number of births, which grew from 2,853 in 1980 to 4,034 in 1986. This means that in six years alone, the number of live births increased by as much as 41.4 percent. Taking into consideration that during that period the total fertility rate (TFR, average number of children born to a woman during her lifetime) not only did not increase but rather substantially decreased, the only logical explanation for the rapid growth in the number of live births was due to a substantial increase in the number of women of childbearing age. However, due to the absence of any data regarding naturalization in Qatar, it is impossible to evaluate the number of Qatari nationals during the period between the 1970 and 1986 censuses.
Moving forward in time, according to the 1997 census results, Qatari nationals aged 15- years old and above numbered 84,902 while those aged ten and above numbered 103,273. The number of live births minus infant deaths (children under the age of 1) during the decade prior to the census implementation was 48,498 (see Table 4a). If we assume 0 emigration of the 0-10 age group and 0 mortality of children in the 1-10 age group, this amounts to total Qatari citizens of 151,771 with the under-10 age group representing 32 percent of the total population—a plausible percentage given Qatar’s natural increase patterns at that time.
Comparing the 1986 census results to those of 1997 indicates a nominal increase of 49,912. The nominal gap between the 1986 and 1997 data is almost identical to the natural increase between the two censuses, which numbered 48,266. The small gap of 1,650 people between the natural increase and the actual growth is probably due to the naturalization of foreign women, which also explains the small surplus of females over males identified in the 1997 census data in the age group of 15-years and above. Since no official Qatari data is available on either the scale or the timing of the naturalization, it is reasonable to distribute the 1,650 surplus equally across the entire period between the two censuses. Thus, adding 150 to the natural increase each year during the eleven years between the two censuses produces the exact increase throughout the period between the two censuses.
By the time of the March 2004 census, the Qatari authorities were publishing data regarding citizens 3-years old and above (168,958). By adding live births minus infant deaths during the three years prior to the implementation of this census (19,059), one arrives at a total figure for the Qatari indigenous population of 188,017 (see Table 1).
Measuring the natural increase between the 1997 and the 2004 censuses suggests the figure of 36,748. Thus, the 1997 census results plus the natural increase between the two censuses suggest 188,519, namely, 500 more than the actual 2004 census results—an insignificant number that is probably due to some deaths of nationals in the 1-10-age group and some misreporting or errors in the censuses. The calculated number according to the Qatari natural increase data suggests the figure of 194,092 in mid-2004 (see Table 1) which is about 3 percent higher than this author’s calculation for the census results. This gap could be attributed to the fact that there are three and a half months between the census implementations, namely between mid-March, and mid-year (end of June). Another reason is that the rate of the natural increase provided by the QSA is not totally accurate as it includes only one digit after the decimal point.
In 2005, the Qatari authorities revoked the citizenship of 6,000 members of the Murrah tribe on suspicion of disloyalty to the emir.
The latest Qatari census was implemented in April 2010. As in the 1997 census, the authorities only published data regarding the population of 10-years old and above. According to that census, nationals of ten years and older numbered 174,279. If one adds 65,763—live births minus infant deaths during the decade prior to the census (see Table 4b)—the result is a Qatari indigenous population numbering 240,042 in late April 2010.
However, a curious and significant anomaly emerges. This is because adding the natural increase between the two censuses (38,641) to the 2004 census data yields 226,658, namely, 13,384 less than the actual 2010 census results. This substantial gap could not be explained by an under-enumeration of births. This is not only due to the fact that since 2000, the Qatari civil registration system has been totally computerized but also because Qatari parents have had every reason to register new births due to various benefits granted by the government for every Qatari newborn. Moreover, because of the short time between the two censuses, it is quite easy to compare age groups in these two censuses.
Under a condition of “zero naturalization and migration balance,” i.e., the natural increase only, the number of Qatari citizens in the age group of 4-58 from the 2004 census should have been close to identical to the 10-64 age group in the 2010 census. In reality, however, while the 4-58 age cohort in the 2004 census numbered 155,024, the 10-64 age group in the 2010 census numbered 166,932, about an extra 12,000 people.
The unexplained gap between the two censuses could not be justified by the matter of the al-Murrah tribe, when in March 2005, the Qatari authorities revoked the citizenship of about 6,000 members on suspicion of disloyalty to the emir. This is because their citizenship had already been returned in February 2006. Thus, both revoking and returning their citizenship occurred during the period between the two censuses.
Thus, while the difference in the number of Qatari citizens between the 1970 and the 1986 censuses could be explained at least partially by an under-enumeration of births at a period when the Qatari civil registration system was just beginning, this was certainly not the case in the period between the 2004 and the 2010 censuses. The only plausible conclusion is that, during the period between these two censuses, there was a massive naturalization of about 13,400 people, representing approximately 5.6 percent of the country’s citizens in the 2010 census.
The Qatari natural increase data also indicates massive naturalization during the period between the two censuses, particularly in 2007 and 2008. While according to the calculations based on the Qatari natural increase data, the number of Qatari nationals increased from 215,199 in mid-2007 to 232,267 in mid-2008, the actual natural increase in those twelve months was less than 7,000 (see Tables 2 and 3), namely, about 10,500 less than the actual growth. However, since it is not clear when this large-scale naturalization actually occurred, it is reasonable to divide the “extra” growth beyond the natural increase equally across the 6-year period between the two censuses.
Qatar’s Naturalization Policy
Some analysts estimate that 88 percent of Qatar’s population is made up of migrant workers. But Qatar has made no progress in abolishing laws that effectively force foreign workers into slavery.
With the beginning of the Persian Gulf states’ oil era, but particularly following the October 1973 oil boom, these states were confronted with two options for closing the gap between their labor needs and the available supply: Adopt the labor migration policies of the developed world and naturalize vast numbers of foreign laborers, or import temporary labor migrants in order to solve shortages in the short run. This second option was eventually implemented by all of the Gulf oil states including Qatar. It was hoped that in the not-too-distant future, the majority of the required workforce would be supplied by nationals through substantial investments in education and professional training on the one hand and by generous pro-natalist measures that would encourage high fertility rates on the other. This policy was adopted in response to the fear that large-scale naturalization of foreigners, even of Sunni Arabs, could upset the “intimate nature” of these societies. There was also a fear of the introduction of “revolutionary-republican ideologies” by Egyptians, Syrians, Palestinians, or Lebanese migrants, which could potentially topple the royal houses whose legitimacy and hold on power were becoming increasingly tenuous in a modern world.
Thus, in each of the Gulf oil states, the authorities enacted laws to prevent the naturalization of foreign workers, even Sunni Arabs and even if they had lived in the country for decades. Nor would birth in one of the Gulf states entitle newborns to citizenship or even permanent residency. The naturalization laws in each of these states are so strict that even marriage of a foreign male to a Gulf female does not grant citizenship to the husband. On the other hand, a foreign woman who marries a Gulf male does become a citizen of the host country. This difference is due to the fact that according to the Shari’a (Islamic law), the religion of children follows that of the father. Therefore, the vast majority of non-natives who have received citizenship in these countries are females married to GCC males. Only in exceptional circumstances have the authorities granted citizenship to a male foreigner; their number, in any case, was insignificant.
In the case of Qatar, before the Citizenship Act (No. 38) of 2005, foreigners were granted citizenship solely at the emir’s discretion. The new act provides for the first time a legal mechanism by which a foreigner can apply for Qatari citizenship. According to the new law, Qatari citizenship may be obtained for those who fulfilled the following conditions: (a) residency in Qatar for at least twenty-five consecutive years; (b) the ability to speak Arabic; (c) a clean criminal record; and (d) a lawful means of income. In addition to these conditions, those born to a naturalized Qatari father shall be deemed a naturalized Qatari. The new law, however, limits the number of those to be granted Qatari citizenship to only fifty annually.
It should be noted in this respect that the Qatari authorities regularly insisted that the number of those who acquired citizenship in this fashion was very small. Thus, for example in a 2010 interview, Qatari emir Sheikh Hamad stated: “A policy to increase the population; we don’t have this actually. But we give [citizenship] for the people first who apply and who fulfill our own regulations. Until now there are not many who are asking.”
While official Qatar followed the common naturalization policy of the other GCC states with the majority of those receiving citizenship being foreign women married to Qatari nationals, evidence indicates that a substantial number of foreign males also succeeded in receiving Qatari citizenship.
Recently, Qatar apparently started a new process of naturalization of Bahraini Sunnis. However, as it probably began following the implementation of the 2010 census, this process is beyond the scope of this article. Moreover, since the latest publication of vital statistics annual bulletins of the QSA is from 2011, it is impossible to try to evaluate the scale of the Qatari national population following the 2010 census.
Engineered Natural Increase
But whatever the number of naturalized citizens in Qatar, the major contributor to the rapid growth of the indigenous Qatari population since the 1970s has been natural increase.
Qatar University College of Pharmacy. Eighteen female pharmacy students receive their bachelor of science degrees from Qatar University College of Pharmacy, November 30, 2011. It is probable that the decline in the fertility rate of Qatari women has been due to both a substantial increase in the number of indigenous females receiving post-secondary education and to delayed marriages.
Since there are no official vital demographic statistics prior to 1980, the only possibility for estimateing Qatar’s natural increase rate during the 1970s is through comparison with other countries with similar socioeconomic conditions. According to the ECWA estimate, in 1975 the crude birth rate of the indigenous Qatari population was approximately 50 per 1,000 while the crude death rate was 20 per 1,000. The total fertility rate in 1975 was estimated at 7.2 (see Table 3). These values are quite similar to those which prevailed in other Gulf countries at that time. For example, Kuwait’s CBR amounted to 51.1 in 1975 while the TFR was measured at 7.2. Thus, an average natural increase rate of about 3.1-3.3 percent (31-33 per 1,000) during the first half of the 1970s is a reasonable estimate for Qatar as well.
Like other Gulf oil states, Qatar’s natural increase rate rose rapidly following the onset of the oil boom, due to a sharp decline in CDR as greater oil revenues translated, in part, into better health services and a sharp rise of living standards. According to ECWA’s estimate, in 1980, Qatar’s natural increase rate climbed to 4.1 percent (with a CBR of 51 and a CDR of 10); an average of 3.7 percent annual increase during the second half of the 1970s can, therefore, be reasonably assumed.
Due to its nearly exclusive reliance on oil revenues, Qatar fits the classic model of a rentier state, that is, a country that receives a considerable portion of its national revenues from the sale of its natural resources to external clients. Qatar has no income tax, and its citizens are recipients of generous subsidies and extensive social welfare programs. As a result, Qatar is pro-natalist by its very nature, like other rentier states.
Since more than 80 percent of Qatari males work in the public sector, family allowances are, in effect, granted to almost all citizens.
In addition to the indirect pro-natalist measures, there are also various direct pro-natalist measures, first and foremost generous family allowances for each child of male heads of households who are employed in the governmental sector. Since more than 80 percent of the Qatari males work in the public sector, family allowances were and still are in effect granted to almost all citizens. Further, the high salaries and luxury work conditions (without any work-reward causation) offered its national employees can be construed as pro-natalist behavior as are the various full subsidies of public services, including healthcare and education, as well as high subsidies on housing, foodstuffs, and energy products.
The impact of these measures can be seen in the demographic data. In total contrast to what would be expected in line with the “demographic transition theory” (i.e., after a sharp decline in death rates, fertility rates decline substantially), during the 1980s, and particularly in the second half of the decade, despite a sharp decline in infant and child mortality rates and the rapid increase in life expectancy, the fertility rate of indigenous Qatari women only declined slightly. By 1986, the total fertility rate of indigenous Qatari females was 5.8 (see Table 6), a rate much lower than it had been a decade earlier but still very high in comparison to other Arab countries.
This pattern continued through the 1990s when despite great improvements in both healthcare and educational services (which led, in effect, to healthcare indicators similar to those of the developed world), Qatar’s fertility rates remained very high. By 1997, the total fertility rate was 5.8, identical to 1986. While the significant improvement in these services led to a substantial delay in first births, their cumulative number remained the same (see Table 6).
This trend ended, however, by the early 2000s with the fertility rate of Qatari women gradually declining to 3.4 in 2012. It is probable that this decline, marked especially by the drop in births to women under the age of twenty-four, was due to both a substantial increase in the number of indigenous females receiving post-secondary education and to delayed marriages.
At least by 2004, the Qatari authorities had acknowledged the problem and established the Permanent Population Committee (PPC) to promote higher fertility. Its main objective was to, “Raise the current natural population increase rate for nationals, or at least maintain it to achieve an appropriate balance among Qatar’s total population.” In its 2011 annual report, the committee specifically declared that the main objective of Qatar’s population policy was to “increase the proportion of citizens among [the] total population.” This aim was to be achieved mainly through encouraging and facilitating marriages among Qatari citizens; the adoption of policies that would reduce delayed marriage, especially of girls; facilitating the remarriage of divorcees and widows; providing loans for housing; reducing the cost of dowries, and giving family allowances that would increase according to the number of children per couple. In addition to these financial incentives, the Qatari authorities have recruited prominent religious figures who constantly emphasize the religious duty of marriage and childbearing.
Birth in Qatar does not entitle newborns to citizenship; the marriage of a non-Qatari male to a Qatari female does not grant citizenship to the husband or to the child. As a result, these children are denied privileges such as free electricity and water, subsidized food products, free education, and government jobs set aside for nationals.
Thus far, not only have all of the demographic projections for Qatar totally failed, but they have not even been maintained for a decade. For example, in the mid-1990s, the World Bank projected that Qatar’s total population, both nationals and foreigners, would reach 693,000 in 2010 and increase to 769,000 in 2020. Even more recent projections were wildly inaccurate. In 2004, for example, the Population Division of the U.N. projected that Qatar’s population would total 874,000 in 2050. In 2009, analysts Berrebi, Martorell, and Tanner quoted a forecast by the U.S. Census Bureau that “in 2020, the population [both Qataris and non-Qataris] is expected to exceed 1.1 million people.” By the time the article was published, Qatar’s population was already much higher, amounting to 1.64 million in mid-2009.
The failures of these projections were largely due to two factors: First is the impossibility of predicting Qatar’s high demand for foreign labor, even in the short run. The country’s economic development during the past decade has been unique—even among the GCC countries—with a real GDP growth rate of 17.7 percent in 2008, dipping to 12 percent in 2009, and then accelerating to the incredible level of 16.6 percent in 2010. In 2012, Qatar’s per capita GDP was the highest worldwide, amounting to more than $102,000 (in purchasing power parity terms). This rapid economic expansion was accomplished through the massive import of foreign workers who were the main contributors to Qatar’s population increase during the past two decades. The second factor for the demographic projections failure was the lack of knowledge of the number of Qatari citizens, which made it impossible to predict their nominal growth even in the short run.
Despite pro-natalist measures, the fertility rate of indigenous Qatari women has gradually declined since the early 2000s.
Overall, the following three components will dictate future demographic developments for the indigenous Qatari population:
The natural increase rate. Despite significant pro-natalist measures, the fertility rate of indigenous Qatari women has gradually declined since the early 2000s. In 2012, the total fertility rate of indigenous Qatari females was quite similar to that of Jordanians and only a little bit higher than in Egypt, both of which had implemented open, anti-natalist policies, at least until the onset of the Arab upheavals. However, in Egypt and Jordan, the total fertility rate is approximately 3.1-3.3 due to a huge difference between low fertility rates in the urban centers and much higher fertility rates in rural and peripheral areas, yielding an average TFR of 3.1-3.3. Qatar’s current fertility rate, by contrast, is due to the great financial benefits given to all nationals, which in practice overshadow the various specific, pro-natalist incentives. What else can the Qatari government give its nationals in order to increase their fertility rate? In other words, Qatar, as the most rentier state worldwide, has no more “carrots” for encouraging its nationals to increase their fertility level. Thus, Qatar’s current TFR is probably at the highest level possible under the current rentier system while in Egypt and Jordan, for example, the fertility level is more elastic and could rise or decline, in line with the natalist policy. Consequently, Qatar’s fertility rate is projected to stabilize at 3.0-3.2 for the foreseeable future.
The age pyramid. However, even if the fertility rate continues to decline to less than three children due to its current, wide-based age pyramid (see Table 5), Qatar’s indigenous population will continue to increase rapidly at least into the foreseeable future—a result of the “demographic momentum” phenomenon, i.e., the tendency for a population to continue to grow because the number of women of reproductive age will continue to increase for a number of decades before finally stabilizing. Therefore, it is reasonable to predict an average natural increase rate of 2.6-2.7 percent for the coming decade and approximately 2.3-2.5 percent for the decade following. The natural increase rate of the indigenous Qatari population is expected to go down not only due to declining fertility rates but because of an increasing crude death rate as the percentage of the elderly population naturally increases due to the sharp decline of the fertility rates since the early 2000s.
The naturalization scale. Among the three components, this is the least knowable. This is the case not only because Qatari authorities have not published any data on naturalization but also because, as previously discussed, naturalization in Qatar occurred in two large, unexpected waves that had hitherto been undetected. Thus, if there is a next large-scale naturalization, it will probably also be unexpected and consequently unpredictable.
Despite the fact that the latest publication of the annual bulletin of vital statistics of the QSA is from 2011 and that the scale of naturalization since the 2010 census is unknown, it would be reasonable to assume that the number of Qatar’s citizens has increased by about 4 percent annually since the implementation of the 2010 census. Thus, one can conclude that in early 2015, the number of Qatar’s citizens will total approximately 290,000 and will increase to about 440,000-470,000 in 2030.
Achieving high population growth by encouraging a high natural increase rate was and still is the basic demographic policy of the Qatari authorities. In this respect, the emirate is no different from other GCC states, such as the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. However, both censuses and official natural increase data indicate that the Qatari population grew significantly also due to two waves of naturalization.
Who are these “new Qataris”? Was this mass naturalization a consequence of a huge labor shortage? Unfortunately, the Qatari authorities have barely mentioned the issue of naturalization and have never acknowledged any form of mass naturalization.
Qatar may continue to act according to its current super rentier policies due to its huge per capita income. It has also enjoyed unusual economic growth for a GCC country as the result of a rapid increase in liquefied natural gas exports and a massive development of infrastructure. It remains to be seen how the new emir, Sheikh Tamim, will run the country with a much larger indigenous population and with a much larger national workforce which cannot be employed almost exclusively in the public sector, as is currently the case.
Onn Winckler is associate professor in the department of Middle Eastern History, University of Haifa, specializing in political demography and economic history of the Arab countries. The author thanks Noa Josef and Fany Pesahov for their assistance in data.
Table 1: Alternative Estimates of Qatar’s Indigenous Population, 1970-2010
The Year then followed by the three columns:
(a) Semi-official and
(b) Author’s calculation
of total Qatari citizens
according to the NI data
(c) Author’s estimate
1970 (c) 45,039(c) – 47,700(c)
1975 60,300 — –
1980 65,357(so) – –
1984 — 91,979 –
1985 84,240 (un) 95,698 –
1986 (c) 99,754 (uo) /101,859 (so) 99,642 101,859(c) 105,340*
1987 — 103,594 109,064*
1988 — 107,533 113,268*
1989 — 111,639 117,504*
1990 103,400(uo) 116,081 121,949*
1991 — 120,461 126,279*
1992 141,000(uo) 124,820 130,935*
1993 — 129,735 135,976*
1994 128,986(so) 134,861 140,981*
1995 — 140,440 145,920*
1996 133,450(so) 145,670 150,848*
1997 (c) 151,673(uo) 151,624 151,771(c) 155,664*
1998 142,341(s) 157,573 160,533*
1999 — 163,388 165,500*
2000 152,449(so) 173,514 170,636*
2001 — 179,867 176,032*
2002 – 184,983 181,415*
2003 — 190,435 187,109*
2004 (c) 192,586(uo) 194,092 188,017(c) 194,390*
2005 — 202,222 202,385*
2006 — 209,120 210,510*
2007 — 215,199 219,269*
2008 — 232,267 228,509*
2009 — – 237,590*
2010 (c) 280,000-300,000 (Gray)/250,000 (Kamrava)/243,073
(GLMM) – 240,042(c) 245,770*
(c) = census; (uo) = unofficial estimate; (so) = ESCWA semi-official data; * End of the year; ** See Table 2.
Sources for Semi-official and unofficial estimates: 1970: British Embassy in Beirut, Middle East Development Division, by N.B. Hudson, The First Population Census of Qatar, Apr./May 1970 (Beirut, Oct. 1970), p. 17; 1975 (uo): J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, International Migration Project, Country Case Study: The State of Qatar (University of Durham, Department of Economics, February 1978), table 1, p. 6; 1980 (so): ECWA, Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets for Countries of the ECWA, No. 3 (Beirut, May 1982), table 1, p. 131; 1985 (uo): HRD Base Ltd., Lloyds Bank Chambers, Socio-Demographic Profiles of Key Arab Countries (Newcastle, May 1987), table 1, p. 151; 1986 (so): ESCWA, Population Situation-1990, table 9.1, p. 153; 1986 (uo): Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM).; 1990 (uo): Birks, Sinclair & Associates Ltd., GCC Market Report-1990 (Durham: Mountjoy Research Centre, May 1990), table 1.1, p. 108; 1992 (uo): Birks, Sinclair & Associates Ltd., GCC Market Report-1992 (Durham: Mountjoy Research Centre, 1992), table 1.1, p. 82; 1994 (so): ESCWA, Demographic Data Sheets, No. 8 (1995), table 1, p. 92; 1996 (so): ESCWA, Demographic Data Sheets, No. 9 (1997), table 1, p. 84; 1997 (uo): Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM). Available at: gulfmigration.eu/population-by-na…; 1998 (so): ESCWA, Demographic Data Sheets, No. 10 (1999) table 1, p. 83; 2000: ESCWA, Demographic Data Sheets, No. 11 (2001), table 1, p. 116; 2004 (uo): Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM); 2010 (uo): Matthew Gray, Qatar: Politics and the Challenge of Development (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, 2013), p. 222;Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013), p. 5; Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM).
Table 2: Calculated Total Qatari Citizens through the Official Qatari Natural Increase Data, 1984-2008
Year and again column we present here but which are better viewded in the original
of live births
of total Qatari citizens
according to the NI data
1984 41.4 3,812 3.5 326 37.9 3,486 91,979
1985 40.3 3,857 4.5 431 35.8 3,426 95,698
1986 40.4 4,034 4.2 417 36.3 3,617 99,642
1987 38.5 3,991 4.0 417 34.5 3,574 103,594
1988 41.5 4,472 3.9 418 37.7 4,054 107,533
1989 40.4 4,513 3.8 427 36.6 4,086 111,639
1990 40.7 4,724 3.7 429 37.0 4,295 116,081
1991 38.9 4,691 4.2 511 34.7 4,180 120,461
1992 40.1 5,016 4.1 510 36.1 4,506 124,820
1993 41.5 5,389 3.8 498 37.7 4,891 129,735
1994 39.8 5,373 3.8 518 36.0 4,855 134,861
1995 38.1 5,344 4.0 555 34.1 4,789 140,440
1996 36.4 5,306 3.6 528 32.8 4,778 145,670
1997 35.0 5,312 3.6 551 31.4 4,761 151,624
1998 34.6 5,446 3.7 577 30.9 4,869 157,573
1999 34.1 5,575 3.7 608 30.4 4,967 163,388
2000 33.3 5,750 3.6 614 29.6 5,136 173,514
2001 33.5 6,014 3.5 618 30.0 5,396 179,867
2002 32.8 6,047 3.7 664 29.1 5,383 184,983
2003 33.2 6,312 3.3 618 29.9 5,694 190,435
2004 33.7 6,538 3.4 657 30.3 5,881 194,092
2005 31.3 6,324 3.4 682 27.9 5,642 202,222
2006 31.6 6,615 3.3 676 28.4 5,939 209,120
2007 33.4 7,187 3.2 688 30.2 6,499 215,199
2008 33.0 7,621 2.9 653 30.0 6,968 232,267
CBR = Crude birth rate; CDR = Crude death rate; NI = Natural increase
The formula for calculating: N = E(X) (Under the assumption of a binomial distribution) P; N = Total Qatari citizens; E(X) = The nominal number of the natural increase; P = NI (natural increase) per 1 Qatari citizen. Sources: CBR and CDR: Qatar Information Exchange; Live births and Deaths: Table 3.
Table 3: Natural Increase Rates in Qatar, 1975-2010 (author’s calculations)
Total Fertility Rate
1975 – – 50.0 – 20.0 – 30.0 7.2
1980 – 2,853 – 337 – 2,516 – 7.7
1981 – 3,002 – 334 – 2,668 – –
1982 – 3,457 – 373 – 3,084 – –
1983 – 3,416 – 391 – 3,025 – –
1984 – 3,812 – 326 – 3,486 – 6.8
1985 – 3,857 – 431 – 3,426 –
1986 – 4,034 – 417 – 3,617 – 5.8
1987 107,202 3,991 37.2 417 3.9 3,574 33.3 –
1988 111,166 4,472 40.2 418 3.8 4,054 36.5 5.4
1989 115,386 4,513 39.1 427 3.7 4,086 35.4 –
1990 119,727 4,724 39.5 429 3.6 4,295 35.9 –
1991 124,114 4,691 37.8 511 4.1 4,180 33.7 –
1992 128,607 5,016 39.0 510 4.0 4,506 35.0 4.8
1993 133,456 5,389 40.4 498 3.7 4,891 36.6 –
1994 138,479 5,373 38.8 518 3.7 4,855 35.1 5.0
1995 143,451 5,344 37.3 555 3.9 4,789 33.4 –
1996 148,384 5,306 35.8 528 3.6 4,778 32.2 –
1997 153,256 5,312 34.7 551 3.6 4,761 31.1 5.8
1998 158,099 5,446 34.4 577 3.6 4,869 30.8 –
1999 163,017 5,575 34.2 608 3.7 4,967 30.5 –
2000 168,068 5,750 34.2 614 3.7 5,136 30.6 5.0
2001 173,334 6,014 34.7 618 3.6 5,396 31.1 –
2002 178,724 6,047 33.8 664 3.7 5,383 30.1 –
2003 184,262 6,312 34.3 618 3.4 5,694 30.9 –
2004 190,750 6,538 34.3 657 3.4 5,881 30.8 4.2
2005 198,388 6,324 31.9 682 3.4 5,642 28.4 3.9
2006 206,448 6,615 32.0 676 3.3 5,939 28.8 3.9
2007 214,890 7,187 33.4 688 3.2 6,499 30.2 4.0
2008 223,889 7,621 34.0 653 2.9 6,968 31.1 3.9
2009 233,050 7,499 32.2 684 2.9 6,815 29.2 3.8
2010 241,680 7,733 32.0 673 2.8 7,060 29.2 3.6
– No data available.
The CBR and CDR were calculated by the average of Qatari citizens each year. For example, the average Qatari citizens in 1998 was their number at the end of 1997 plus their number at the end of 1998 divided by 2 (155,664 + 160,533 : 2 = 158,099).
Sources: Natural increase, 1975: “Available Demographic Socio-Economic Data for Countries of the ECWA Region,” Population Bulletin of ECWA, Nos. 10-12 (1978), p. 25; 1980-1982: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin, 1st Issue, 1984 (Doha: Central Statistical Organization, Sept. 1985), table 2, p. 2; table 19, p. 30; 1983-1992: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin, 9th Issue, 1992 (Doha: Central Statistical Organization, June 1993), table 2, p. 5; table 25, p. 59; 1993-1999: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin, 16th Issue, 1999 (Doha: Central Statistical Organization, July 2000), table 2, p. 5; table 25, p. 61; 2000: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin-2009, 26th Issue (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, July 2010), tables10 and 28; 2001-2010: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin-2010, 27th Issue (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, July 2011), table 3; 2011: Annual Statistical Abstract-2012 (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, 2013), chapter 3, tables 2 and 10; Total Fertility Rate, The data on the TFR except for the 2005-2007 period is taken from Table 5.; The Data for the 2005-2007 period is taken from: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin-2009, 27th Issue (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, July 2010), table 1.
Table 4a: Qatari Nationals Ages 0-10 in 1997
Number of births
Number of infant deaths (0-1)
1987* 3,223 48 3,175
1988 4,472 53 4,419
1989 4,513 55 4,458
1990 4,724 54 4,670
1991 4,691 59 4,632
1992 5,016 54 4,962
1993 5,389 62 5,327
1994 5,373 59 5,314
1995 5,344 60 5,284
1996 5,306 64 5,242
1997** 1,033 18 1,015
Total 49,084 586 48,498
* Since the census was implemented in mid-March, the live births and infant deaths were not included Jan., February and half of March; ** Since the census was implemented in mid-March, the infant live births and deaths were included Jan., February and half of March.
Sources: Live Births, 1987: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin, 4th Issue (Doha: Central Statistical Organization, June 1988), table 4a, p. 4; 1988-1997: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin, 14th Issue, 1997 (Central Statistical Organization, June 1998), table 2, p. 5; table 4.1, p. 7; Infant deaths, 1987: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin, 4th Issue (Doha: Central Statistical Organization, June 1988), table 38, p. 77; 1988-1997: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin, 14th Issue, 1997 (Doha: Central Statistical Organization, June 1998), table 39, p.123; table 41, p. 128.
Table 4b: Qatari Nationals Ages 0-10 in 2010
Number of births
Number of infant deaths (0-1)
2000* 3,743 33 3,710
2001 6,014 53 5,961
2002 6,047 62 5,985
2003 6,312 74 6,238
2004 6,538 45 6,493
2005 (Jan.-Apr.) 2,057 19 2,038
2005 (May-Dec.) 4,203 29 4,174
2006 6,615 55 6,560
2007 7,187 52 7,135
2008 7,621 42 7,579
2009 7,499 53 7,446
2010** 2,457 13 2,444
Total 66,357 530 65,763
* Data include the period of May-Dec.; ** Data include the period of Jan.-Apr.
Sources: Live Births, 2000: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin-2000, 17th Issue (Doha: Central Statistical Organization, Apr. 2001), table 4-1, p. 7.; 2001-2004: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin-2009, 27th Issue (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, July 2011), table 3.; 2005: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin-2005, 22th Issue (Doha: Central Statistical Organization, Sept. 2006), table 7-1, p. 25; table 44, p. 205.; 2006-2009: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin-2009, 27th Issue (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, July 2011), table 3.; 2010: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin-2010, 26th Issue (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, July 2010), table 6-1.; Infant deaths, 2000: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin-2000, 17th Issue (Doha: Central Statistical Organization, Apr. 2001), table 41, p. 168.; 2001-2009: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin-2010, 26th Issue (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, July 2010), table 53.; 2010: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin-2010, 26th Issue (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, July 2010), table 20.
Table 5: Qatari Indigenous Population by Age Groups, 2004 & 2010 Censuses
Age group Year 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75+ Total Qatari population
2004(c) 29,343 24,730 23,539 20,114 16,903 14,327 13,081 11,703 10,127 7,704 5,134 3,257 2,888 2,159 1,477 1,531 188,017
2010(c) 35,338(a) 30,425(b) 28,017 47,665 35,517 27,159 19,403 9,171 7,347 240,042
(a) =Include the period of May 2000-Apr. 2005; (b) = Include the period of May 2005-Apr. 2010
Sources: 2004, 0-3 age group: Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin-2004, 21th Issue (Doha: Central Statistical Organization, June 2005), table 1.7, p. 26; table 44, p. 208; Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin-2007, 24th Issue (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, July 2008), table 5, p. 26; table 44, p. 208; 3 years and above: At-Ta’dad al-’Amm lil-Sukan wal-Masakin-2004 (2004 Census) (Doha: Majlis at-Tahtit, Dec. 2004), table 1, p. 141; table 8, p. 154; 2010, 0-9 age group: Table 4.b.; 10 years and above: The General Census of Population and Housing, and Establishment, Apr.-2010 (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, 2010), table 24.
Table 6: Age-Specific Fertility Rate, Qatari Indigenous Women, 1980-2012
Year Age Group 1980 (so) 1984 (so) 1986 (o) 1988 (so) 1992 (so) 1994 (so) 1997 (o) 2000 (o) 2004 (o) 2008 (o) 2009 (o) 2010 (o) 2011 (o) 2012 (o)
15-19 151 68 43 66 32 25 14 20 13 12 12 10 8 8
20-24 346 273 213 305 152 157 147 144 129 129 123 115 106 106
25-29 380 336 306 326 223 229 270 244 246 220 212 192 188 188
30-34 310 296 274 234 262 280 290 237 217 209 206 197 187 186
35-39 213 214 188 123 196 227 228 163 166 149 146 138 133 132
40-44 100 108 102 19 66 51 143 61 65 57 55 59 51 51
45-49 45 57 30 8 30 28 65 17 9 5 7 7 6 6
TFR 7.7 6.8 5.8 5.4 4.8 5.0 5.8 4.4 4.2 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.4
o = Official Qatari data; so = Semi official data (ECWA/ESCWA).
Sources: 1980: ECWA, Demographic Data Sheets, No. 3 (1982), table 2, p.132.; 1984: ESCWA, Demographic Data Sheets, No. 4 (1985), table 2, p. 124.; 1986: Women and Men in the State of Qatar: A Statistical Profile-2006 (Doha: Central Statistical Organization, Apr. 2006), p. 27; 1988: ESCWA, Population Situation-1990, table 9.4, p. 156; 1992: ESCWA, Demographic Data Sheets, No. 7 (1993), table 3, p. 108; 1994: ESCWA, Demographic Data Sheets, No. 8 (1995), table 3, p. 94.; 1997: Women and Men in the State of Qatar: A Statistical Profile-2006 (Doha: Central Statistical Organization, Apr. 2006), p. 27; 2000: Qatar Information Exchange; 2004: Women and Men in the State of Qatar: A Statistical Profile-2006 (Doha: Central Statistical Organization, Apr. 2006), p. 27; 2008-2011: Woman and Man in the State of Qatar: A Statistical Profile-2012 (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, 2013), table 1/5, p. 16.; 2012: Qatar Information Exchange. Available at: www.qix.gov.qa.
Appendix A: Research Methodology
The research for this article is mainly derived from two kinds of sources:
(a) Official Qatari data, which includes two types of materials. The first is the five censuses which Qatari authorities implemented, beginning in April 1970 and most recently in April 2010.
The second is drawn from the Qatari civil registration system and ongoing demographic and health statistical publications. Although Qatar implemented its first census in 1970, it did not have an accurate system of vital demographic registration until the early 1980s. In 1980, the Central Statistical Organization (CSO) was established and, in 1998, it was integrated into the Planning Council. In June 2007, the Statistics Authority (QSA) was established as a new independent governmental agency.
(b) ECWA/ESCWA publications. The U.N. Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA) was established in 1973. In 1985, the name of the organization was changed to the U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. The data provided by ECWA and ESCWA since the early 1980s is quite detailed. In addition to providing the total number of Qatari citizens according to sex and age groups, it covers a wide range of other demographic parameters such as the crude birth and death rates, age-specific fertility rates, and in some years, even the scale and structure of the indigenous workforce. However, in many cases, the estimates provided by ECWA/ESCWA were not accurate, and in some instances, there was quite a substantial gap between the data it provided and the estimates from our research on the number of the Qatari nationals.
The “accuracy hierarchy” supposition on which this research is based is that since the mid-1980s, the most reliable data is that published by the Qatari authorities themselves, followed by that published by ECWA/ESCWA. Unofficial estimates have been credited with little accuracy as their research methodology was not specified. This article did not use any data from the World Bank or the CIA, as the demographic data published by both organizations lumps the Qatari nationals and the foreign population into one group without any distinction between them.
In light of the above-mentioned accuracy hierarchy, the Qatari official data served as a “fulcrum” on which the calculated estimates were based regarding both the total number of Qatari citizens and their natural increase. In many cases, ECWA/ESCWA’s data serve either to check the probability of the Qatari official data or as a supplement to Qatari partial official data.
 Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
 Jure Snoj, “Population of Qatar,” bq magazine (Doha), Dec. 18, 2013.
 “History of Census in Qatar,” Qatar Statistics Authority, Doha, accessed Jan. 15, 2015.
 Allen J. Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), p. 1.
 Population and Development, Issue No. 6: Development Policy Implication of Age-Structure Transitions in Arab Countries (New York: U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2013), annex I, table 1, p. 67; The Population Situation in the ECWA Region-Qatar (Beirut: U.N. Economic Commission for Western Asia, 1980), p. 8.
 N.B. Hudson, The First Population Census of Qatar, April/May 1970 (Beirut: British Embassy in Beirut, Middle East Development Division, Oct. 1970), p. 17.
 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
 J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, Country Case Study: The State of Qatar, International Migration Project, (Durham: University of Durham, Feb. 1978).
 Women and Men in the State of Qatar: A Statistical Profile-2006 (Doha: Central Statistical Organization, Apr. 2006), table 1/4, p. 96.
 At-Ta’dad al-Amm li-l-Sukan wa-l-Masakin-March 1997 (Doha: Majlis at-Tahtit, Feb. 1999), table 13, p. 65.
 The natural increase between the two censuses included the natural increase growth for the period of Mar.-Dec. 1986, the whole period of 1987-1996 and that of Jan., Feb., and half of Mar. 1997 since the census was implemented on Mar. 16.
 According to the 1997 census data, the age group of 15-65 represented 51.3 percent among the males but 54.5 percent among the females. See Women and Men in the State of Qatar, p. 16.
 At-Ta’dad al-Amm li-l-Sukan wa-l-Masakin-March 2004 (Doha: Majlis at-Tahtit, Dec. 2004), table 1, p. 141, table 8, p. 154.
 Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin-2010, 26th issue (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, July 2010), table 10, p. 29, table 53, p. 201.
 The natural increase growth between the 1997 and the 2004 censuses was calculated as follows: half of the natural increase in March 1997 plus the whole natural increase of the rest of that year; the natural increase of the whole period of 1998-2003; and the natural increase of Jan., Feb., and half of Mar. 2004.
 Census of Population and Housing, and Establishment, April-2010 (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, 2010), table 24, p. 91.
 The natural increase growth between the two censuses was calculated as follows: half of the natural increase in Mar. 2004 plus the whole natural increase of the rest of that year; the natural increase of the whole period of 2005-09; and the natural increase of Jan.-Mar. and two-thirds of Apr. 2010.
 Since there is no available data for the age group of 55-59 each year, the total population of this age group was divided by 5 (since this cohort contains 5 years) and multiplied by 4 (since only 4 not 5 years are needed for the comparison), thus producing 2,606 people for the age group of 55-58.
 At-Ta’dad al-Amm li-l-Sukan wa-l-Masakin-March 2004, table 1, p. 141, table 8, p. 154.
 Census of Population and Housing, and Establishment, April-2010, table 14; Summary Results of 2010 Population, Housing and Establishments Census (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, 2010), table 2-1, p. 11.
 See Gianluca P. Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion and Nation-State (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), p. 116; Gulf News (Dubai), Apr. 3, 2005.
 Baquer Salman al-Najjar, “Population Policies in the Countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council,” in Abbas Abdelkarim, ed., Change and Development in the Gulf (London: Macmillan Press and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), pp. 138-9.
 Nasra M. Shah, “The Management of Irregular Migration and Its Consequence for Development: Gulf Cooperation Council,” ILO Working Papers, International Labour Organization, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, Mar. 2009, p. 8.
 See, for example, Philippe Fargues, “Immigration without Inclusion: Non-Nationals in Nation-building in the Gulf States,” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, no. 3-4 (2011), p. 273.
 Law No. 38 of 2005 on the acquisition of Qatari nationality, 38/2005, Qatar Legal Portal (al-Meezan); Zahra R. Babar, “Citizenship Construction in the State of Qatar,” Middle East Journal, Summer 2014, pp. 411-3; Gulf News, June 6, 2006.
 Financial Times, Oct. 24, 2010.
 Asharq al-Awsat (London), Sept. 18, 2014; Justin Gengler, “Bahrain Drain: Why the King’s Sunni Supporters are Moving Abroad,” Foreign Affairs, Sept. 5, 2014.
 Statistical Abstract of the Region of the Economic Commission for Western Asia, 1970-1979, 4th issue (Beirut: U.N. Economic Commission for Western Asia, 1981), table 1-2, p. 174.
 Demographic and Related Socio-economic Data Sheets for Countries of the ECWA, no. 3 (Beirut: U.N. Economic Commission for Western Asia, May 1982), tables 2, 3, pp. 132-3.
 “World Population Policies-Qatar,” Population Studies, no. 102, vol. 3, U.N. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, New York, 1990, pp. 39-40.
 “Labor Force Sample Survey-2011,” Qatar Statistics Authority, Doha, Nov. 2011, pp. 11-2, 14.
 For comparison, see Onn Winckler, Arab Political Demography: Population Growth, Labor Migration and Natalist Policies (Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), table 2.4, pp. 62-3.
 Bulletin on Population and Vital Statistics in the Arab Region, no. 16 (New York: U.N. Social and Economic Commission for Western Asia, 2013), table 77, p. 102.
 The State of Qatar’s Population Policy (Doha: Permanent Population Committee, Oct. 2009), p. 13.
 Annual Report-2011 (Doha: Permanent Population Committee, Jan. 2012), p. 8.
 The State of Qatar’s Population Policy, p. 13.
 World Population Projections, 1994-95 Edition, The World Bank (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 442.
 World Population to 2030 (New York: U.N. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2004), table A11, p. 200.
 “Qatar,” International Data Base, U.S. Census bureau, Dec. 2013.
 Claude Berrebi, Francisco Martorell, and Jeffery C. Tanner, “Qatar’s Labor Market at a Crucial Crossroad,” Middle East Journal, Summer 2009, p. 429.
 Annual Abstract-2014 (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, 2014), table 5.
 “Qatar: 2012 Article IV Consultation,” IMF Country Report No. 12/18, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., Jan. 2012, table 1, p. 27.
 “Qatar Economic Insight-2013,” Qatar National Bank, Doha, Nov. 2013, p. 2.
 For a detailed methodological examination of the various demographic sources used in the article, see Appendix A.
Related Topics: Demographics, Persian Gulf & Yemen | Onn Winckler | Spring 2015 MEQ This text may be reposted or forwarded so long as it is presented as an integral whole with complete and accurate information provided about its author, date, place of publication, and original URL.
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 12th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
CHORNOBYL SONGS PROJECT
SPECIAL CD RELEASE CONCERT
Saturday, April 25, 7:00PM
from: Center for Traditional Music and Dance (CTMD) – traditions at ctmd.org via ctmd.ccsend
In partnership with the Ukrainian Museum and Yara Arts Group, we are excited to present a special concert of the Chonobyl Songs Project, performed by Ensemble Hilka.
Back in 2011, CTMD worked with ethnomusicologist/singer Maria Sonevytsky (Bard College) to bring renowned vocalist/ethnomusicologist Yefim Yefremov to New York for a series of workshops and concerts with a group of leading local singers (Hilka) that focused on the polyphonic village singing styles of Ukraine’s Chornobyl region which were extant before the nuclear disaster of 1986. The Chornobyl Songs Project CD is now being released on Smithsonian Folkways.
This concert will take place at the beautiful Ukrainian Museum, 222 East Sixth Street (between 2nd & 3rd Avenues) in Manhattan’s East Village.
A reception in the museum concourse featuring music by the Veveritse Brass Band will follow the concert. Admission is $15/$10 members and seniors/$5 students.
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 11th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
Politics & Policy
Plagued By Smog, Krakow Struggles To Break Its Coal-Burning Habit.
April 11, 2015
by Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson of NPR
Poland’s second-largest city is also a major tourist destination. Krakow (seen here at night from the Krakus Mound) is suffering some of the worst air pollution in Europe
Krakow is one of Europe’s top tourist destinations and attracts millions of visitors each year to soak up its history, culture and architecture. But its appeal wanes during colder months when another prominent feature of the Polish city is on display: air pollution.
Environmental officials say Krakow’s air is among the most polluted in Poland, which in turn, has the most polluted air in the European Union.
And what’s the source of the smog hanging over the city during colder months? It’s not Polish industry, but rather residents who burn coal to keep warm.
One such resident is Arleta Wolek. The 73-year-old retired production line worker keeps her coal-burning stove in her basement in a hillside neighborhood. The furnace is four years old, and she feeds it from a nearby pile of coal that’s almost as tall as she is.
“I used to have gas but switched to coal because it’s warmer,” Wolek explains.
Like many Krakow residents, she doesn’t believe coal smoke is the main contributor to the thick smog that hangs over the city like a dirty blanket. But she nevertheless has decided to switch her heating system back to gas after learning the local government will reimburse her for the retrofit.
“The switch is a good thing and will make my life easier because going into the basement to get coal and putting it into the stove takes time” and is strenuous, Wolek says.
It can take up to a year to get the government refund, but Wolek says she doesn’t mind. What she is concerned about, however, is how senior citizens on fixed incomes are supposed to pay for the gas each month. Most gas here comes from Russia and costs consumers in Krakow twice as much as coal.
Dr. Eva Konduracka, a cardiologist, says air pollution causes 30 percent of the chronic obstructive lung disease cases she and other doctors here treat, many of them in young people. High cancer rates are also linked to the toxins people are breathing.
That’s likely why more than 30,000 Krakow homeowners continue to use coal. Their intransigence leaves the air here hazy and sour-smelling, says Wolek’s neighbor, Andrzej Plebancyzk, 71, who moved back from the United States in 2010.
“I have a problem breathing and it was really connected to the air, because I didn’t have it in the States,” he says. “Sometimes, when I used to be a kid, before we’d go to sleep we’d open the window to get fresh air. Forget doing that now, especially when there is no wind.”
The health effects are even worse than the smell, says Dr. Eva Konduracka, who compares it to “smoking 2,000 cigarettes per year.”
The cardiologist says smog is causing 30 percent of the chronic obstructive lung disease cases she and other doctors here treat, many of them in young people. High cancer rates are also linked to the toxins people are breathing.
In Krakow, she says, doctors diagnose a new case of malignant tumor every three hours.
One was Anna Krokosz. She died a few days after being diagnosed with lung cancer two years ago, says her daughter, Aleksandra Bedek. The quality control engineer says her 77-year-old mother never smoked a day in her life, but coughed all the time.
Bedek, who is 58, says she coughs a lot, too. She avoids spending any more time outdoors than necessary because of the smog. But the smell of her neighbors’ coal smoke seeps into her apartment.
Anna Dworakowska, 35, helped found a grass-roots movement called the Krakow Smog Alert campaign, which educates residents about the dangers of air pollution.
Anna Dworakowska, 35, helped found a grass-roots movement called the Krakow Smog Alert campaign, which educates residents about the dangers of air pollution.
Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson/NPR
“Whenever the wind stops, I feel like I’m suffocating, especially when I’m lying in bed at night,” Bedek says.
Anna Dworakowska, 35, helped found a grass-roots movement called the Krakow Smog Alert campaign, which educates residents about the dangers of air pollution.
“Of course the air in Krakow was much worse 20 years ago because, first of all, there were [many] more people heating their houses with coal,” Dworakowska says. “The second thing is we had much more industry, which was closed down after the anti-communist revolution. But on the other hand, we know much more about the impact of air pollution on our health than 20
One of those revelations is the high concentration of benzo(a)pyrene in Krakow’s air. The compound is found in coal tar and is highly carcinogenic. Dworakowska says Poles breathe in five times the EU-prescribed norms of benzo(a)pyrene.
Her group spurred the Krakow government into approving a ban on residential wood and coal-burning in the city starting in 2018. But a regional court last August overturned the measure, declaring it unconstitutional and unenforceable.
That ruling has been appealed, and the proposed ban remains in legal limbo.
Krzysztof Bolesta, a political adviser to the Polish environmental minister, says he isn’t surprised. In fact, it’s such a big problem that his ministry made air quality its highest priority for 2015.
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 11th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
International Advocacy in the Digital Age
CPD Forum on Public Diplomacy
This panel brings together representatives from the foreign ministries of Canada, Israel, Mexico and the U.S. Department of State to share insights from the recent advocacy efforts they have led. Particular focus will be placed on the exploration of how best to merge traditional and digital campaigns and how we determine success through the use of metrics.
Panel discussion from 6:30pm-8:00pm; reception immediately following.
Registration required. Photo ID required for entry and no parking will be available on-site.
The program is co-sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Trade and Development Canada, and the Foreign Policy Group.
Monday, April 20, 2015 – 6:30pm to 8:00pm
Canadian Embassy, 501 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, DC
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 10th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
The transformation to fair and sustainable regional economies requires place-based, citizen-driven tools. The principles behind these tools are universal, but their effective application will be shaped by the landscape, the people, the history, and the culture of each particular region.
On September 14, 2015 Schumacher College for New Economists will welcome its first class of students to the Berkshires for the first two months of a nine month program. The program will be unprecedented, involving over twenty partner organizations at multiple locations across the US and UK. The list of partners is still growing, and currently includes:
The initiative grows from a common recognition: every local economy will need its own community economists – part visionary theorists, part activists – imagining what can be achieved and organizing to achieve it. Schumacher College was formed to train these new economists.
Program graduates may not have all the answers – but they will have the resources and connections to know where to look. They will know, and be known by, their community, and be committed to sharing and applying what they have learned.
They will find allies in the Maker Community who value the hand-crafted over the mono-culture products of an anonymous global economy, in the new agrarians cultivating small lots to produce for a regional food system, in community bankers who still make loan decisions based on face to face interviews, in environmentalists who understand the carbon cost of transporting goods over long distance, and in all those who love the “sidewalk dance” of a vibrant local economy.
They will engage a community process to explore the financing structures, the land tenure structures, the community supported industry structures, and the ownership structures needed to sustain and grow locally-owned businesses that pay a living wage.
They will need community engagement and support for their training. See below for more information on how to send a student from your community.
To get further details on Schumacher sustainability and the education for a new economy – please go to:
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Posted in Archives, European Union, Green is Possible, Massachusetts, United Kingdom
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 6th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
Andrei Kolesnikov is a senior Associate, and the Chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program, at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
More from this author…
Why Sanctions on Russia Don’t Work
A Blast From the Past
Russian Opposition “in a Great Depression” After Nemtsov Murder
The Russian Middle Class in a Besieged Fortress.
Andrei Kolesnikov, Carnegie Moskow Center, Russia.
Article April 6, 2015
There is little reason to believe that the Russian middle class will react to the ongoing financial and economic crisis with protests or renewed calls for change. Instead, it seems almost certain that it will opt for strategies of survival and perseverance.
How will the Russian middle class react to the effects of low oil prices, Western sanctions, and deep-set economic problems, a state of affairs that some economists have dubbed the “triple whammy”? Unfortunately, these problems are only part of the broader systemic crisis that plagues Russia today. Yet there is little reason to believe that the Russian middle class will react to the ongoing financial and economic crisis with protests or renewed calls for change. Instead, it seems almost certain that this dynamic segment of society will opt for strategies of survival and perseverance rather than articulating a political agenda that challenges the Russian government or its current policies.
The nature and consequences of Russia’s current crisis cannot be reduced to economic issues. Sberbank President German Gref argued in his January 14, 2015, speech at the Gaidar Forum in Moscow that it is important not to overlook the impact of critical governance shortcomings. But instability or gaps in the quality of the state’s administrative capabilities—however important—are not a root cause. Rather, they are one of the effects of a deeper institutional and values-based crisis. All other aspects of the crisis, including the current political situation, merely stem from it. And there should be no question that Russia is indeed in a political crisis, despite outward manifestations of calmness and the consolidation of society and elites around the head of state.
Unfortunately, the triple whammy is not unleashing the forces of “creative destruction” or disruption that some reformist voices had been pinning their hopes on. In many cases, crises enable states to reform political life and move forward. In this sense, the 2008–2009 financial crisis was a lost opportunity for Russia. The crisis did not change behavior among state capitalism’s elites nor did it spur structural reform. Rather, the struggling economy was simply flooded with money from the state’s reserve funds. The state’s playbook conformed with former U.S. president Ronald Reagan’s old axiom: “Government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.”
The Economy After Crimea
Russia’s economic problems are certainly significant.
Economic analysts generally agree that Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) will decline by at least 3–7 percent in 2015 while annual inflation will soar. Inflation is forecast by the central bank to peak at 17.0–17.5 percent in the second quarter of 2015.
Headline inflation was 15 percent in January 2015 (from January 2014 to January 2015), and increasing at a rate of 3.9 percent a month—the highest rate since February 1999. The disaggregated components of the inflation numbers also tell a powerful story. Prices for medicine and medical equipment grew 6.6 percent in January (19.4 percent year-on-year). Food prices, excluding fruit and vegetables, were up 3.7 percent in January (18.4 percent year-on-year). Fruit and vegetable prices increased by 22.1 percent in January (40.7 percent year-on-year).
Assessments of the effect of sanctions on overall GDP vary. Experts from FBK Grant Thornton, a business consultancy, suggest that the sanctions will shave off 1.2 percent of Russian GDP by mid-2015.1 The effect of the sharp decline in oil prices on GDP is even greater. Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy experts Sergey Drobyshevsky and Andrey Polbin estimate that a decrease in oil prices to $40 per barrel would translate into a 3.7 percent decline in GDP in constant prices.
Structural problems, for example, state intervention on behalf of favored industries and companies and the blocking of pension reform, are in part linked to the Russian economy’s dependence on oil and gas. They are also tied to the lack of reform in the sectors of the economy (such as healthcare and education) that are human-capital-intensive as well as the lack of resources allocated to these sectors due to inadequate government financing.
As the labor force has shrunk, economists have begun to notice a decline in the skill level of Russian workers. The rector of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Vladimir Mau, has pointed out that “the unemployment rate in Russia is rather low due to the effects of demographic factors. However, a conflict is brewing: on the one hand, the army of retirees is on the rise; on the other, there are young people who are unwilling to fill the jobs being vacated.”2 ?he low-skilled segment of the labor market is also changing. Inflation and a weak ruble have made Russia unattractive even to migrants—the most unpretentious part of the workforce; there was a 70 percent decrease in the number of migrants arriving in Russia in the beginning of 2015.
Another factor contributing to the current situation is the large percentage of workers who are employed in the shadow economy, which, according to official statistics, accounts for 12.5 percent of GDP. According to Rosstat data, in 2011, 22 million Russians—almost a third of the 71-million-person workforce—were employed in informal sectors of the economy. (This sector comprises, for example, many entrepreneurs and their employees, those providing paid services off the books, and agricultural workers.)3 The number is expected to increase as a result of the ongoing decline in real incomes, worsening labor market conditions, employee realignment and reductions at various large-scale enterprises, and other crisis-related factors. Workers in the informal economy pay no taxes and therefore will not be able to contribute to the Pension Fund. According to data from the Russian Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, 20 percent of the able-bodied population is missing from the Pension Fund databases.4
Politics and Policy
While oil price volatility is certainly not a by-product of current Russian economic policy, the other two components of the triple whammy—sanctions and structural problems—have a lot to do with decisions made by the government. Moreover, they are directly related to the nature and content of domestic and foreign policy decisionmaking. In a nutshell, such decisions are increasingly the province of an extremely close-knit and ever-shrinking circle of decisionmakers around Russian President Vladimir Putin, known as “Putin’s friends,” a description that has become increasingly literal.
It is telling that Russia’s economic downturn worsened after the annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014. Macroeconomic indicators looked dreadful by the end of the year. The ruble was the world’s worst-performing currency against the dollar.5 Former finance minister Alexei Kudrin has suggested that the drop in oil prices only accounts for 25 percent of the ruble’s recent depreciation. Kudrin claims that sanctions account for 25 to 40 percent of the currency’s slide with the dollar’s overall surge contributing an additional 5 to 10 percent. Kudrin also highlights the negative effects of “risks, expectations, and fears,” including investors’ lack of confidence in the government’s efforts to improve the investment climate and support economic growth.6
Economic policymaking is increasingly held hostage by a new and unexpected set of actors. For example, any attempts by the government to mount superhuman policy changes in the economic sphere or complex diplomatic maneuvers could be blown to bits if Donetsk People’s Republic leader Aleksandr Zakharchenko were to order his troops to move on the city of Mariupol. Russia’s investment climate, financial stability, and economic development depend more on the actions of separatist leaders in Donetsk and Lugansk, the chief prosecutor, and the Investigative Committee than the central bank’s official monetary and interest rate policies or deputy prime ministers’ declarations at the Davos World Economic Forum. Amid growing isolationism, nationalism, and anti-Western sentiments, the “Zakharchenko Factor” may not be the sole determinant of current developments, but it plays a very important role.
Taxpayer’s Democracy: An Unattained Ideal
Meanwhile, Russians remain quite passive about their economic situation, even as the consequences of the triple whammy gradually emerge.
Both Hegel and Marx wrote about alienation (Entfremdung), specifically, the mutual alienation of the people and their government. On a conceptual level, governments seek to exploit the benefits from GDP, economic rents, and tax revenues for the sake of self-preservation. This goal in turn leads to unproductive government expenditures on defense, law enforcement, and operations that significantly exceed productive government expenditures in other areas, say, education and healthcare.
In Russia, the clique of Putin-era oligarchs is not constrained by political institutions that would ordinarily help relay public opinion to the government. Of course, the Russian political system has never fully subscribed to the principle of “no taxation without representation.” However, under Russia’s particular brand of state capitalism and heavy dependence on oil and gas profits, closed channels of political representation have practically obliterated it.
The president’s inner circle views economic rent as its personal revenue stream or private property, as evidenced by state-owned oil company Rosneft’s request for substantial subsidies from the National Wealth Fund, which was created in order to accumulate oil-based revenues to compensate for a projected state-backed Pension Fund deficit. This is quite logical for a system in which having power is synonymous with owning property; this so-called power-property relationship is also sanctified by the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church. The church is increasingly playing a role geared toward maximizing the effect of pro-government propaganda and ensuring greater conformity inside Russian society with its socially conservative goals and values. (The persecution of the band Pussy Riot is only the most well-known example of these efforts.)
However, such an arrangement contradicts the Russian constitution, which states that “land and other natural resources shall be utilized and protected in the Russian Federation as the basis of the life and activity of the peoples living on the territories concerned.” Those resources were not intended to be the basis of life and activity for a handful of beneficiaries of state capitalism and their families.
?conomic rent is alienated from the people, and so is the government. People believe that they have no way to advocate meaningful change in their country and thus allow the establishment to make decisions on its own. The classic Putin-era social contract (“freedom in exchange for sausage”) that emerged during the period of high oil prices gave way in 2014 to “freedom in exchange for Crimea and national pride.”
The government is also alienated by virtue of the fact that elections now distort the principles of representation more than ever before. This fact triggered the street protests in 2011–2012, when some in the middle class demanded democracy and fair elections. These demands were perfectly in line with Seymour Lipset’s theory that higher living standards, education, and income are the foundations for a realization by increasingly affluent members of society of the need for greater democracy.7
In 2011, Russia’s urban middle class offered some support for Lipset’s hypothesis by advancing their demands for democracy. Yet in 2014, after failing to achieve their original goal, they set aside such political interests in favor of the “Crimea is ours” (Krym nash) concept. In essence, they agreed that the concoction of hybrid and trade wars was better for the motherland than its presence, to put it pompously, in the family of European nations.
The year 2014 marked the degradation and militarization of state policies and mass consciousness. These policies were a striking contrast to the recent behavior of modern democratic societies, which consider military losses unacceptable and regard appeals to an entity’s sacred status as a relic of bygone theocratic eras.8
Along with the post-Crimean consolidation of Russian society, sociologists have found that Russians stayed true to a core belief: “We cannot have an impact on anything so therefore we do not want to impact anything.” According to a Levada Center poll, about 60 percent of the population agree with the statement that they are unable to affect the situation in the country. Close to 50 percent believe that they can do nothing to influence events in their own city or town.9
Such views give rise to paternalistic attitudes like “let the state decide everything for me.” These attitudes correlate with the relatively insignificant contribution that taxpayers make to federal and local budgets compared with the budget revenues derived from sales of oil and gas.
Kudrin has described the public’s alienation from the decisionmaking process in the following terms. “In the 2000s, the country’s prosperity grew largely due to the revenue from natural resources,” he wrote. “But the people were not the ones benefiting from it. In terms of GDP, out of 37 percent of all collected taxes and other payments, rents constituted more than a third, while individual income tax accounted for only about 3 percent. . . . Officials easily and freely redistributed easy money—as a result, no feedback mechanisms were created.”10
While the Russian citizen is alienated from the rent revenues, he knows that his livelihood depends on them. He is willing to accept them from the state, but at the same time he develops an inferiority complex about his material wealth, knowing that he did not exactly earn the money. This belief allows pro-redistribution coalitions—which divide rent among those close to the authorities’ clans as well as lobbyists and pressure groups—to claim their “right” to “their” share in the redistribution of public funds. This stance seems extremely provocative in the midst of the economic crisis but clearly indicates who holds the keys to the house of Russian politics. For example, Nikolai Podguzov, the deputy minister for economic development, recently announced that “Rosneft requests a total of 1.3 trillion rubles from the National Wealth Fund (NWF) for 28 projects. . . . Rosneft proposes that the NWF finance projects worth over 3 trillion rubles.”11 Not surprisingly, such a state of affairs angers the members of other pro-redistribution coalitions.
Out of this emerges a level of passivity among the public and acceptance of the consequences of the triple whammy as they gradually materialize. It appears that there never was and never will be a taxpayer democracy in the current rentier system—after all, individual contributions to the national well-being are quite small when contrasted with what is received from hydrocarbon-based rents. The public’s impact on government decisions, their own political participation, and their involvement in civic life are just as insignificant. The process of spending taxpayer money does not concern the taxpayers themselves.
But when the oil-oozing, ostensibly collective pie is complemented by the mantra “Crimea is ours,” it destroys both consensus-based and participatory democracy, along with any sense of civic duty or collective effort. Crimea was not a collective effort by any stretch—the Russian public stormed the peninsula while sitting in front of their televisions. Rather, Crimea was a gift from the government.
In their heart of hearts, Russians do not consider themselves creators of national wealth. That further discourages most forms of political participation, which should ideally be directed at achieving a more rational, honest, and equitable distribution of the goods and services produced by the economy.
This reality explains the public’s willingness to tolerate just about everything and its unwillingness to protest. It also explains the lack of incentive for private initiative, for private investment, for innovation, and for the protection of private property. For their part, state investments further discourage private economic activity and fail to spur economic growth. Generally speaking, state-generated investment produces a pool of money that either provokes inflation or encourages capital flight to countries with more attractive investment climates. The Russian economy needs state investment as much as Soviet-era enterprises needed foreign machinery, most of which was never unpacked and rusted away in leaky warehouses.
The Class Pyramid
The triple whammy is a blow to all income levels of Russian society, but it especially affects lower- and middle-income groups who are more sensitive to price increases. The general level of inflation that took off in early 2015 severely impacted the middle class, the major consumer of various services and durable goods. Real disposable incomes fell 7.3 percent in December 2014 compared to the same period in 2013. According to a January 2015 Public Opinion Foundation poll, 62 percent of the population describes the situation as an economic crisis and sees “dreadful inflation” as the main manifestation of the crisis.12
Research on the middle class by the director of the Independent Institute for Social Policy at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Tatyana Maleva, suggests that the social structure of Russian households has not undergone significant change in recent years. According to Maleva, about 70 percent of the population are below the middle class. Approximately 40 percent of households belonging to that group are at risk of poverty, while 30 percent could potentially join the middle and upper-middle class.
The size of the middle class can be measured in a number of ways based on different criteria. A rough estimate of the size of the middle class puts the number at around 20 percent of the population.13 While some other studies have come up with different numbers, an approach based on analysis of 2012 Eurobarometer data supports Tatyana Maleva’s conclusions.14
In a political sense, the group at risk of poverty makes up the regime’s social and electoral base. Not coincidentally, they are also the main recipients of public funds. Even amid the constraints imposed by the triple whammy, the government will therefore strive to ensure that this group does not end up below the poverty line. Humanitarian considerations play a fairly minor role in these efforts, which are based on cold political calculations and the regime’s desire to discourage the creation of social tensions. Social mobility from the middle to the upper-middle class, which has been long stifled by the highly monopolistic economy controlled by a small number of political-business elites, may cease altogether as a result of the current crisis.
Thus, the regime’s social goal is to preserve the class pyramid, which emerged during the oil boom and economic recovery of the 2000s and has enabled the system of power-property and crony capitalism to reproduce itself. Evaporating material gains are being replaced with spiritual appeals, which will involve using cruder and more archaic propaganda, including indoctrination by the top brass of the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as the increasingly selective application of repressive laws.
The Estate Structure of the Resource State
This is only a slight correction of the regime’s principal course of action, which Higher School of Economics Professor Simon Kordonsky describes as “the suzerain takes care of his people—the amalgamation of estates—by distributing resources in a way that ensures that the privileged estates don’t get too brazen and the underprivileged ones don’t die from hunger.” Notably, this theory views modern Russian society as estate-based rather than class-based. And, as Kordonsky explains, “The distribution of resources is at the core of estate-based society, in contrast to class society, whose economy is mainly based on converting resources into capital and their broader reproduction.”15 In essence, this is status commercialization.
Status can be acquired by assuming high office (hence all the talk of regime figures buying top positions, seats in parliament, and so on). It can also be bestowed by the suzerain (look at the members of the Kremlin’s inner circle, who share similar security and intelligence backgrounds with Putin), and it can be inherited. Children of high-ranking officials and state capitalists from the redistributional coalitions take charge of high offices and even receive government decorations. Naturally, concludes Kordonsky, “Such a system does not need democracy as an institution for reconciling interests, nor does it focus on the needs of individuals who fall outside of the estate system.”16
Privatization in the 1990s was a way to utilize (and increase) resources within the market framework. The “re-privatization” of the 2000s in favor of state capitalism and figures from the president’s inner circle was a way to escape the market framework and return to a system based on estates.
Instead of encouraging middle-class growth, this type of estate structure actually slows it down. Quite often, one can only join the middle class—at least in terms of income levels—by working in a system dominated by the most privileged estates, for example, state-run corporations and companies that live off of government contracts or tenders.
The Conformist Class: Survival Instead of Change
How will the Russian middle class respond to the triple whammy? How will its political behavior and socioeconomic well-being be affected?
Some researchers point out that the middle class has been “the main actor of socioeconomic adaptation” in recent years.17 At the same time, it is still not large enough, strong enough, or confident enough in its future well-being to clearly formulate a political outlook or to insist on proper representation in government bodies and decisions. Other economists also talk about its “low bargaining power.”18
This bargaining power decreased even more after the failure of the 2011–2012 protests. After Dmitry Medvedev left the president’s office, both society and the loyal, liberal political elite lost incentives to construct political, lobbying, and civic coalitions in favor of modernization. Thus, modernization coalitions were replaced with redistributional, estate-based ones.
The big question is whether the middle class, which is quite adaptable, even wants such coalition-based bargaining power. In reality, its political behavior and positions are far removed from the romantic image that took shape in Moscow’s streets and squares and in the independent media during the democratic illusions of late 2011 and the first half of 2012.
In a 2014 book, Francis Fukuyama argues that the middle class has been the engine behind practically every recent protest in various countries across the world.19 What’s more, even a fairly elected but ineffective or corrupt government does not enjoy sufficient legitimacy in the eyes of the most advanced segments of the population. As Fukuyama writes, “Government actually had to deliver better results if it was to be regarded as legitimate, and needed to be more flexible and responsive to changing public demands.”20
That was exactly the chief motivation behind the 2011–2012 protests. Russians were dissatisfied with the government, and its legitimacy was diminishing as a result of dishonesty and ineffectiveness.
But the political protests that grew out of the public’s stance against the regime’s corruption were mostly limited to Moscow and involved only a very small part of the educated, urban middle class (although some upper- and lower-income segments of the population joined at times). This social stratum was immediately named the “creative class,” which, in turn, led to the shorter and more derisive word, “creatives.” While this concept does have something in common with the term coined by Richard Florida, the Russian meaning of the term does not actually cover people who are engaged in creative work. It refers instead to a small segment of Russian citizens who are dissatisfied with the regime and its authoritarian rule, predominantly for political and ethical reasons. In their beliefs and goals, creatives today somewhat resemble the democratic intelligentsia of the late 1980s.
Nor is the creative class always synonymous with the middle class, especially in terms of income levels (although its behavior does correspond to that of the middle class). In addition, its opposition activities sharply contrast with the conformism exhibited by the majority of the middle class. Contrary to expectations, this conformism will only grow or remain unchanged as a result of the triple whammy. Despite some sporadic protests, the majority will more readily embrace the strategies and tactics of survival instead of protests and demands for change, at least in 2015.
Consider the 2012 Eurobarometer survey of the middle class.21 According to the data, against the backdrop of blatantly dishonest elections that provoked protests in 2011, the middle class actually voted for United Russia—the pro-regime party. And at higher strata of Russian society, the level of support for the regime actually increased. The motivations underlying voting behavior varied: some voters had benefited handsomely during the economic boom of the early 2000s while others became complacent with their lot. Either way, conformism became the overarching trend.
The middle class was only slightly more active in terms of participation in opposition rallies (2.3 percent versus 1.9 percent at lower-income levels). The upper-middle class seemed to be the most active (11.7 percent), but this stratum was also quite active when it came to attendance at pro-government rallies (6.7 percent versus 1.0 percent of the middle class).
The lack of participation by the middle class—either in opposition to or in support of the government—suggests that its conformism is inherently passive. It does not express passionate or unequivocal support for the government; rather, the middle class is simply not ready to struggle for change. (It seems that active support for the regime manifested itself only after the referendum in Crimea and did not diminish much, if at all, as the Ukraine crisis worsened.)
According to the Eurobarometer survey, the middle class was evenly split in its assessment of the political situation (43 and 44 percent were satisfied or dissatisfied with it, respectively). In fact, the majority of respondents wanted no change to the political situation, while 12 percent preferred radical change.
The middle class’s relationship to the European Union (EU) is further proof of its conformism: 18.2 percent of the middle class and 27.8 percent of the upper-middle class wanted Russia to distance itself from the EU as much as possible. It is quite indicative of the mood in the country that the lower-middle class was the biggest supporter of EU integration, at 23.4 percent. These numbers have changed in the direction of greater “patriotism” for the time being. A January 2015 Levada Center poll, for example, demonstrated an increase in negative attitudes toward the United States and EU countries to 81 and 71 percent, respectively.
In his 1997 work “Anomalies of Economic Growth,” Yegor Gaidar, the architect of Russian reform, noted that two main social groups are interested in liberal market reforms in Russia: “The middle class, which needs a level playing field, effective protection of private property, and a government that is not cumbersomely involved in economic affairs; and the intelligentsia—those who are connected to the science, education, healthcare, culture, and other such sectors—to whom the redistribution of resources objectively reflects the economic needs of the country.” Russia’s developmental perspectives depend on the combined resources of these two groups.
In the nearly two decades since Gaidar began his work, by and large, very little social change has come to Russia: those in the middle class are considered the agents of change. The creative class can be considered the new intelligentsia.
Nevertheless, the coalition for modernization that began to emerge under Dmitry Medvedev was never realized. The signal from above that permitted the very existence of such a coalition was unceremoniously cut off, while the politician who had the best chance to launch perestroika 2.0 surrendered power based on his own free will.
The Russian model of change can only work if the demand for modernization expressed from below is noticed and clearly approved from above. In such a case, the notorious middle-class conformism toward official government policy could yet play a constructive role. If the higher-ups allow democracy, this brand of conformism implies that citizens will recognize that it must be supported and taken advantage of. As for the creative potential of the Russian middle class, it may very well serve as the engine of economic liberalization and political democratization, if it receives a level of representation in the government.
However, the creative forces among the agents of change can lie dormant for extremely long periods of time. After all, modernization coalitions in Venezuela and Iran have never really gained momentum, and those countries have experienced their own analogues to the triple whammy. So far, these forces have not yet fully shaken the Russian middle class.
We are now anxiously waiting for the agents of modernization, who have turned into the agents of mobilization, to finally come to their senses. But we probably will need to wait quite a bit longer. Give it a year or two.
1 “??????? ????? ?????? 1,2% ??? – ???????????? ???????? ???,” [The price of sanctions to Russia—1.2% of GDP: The research of the FBK company] FBK Grant Thornton, January 12, 2015, www.fbk.ru/press-center/news/sank….
2 “?????? ????????? ?????????????? ????? «????????»: ????????????? ?????? ? ?????–2015,” [The discussion club “Academy” first meeting: The economic challenges and risks in 2015] Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, December 19, 2014, www.iep.ru/ru/19-12-2014-pervoe-z….
3 Maxim Tovkaylo, “???????: 38 ??? ??????? ?????? ‘????????? ??? ? ???,’” [Golodets: It’s incomprehensible what 38 million of Russians are doing and where] Vedomosti, April 3, 2013, www.vedomosti.ru/career/news/1072….
4 Lyudmila Klimenteva, “???????: ????? 20% ????????? ????? ???????? ??? ????????? ??????,” [Topilin: Approximately 20% of the population can remain without noncontributory pension] Vedomosti, January 26, 2015, www.vedomosti.ru/finance/articles….
5 Henry Meyer and Irina Reznik, “The Chilly Fallout Between Putin and His Oligarch Pals,” Bloomberg, January 22, 2015, www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-22….
6 Gaidar Institute, 2014.
7 A number of researchers have found empirical evidence for this controversial modernization hypothesis put forward by Seymour Lipset. For instance, Robert J. Barro, Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).
8 Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 99.
9 Denis Volkov and Stepan Goncharov, ????????? ???????????? ??????? ? ??????? ?????????? ??????? [The potential of the civic participation in solving social problems] (Moscow: Levada Center, 2014), www.levada.ru/books/potentsial-gr….
10 Alexei Kudrin, “????????? ? ???????? ? ??????? ???????” [Economy and politics in search of a balance] ????? ???????, no. 2-3 (Moscow: Moscow School of Civic Education, 2014). otetrad.ru/article-763.html.
11 Margarita Lyutova, “‘????????’ ????????? ?? ??? 1,3 ???? ?????? ?? 28 ????????” [Rosneft asked for 1.3 billion rubles from the National Wealth Fund] Vedomosti, January 28, 2015, www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/3….
12 “???????? ? ??????????? ?????????????? ???????” [Russians about manifestations of the economic crisis] Public Opinion Foundation, January 21, 2015, fom.ru/Ekonomika/11919.
13 Tatyana Maleva and Lilia Ovcharova, ?????????? ??????? ?????? ???????? ? ?? ???? ?????????????? ????? [Russian middle classes on the eve and at the peak of economic growth] (Moscow, 2008), 73.
14 Svetlana Misikhina, ?????????-????????????? ?????????????? ? ?????????-???????????? ????????? ???????? ?????? ? ?????????? ????????? [Socioeconomic characteristics and value-political choices of the middle class in the Russian Federation] preprint edition (Moscow: Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, 2014).
15 Simon Kordonsky, ????????? ????????? ????????????? ?????? [The estate structure of the post-Soviet Russia] (Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, 2008), 28.
16 Ibid., 34.
17 Tatyana Maleva et al., ???????????? ????????? ?????????? ???????? ?????????? ????????? ?? 2050 [The long-term concept of social policy of the Russian Federation until 2050] preprint edition (Moscow: Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, 2014), 43.
18 Alexander Auzan et al., ??????? ????? ? ????????????: ???????? ? ???????????? ????????????? ? ?????????-???????????? ?????????? ? ?????? [The middle class and modernization: Hypotheses on the formation of economic and sociopolitical institutions in Russia] (Moscow: 2009), 264.
19 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2014), 6.
21 The data are cited from Svetlana Misikhina, ?????????-????????????? ?????????????? [Socioeconomic characteristics].
Read more at: carnegie.ru/2015/04/06/russian-mi…
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 6th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
This Country Belongs to All of Us, Not Just the Billionaire Class.
By US Senator from Vermont – Bernie Sanders, Reader Supported News
06 April 2015
“We must launch a political revolution which engages millions of Americans from all walks of life in the struggle for real change.”
The good news is that the economy today is much better than it was six years ago when George W. Bush left office. The bad news is that, despite these improvements, the 40-year decline of the American middle class continues. Real unemployment is much too high, 35 million Americans continue to have no health insurance and more of our friends and neighbors are living in poverty than at almost any time in the modern history of our country.
Meanwhile, as the rich become much richer, the level of income and wealth inequality has reached obscene and unimaginable levels. In the United States, we have the most unequal level of wealth and income distribution of any major country on earth, and worse now than at any other time since the 1920s.
Today, the top one-tenth of 1 percent of our nation owns almost as much wealth as the bottom 90 percent, and one family owns more wealth than the bottom 42 percent. In terms of income, 99 percent of all new income is going to the top 1 percent.
This is what a rigged economic system looks like.
At a time when millions of American workers have seen declines in their incomes and are working longer hours for lower wages, the wealth of the billionaire class is soaring in a way that few can imagine. If you can believe it, between 2013 and 2015, the 14 wealthiest individuals in the country saw their net worth increase by over $157 billion dollars. Children go hungry, veterans sleep out on the streets, senior citizens cannot afford their prescription drugs — and 14 individuals saw a $157 billion dollar increase in their wealth over a two-year period.
The grotesque level of income and wealth inequality we are experiencing is not just a moral and economic issue, it is a political issue as well. As a result of the disastrous Citizens United Supreme Court decision, billionaires are now able to spend unlimited sums of money to buy the candidates they want. The Koch brothers, an extreme right-wing family, recently announced that they were prepared to spend some $900 million in the next election cycle. This is likely more money than either the Democratic or Republican parties will spend. If you think that it is an accident that the Republican Party has become a far-right party, think again. The Koch brothers’ agenda — ending Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, the U.S. Postal Service, the Environmental Protection Agency and all campaign finance limitations — has become the agenda of the Republican candidates they fund.
And, by the way, if you think that the Republican Party’s refusal to acknowledge that climate change is real, is caused by human activity and is a severe threat to our planet, is not related to how we finance campaigns, you would be sorely mistaken. With the Koch brothers (who make much of their money in the fossil fuel industry) and big energy companies strongly supporting Republican candidates, it should not surprise anyone that my Republican colleagues reject the views of the overwhelming majority of scientists who study climate issues.
With Republicans now controlling both houses of Congress, let me briefly touch on some of the battles that I will be helping to lead in this extreme right-wing environment. In my view, with so many of our fellow citizens demoralized about the political process, it is absolutely imperative that we establish a strong progressive agenda that Americans can rally around. It must be an agenda that reflects the real needs of the working families of our country. It must be an agenda that engages people in a political struggle that they are prepared to fight for.
Jobs, Jobs, Jobs: The truth is that real unemployment in our country is not the “official” and widely-reported 5.5 percent. Counting those who are under-employed and those who have given up looking for work, real unemployment is 11 percent. Even more disturbingly, youth unemployment is close to 17 percent and African-American youth unemployment is much higher than that.
If we are truly serious about reversing the decline of the middle class and putting millions of people back to work, we need a major federal jobs program. There are a number of approaches which can be taken, but the fastest way to create jobs is to rebuild our crumbling infrastructure — roads, bridges, dams, levees, airports, rail, water systems and wastewater plants.
In that regard, I have introduced legislation which would invest $1 trillion over 5 years to modernize our country’s physical infrastructure. This legislation would create and maintain at least 13 million good-paying jobs. It would also make our country more productive, efficient and safe.
I will also continue my opposition to our current trade policies and vote against fast tracking the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Simply put, our trade policies have failed. Permanent normal trade relations with China have led to the loss of more than 3.2 million American jobs. The North American Free Trade Agreement has led to the loss of nearly 1 million jobs. The Korean Free Trade Agreement has led to the loss of some 60,000 jobs.
We have got to fundamentally rewrite our trade rules so that American jobs are no longer our No.1 export. Corporate America must start investing in this country, not China.
As we struggle for decent-paying jobs, we must also rebuild the trade union movement. Throughout the country, millions of workers want to join unions but are meeting fierce opposition from their employers. We need legislation that makes it easier, not harder, for unions to flourish.
Raising Wages: Today, millions of Americans are working for starvation wages. The current federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour is totally inadequate. In fact, the real value of today’s minimum wage has declined by one-third since 1968. By raising the minimum wage to a living wage we can provide an increase in income for those people who need it the most. Our goal must be that no full-time worker in this country lives in poverty.
We must also bring about pay equity. There is no rational reason why women should be earning 78 cents on the dollar compared to men who perform the same work.
Further, we have got to expand overtime protections for millions of workers. It is absurd that “supervisors” who earn $25,000 a year are currently forced to work 50 or 60 hours a week with no overtime pay. Raising the income threshold to at least $56,680 from the absurdly low level of $23,660 a year for overtime will mean increased income for many millions of salaried workers.
Addressing Wealth and Income Inequality: Today the richest 400 Americans own more than $2.3 trillion in wealth, more than the bottom 150 million Americans combined. Meanwhile, nearly half of Americans have less than $10,000 in savings and have no idea how they will be able to retire with dignity.
We need real tax reform which makes the rich and profitable corporations begin to pay their fair share of taxes. It is absurd that in 1952 corporate income taxes provided 32 percent of federal revenue while in 2014 they provided 11 percent. It is scandalous that major profitable corporations like General Electric, Verizon, Citigroup and JP Morgan have, in a given recent year, paid nothing in federal income taxes. It is fiscally irresponsible that the U.S. Treasury loses about $100 billion a year because corporations and the rich stash their profits in the Cayman Islands, Bermuda and other tax havens.
Warren Buffett is honest. He has pointed out the unfairness of him, a multi-billionaire, paying a lower effective tax rate than his secretary. It is disgraceful that millionaire hedge fund managers are able to pay lower tax effective tax rates than truck drivers or nurses because they take advantage of a variety of loopholes that their lobbyists wrote.
This must end. We need a tax system which is fair and progressive. Children should not go hungry in this country while profitable corporations and the wealthy avoid their tax responsibilities.
Reversing Climate Change: The United States must lead the world in reversing climate change and make certain that this planet is habitable for our children and grandchildren. We must transform our energy system away from fossil fuels and into energy efficiency and sustainable energies. Millions of homes and buildings need to be weatherized, our transportation system needs to be energy efficient and we need to greatly accelerate the progress we are already seeing in wind, solar, geothermal and other forms of sustainable energy. Transforming our energy system will not only protect the environment, it will create good-paying jobs.
Health Care for All: The United States remains the only major country on earth that does not guarantee health care for all as a right. Despite the modest gains of the Affordable Care Act, 35 million Americans continue to lack health insurance and many more are under-insured. Yet, we continue paying far more per capita for health care than any other nation. The United States must move toward a Medicare-for-All single-payer system.
Protecting Our Most Vulnerable: Today the United States has more people living in poverty than at almost any time in the modern history of our country. We have the highest rate of childhood poverty of any major nation, 35 million Americans still lack health insurance and millions of seniors and disabled people struggle to put food on the table because of insufficient Social Security benefits.
The Republican response to the economic pain of so many of our people was to make a bad situation much worse. The recently-passed Republican budget throws 27 million Americans off of health insurance, cuts Medicare, makes huge cuts to nutrition and makes it harder for working class families to afford college or put their kids in the Head Start program.
In my view, we have a moral responsibility to make certain that no American goes hungry or sleeps out on the streets. We must also make certain that seniors and people with disabilities can live in dignity. Not only must we vigorously oppose Republican attacks on the social safety net, we must expand benefits for those in need. That is why I have recently introduced legislation which would increase the solvency of Social Security until 2065, while expanding benefits for those who need them the most.
Making College Affordable for All: We live in a highly competitive global economy. If this country is to do well economically, we need to have the best-educated workforce in the world. Yet today many Americans cannot get a higher education, not because they are unqualified, but because they simply cannot afford it. Millions of others who do graduate from college or graduate school are drowning in debt. According to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the total amount of outstanding student loan debt in the United States has tripled in the last 10 years, and has now reached $1.2 trillion.
The United States must join many other countries in understanding that investing in our young people’s education is investing in the future of our nation. I will soon be introducing legislation to make tuition in public colleges and universities free, as well as substantially lower interest rates on student loans.
And these are just SOME of the issues we are dealing with.
Let me conclude this letter by stating the obvious. This country is in serious trouble. Our economic system benefits the rich and large corporations and leaves working families behind. Our political system is dominated by billionaire campaign contributors and their lobbyists and is moving us in the direction of oligarchy. Our media system, owned by the corporate world, spends enormous time and energy diverting our attention away from the most important issues facing us. Climate change threatens the planet and we have a major political party denying its reality.
Clearly, the struggle to create a nation and world of economic and social justice and environmental sanity is not an easy one. But this I know: despair is not an option if we care about our kids and grandchildren. Giving up is not an option if we want to prevent irreparable harm to our planet.
We must stand up and fight back. We must launch a political revolution which engages millions of Americans from all walks of life in the struggle for real change. This country belongs to all of us, not just the billionaire class.
Please join the grass-roots revolution that we desperately need.
-20 # Depressionborn 2015-04-06 12:39
For sure Senator Bernie Sanders well describes the situation. But in the past his solutions have made things worse.
For example it is not unusual to find a well off person who once was in poverty. Bernie may know how they did it. It wasn’t socialism. It won’t happen with socialism. So what causes poverty?
Who is getting rich off a 0 interest rate? Profit $ once used to create jobs now go to banking and finance. What happened? More tax will not bring jobs back.
What is Bernie going to revolt us into?
+13 # Barbara K 2015-04-06 13:16
We have many in Congress now who think they are there to work for only the Billionaires and Millionaires; not all of us. I suppose it would be a surprise to them to know they are there to serve ALL Americans, that includes us. If they don’t want to serve all of us, time to kick them out of Congress. We get that chance every election, if enough get out to vote to make a difference.
0 # Nell H 2015-04-06 14:36
Congress serves their employers — the people who give $$ to their campaigns. Congress does not care about the rest of us because most Americans complain a lot, but they don’t bother to vote.
-1 # ctcarole 2015-04-06 14:47
You constantly suggest voting the “bad” guys out but it never happens. The choice is always between Republican bad guys or Democrat bad guys or people of either of those parties who have no chance of winning. When was the last time you actually had a choice for hope and change? Oh yeah. How is that one working out?
+2 # ctcarole 2015-04-06 13:48
The title of this article is wrong. The country does indeed belong to the billionaire class. What’s important now is what “The All of Us” is going to do about it. Electing more Republicrats isn’t going to do it. Bernie’s chances of becoming President are slimmer than a gnat’s ankles and even if he could be elected the Republicrats in congress will have a veto-proof majority to override anything he might want to do that would go against the billionaires. I fear I’m too old to see it but people start revolutions when they don’t have enough to eat. That time is coming and revolution is the only way failed governments change.
0 # jimallyn 2015-04-06 14:42
Quoting ctcarole: “Bernie’s chances of becoming President are slimmer than a gnat’s ankles.”
Only because people like you don’t have the good sense to vote for people who will actually represent them, and prefer to vote for lesser of two evils candidates like that Republican Hillary Clinton.
0 # Henry 2015-04-06 14:45
Bernie’s chances of becoming President are slimmer than a gnat’s ankles
Carole, I’m familiar with this thought myself. But I’m curious why you think he has no chance.
+1 # thoughtr2 2015-04-06 13:52
Hard to believe that in this long diatribe, our champion Bernard Sanders does not mention war or the military nor in his last one. That is the economic engine of our beloved America. Perhaps he needs to be informed. Is the F-35 in the back of his mind? What do you all make of this?
+1 # Henry 2015-04-06 14:41
Quoting thoughtr2: “Hard to believe that in this long diatribe, our champion Bernard Sanders does not mention war or the military nor in his last one. That is the economic engine of our beloved America. Perhaps he needs to be informed.”
Hey thoughtr2, you might want to watch the video of Evan Smith’s interview with Sanders, about 2/3 of the way down this page: berniesanders.com/blog/highlight… He definitely is informed about military spending (although yes, the F-35 is an elephant in the room … )
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 5th, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
The Guardian Divests $1.2 Billion Fund From Fossil Fuels.
By Bill McKibben, EcoWatch
04 April 15
Here’s how far we’ve come in just a couple of years: One of the world’s most respected and influential news organizations —
the Guardian Media Group — announced Wednesday that it will divest from fossil fuels.
The move follows the launch of The Guardian‘s own climate change campaign, in partnership with 350.org, to press two of the world’s largest charitable foundations to stop investing in oil, coal and gas companies.
The chairman of the Guardian Media Group called the move a “hard-nosed business decision” that is justified on both ethical and financial grounds. I couldn’t agree more.
It was also the second billion-dollar divestment commitment in just two days: Syracuse University in New York also ditched fossil fuels this week, demonstrating once again that cutting ties with the fossil fuel industry is both feasible and responsible.
Now is the time to increase the pressure on the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the Wellcome Trust — two of the world’s largest charities, and both explicitly dedicated to global health — to do the same.
Can you help us reach 200,000 signatures this week?
Add your name to the petition calling on the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the Wellcome Trust to stop investing in the climate crisis.
The Guardian Media Group is leading by example by divesting its entire £800 million (aka $1.2 billion) fund from fossil fuels and committing to invest in socially responsible alternatives instead. You can watch a video and find out more about The Guardian decision here.
When the roll of honor for action on climate change is someday called, I believe The Guardian’s name will be high on the list. They’ve taken a bold step in joining the fight to keep fossil fuels in the ground, both through their journalism and their own investments.
As Alan Rusbridger, their editor-in-chief said: “What was a trickle is becoming a river and will, I suspect, become a flood.”
Let’s make sure The Guardian’s divestment commitment sends a strong signal to other foundations—as well as universities, cities, states, churches and any institution that holds money and is dedicated to the public good—to get on the right side of history too.
+35 # Barbara K 2015-04-04 13:08
That is great news. Time to stop making the oil barons wealthier and support solar and wind energy for the sake of the planet, and us. Thank you “The Guardian”.
+1 # Eldon J. Bloedorn 2015-04-04 18:00
Hydrogen? By product of combustion – water!
+22 # Corvette-Bob 2015-04-04 15:13
Fossil fuel is in a death spiral, the only question is whether or not it will take us with it.
-13 # brycenuc 2015-04-04 15:44
Divestment won’t phase the fossil fuel industry. They are well aware that global economy depends on it.
+12 # Littlebird 2015-04-04 17:50
Just because the fossil fuel is dominant now, does not mean that it cannot be replaced with a better source of energy. Wars have been fought to have the oil. It is time for the world to turn away from dependence on fossil fuels. We can dig and frack until it all runs out. The sun is there for everyone and will be always.
+3 # seeuingoa 2015-04-04 16:26
thank you for always stating the obvious.
+8 # Littlebird 2015-04-04 17:41
Thank you Guardian! It takes a few to start the ball rolling. The Green Way is the right way to go to save our planet and to stop the oil barons from their pursuit of their rule over the earth from dependence on oil. There will be plenty of job growth from energy from the sun because of needing solar power panels and the expertise to develop solar power plants to get it to the people. Thomas Edison knew about the power of solar energy and wanted to see it developed in his time. Power from the sun and water will be here for us as long as the earth exists, not so for fossil fuels. Go Green!
+3 # rhgreen 2015-04-04 19:31
That’s great news, but pardon me from being a bit cynical and pointing out that with the fall in oil prices it’s a good time to be doing it out of self-interest, anyway.
+3 # Eliza D 2015-04-04 20:31
Mr. McKibben is a real hero of the grassroots environmental movement. He has few politicians with any power on his or our side. Now is the time for us to support Green and Third parties and turn around this do-nothing, stuck-in-the-tw entieth century government of ours. If Costa Rica could run their electric grid on renewable energy since the new year, the US could make a good run at attaining 50% renewables in two years. The folks who are sick and having their farms torn up by fracking are about as happy about that “clean energy” as the families of the dozens killed in the NYC gas explosion this past week.
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 3rd, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
April 13, 2015, 11h20-13h20, to be held at DAEGU_EXCO – Room DEC_303,
11h20-11h35: Keynote Speech by Angel Gurría, Secretary General, OECD
11h35-12h15: A High-level Perspective on OECD’s Principles to Water Governance
Moderated by Peter Glas, Chair, OECD Water Governance Initiative
Jeong Yeon-man, Vice-Minister of Environment Korea
Jean-Louis Chaussade, CEO of Suez Environnement
§ Lesha Witmer, Coordinator and steering committee member of the “Butterfly Effect” NGO coalition
Francisco Nunes Correia, Professor, Minister of Environment of Portugal (2005-2009)
Célia Blauel, President of Eau de Paris; Deputy-Mayor of Paris
Marta Moren Abat, European Commission, DG ENV
Joppe Cramwinckel, Water Director, World Business Council on Sustainable Development
12:15: Release of the Daegu multi-stakeholder Declaration on the OECD Principles on Water Governance
12:20-13h10: Parallel Roundtables to Take the Principles Forward : Towards an Implementation Action Plan
Chaired by Rolf Alter, Director for Public Governance and Territorial Development, OECD
Multi-level governance – moderated by Sasha Koo-Oshima, US EPA
Managing water(s) at the appropriate scale(s) – moderated by Daniel Valensuela, OIEau
Policy Coherence – moderated by Emmanuel Branche, EDF
Capacity –moderated by Chris Seijger, Deltares
Data and Information – moderated by Donal O’Leary, Transparency International
Governance-Financing nexus – moderated by Anthi Brouma, GWP-Mediterranean
Regulatory Frameworks – moderated by Jaime Melo Baptista, ERSAR, Portugal
Governance and innovation – moderated by Pierre-Alain Roche, ASTEE
Integrity and transparency – moderated by Teun Bastemeijer, WIN
Stakeholder Engagement – moderated by Joannie Leclerc, Suez Environnement
Equity across users, people and places – moderated by Aziza Akhmouch, OECD
Monitoring and evaluation – moderated by Hakan Tropp, SIWI
13h10-13h20: Conclusion and next steps
Link to other sessions of the OECD Water Governance Initiative at the 7th World Water Forum
For more information: Aziza.Akhmouch at oecd.org
Posted on Sustainabilitank.info on April 3rd, 2015
by Pincas Jawetz (PJ@SustainabiliTank.com)
from: npeirce at citiscope.org
Here’s our one-page announcement – Cities at a crossroads – Introducing our new coverage:
Citiscope begins major focus on Habitat III process.
March 30, 2015
By Neal Peirce
United Nations “Habitat” conferences, the world’s pre-eminent venue to take stock of the condition and potential of today’s cities, occur only once every 20 years. And the next one — Habitat III, scheduled for October 2016 in Quito, Ecuador — comes at a fascinating moment, a true crossroads for cities.
Cities now represent, for the first time in human history, a clear majority of the world’s peoples. The U.?N.’s nation-state members continue to hold legal and fiscal power over cities, but they also have a huge stake in their well-being.
Interest in Habitat III is mounting among supporters of the urban cause worldwide. UN-Habitat, the lead agency for this issue, has begun discussions looking to a “New Urban Agenda”, offered background information on its website and inaugurated a series of “PrepComs”, the next to be held in Nairobi on 14-16 April.
But there’s no media outlet providing a regular flow of journalist-generated news and independent commentary for global consumption. Citiscope, starting immediately, is initiating sustained, comprehensive coverage to address this gap. You can find it at citiscope.org
We believe the timing is right. Evidence of cities’ fast-expanding role has emerged through the campaign to include an urban plank in the U.?N.’s new Sustainable Development Goals, succeeding the expiring Millennium Development Goals. And cities are receiving increased attention in the negotiations on climate change that aim to conclude in Paris in December.
Citiscope’s new coverage will include analysis and updates on each of these processes. In addition, we will offer a stream of news reports on Habitat III-related activities, including “explainers” throwing light on sometimes hard-to-grasp U.?N. procedures.
Plus, each week we’ll present commentaries by some of the world’s most prominent urban observers. We begin with a scene-setter by Eugénie Birch, chair of the World Urban Campaign, plus contributions from global strategist Aromar Revi and UN-Habitat expert Eduardo Moreno.
We encourage you to sign up for our weekly round-up of Habitat III news, at citiscope.org Please also help to energize this debate by sending referrals to colleagues and friends you think may be interested. And do let us hear your ideas for future coverage.
— Neal Peirce